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Abstract 
This thesis explains how policing has changed in Turkey between the late 1960s 
and 2012 and explores ways to explain the changes by looking at the enforcement 
anti-drug trafficking measures. Using a process tracing method, it argues that 
Turkey's formerly lax approach to drug control was gradually replaced by stronger 
enforcement, to the point that nowadays Turkey seems to see itself as a champion 
of international police cooperation. The thesis then demonstrates that this change 
can only be partially explained by theories focusing on external change drivers, 
such as the Americanization of global law enforcement or the Europeanization of 
Turkey in its bid for EU membership. It argues that change is best explained by 
analysing micro-processes of socialization within the Turkish National Police 
(TNP), which reveal the role of domestic factors unexplainable otherwise, such as 
the importance of protecting the reputation of Turkey and of the TNP among 
international partners, and the importance of personal career-oriented behaviour 
by officers of the TNP. 
 ii 
 
Acknowledgement 
I would like to give thanks to Allah for letting me achieve this success.  
I would also like to thank the Turkish Republic, particularly the Turkish National 
Police, for the opportunity to complete a PhD in the UK. I hope I can serve 
enough and appropriately to repay this privilege.  
I am immensely grateful to my parents, Sureyya and Ali Cevik, for allowing me to 
go and study in a foreign country and enduring absence of their son. I am thankful 
to my wife Elaine. I could not have managed this accomplishment without her 
support and encouragement. Her presence in my life is the biggest source of 
happiness and strength. I also want to thank to my parents in law, Jannick and 
Ivor Ryan, for their endless support. I also want to thank my daughter Aylin for 
the happiness and joy that she brought along to our life during this period. 
I am thankful to my supervisors, Sue Pryce and Wyn Rees, whose encouragement 
and supervision from the beginning to the very end enabled me to write this 
thesis. I am grateful to Veronica Blake and Gail Evans for all their help at the 
University of Nottingham.   
I also want to thank Sumru Noyan, Sevil Atasoy, Suleyman Demirel, Sadettin 
Tantan, Recep Gultekin, Celal Bodur, Cem Cehdioglu, Mustafa Pinarci, Ismail 
Ozdemir, Oguz Togal, Kaan Boke, Ertan Bese, Aylin Sekizkok, Ayda Unlu, Steve 
Bennet, Guido Beutler, Quentin de Bennetot, Charles de Winter, Mathieu Ghadiri, 
Gamal Mohamed Khair, Simeon Kostadinov, Jens Steen Mortensen, Egisto Ott, 
Giorgio Recchioni, Hossein Rajbali Tehrani, Stelios Tsiakalos, and many others 
for their time and availability, as well as their openness.  
Finally, I would like to thank all my friends and their families around us in 
Nottingham for their friendships and support, Ercan Eser, Hakan Sen, Mehmet 
Bedii Kaya, Recep Yucedogru, Nezir Akyesilmen, Ibrahim Dursun, Duran 
Akbulut, Suleyman Esil, Mustafa Goksu, Bilal Keskinsoy, Ismail Kodaz, Sarper 
Aydogan, Gurbuz Comak, Firat Guzeldag, Peter Cruttenden, Bogdan Popescu, 
Marianna Pobrezhskaya, Imad El-Anis, Natasha Danilova, Robert Lenfert, 
Aikande Kwayu, Ekaterina Kolpinskaya, Abdullah Kurtoglu, Ahmet Durangoz, 
Inanc Kamburoglu, Efsun Kizmaz, Ali Sarihan, Emrah Haspolat, Burhan 
Alveroglu, Ibrahim Duman, Fatih Burak, Huseyin Avsar, Ruike Xu, Lanshu 
Tseng and David Bell.  
Kursat Cevik 
 
 iii 
Table of Contents
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................. i
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................ iii
List of abbreviations ......................................................................................................................... v
Chapter 1: Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Problematization ......................................................................................................................... 3
1.2 Area of academic contribution .................................................................................................... 5
1.3 Method of enquiry ...................................................................................................................... 8
1.4 Sources ....................................................................................................................................... 9
1.5 Structure of the thesis ............................................................................................................... 11
Chapter 2:  Drugs in Turkey ........................................................................................................... 16
2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 16
2.2 Production of opium and opium derivatives ............................................................................. 18
2.2.1 Attempts to protect domestic opium production by defending the right to trade and export; 
and opposition to mounting regulation ...................................................................................... 18
2.2.2 The short lived US-imposed production ban and the opium licensing system ................. 22
2.2.3 Licit opium production ..................................................................................................... 26
2.2.4 Manufacture of opium derivatives, including heroin ........................................................ 29
2.3 Drug use ................................................................................................................................... 32
2.3.1 The importance of drug use as an issue in policy-making ................................................ 32
2.3.2 The reality of hard drug use in Turkey .............................................................................. 34
2.4 Trafficking ................................................................................................................................ 36
2.4.1 Level of trafficking and levels of seizures ........................................................................ 37
2.4.1.1 Opiates ...................................................................................................................... 39
2.4.1.2 Other drugs: cannabis, cocaine, synthetic drugs ....................................................... 40
2.4.1.3 Precursors and chemical substances .......................................................................... 41
2.4.2 Patterns of trafficking: narco-terrorism and organised crime ........................................... 43
2.4.2.1 Narco terrorism: PKK ............................................................................................... 43
2.4.2.2 Organised Crime ....................................................................................................... 46
2.4.2.2.1 Turkish organised crime abroad ......................................................................... 48
2.4.2.2.2 Domestic organised crime .................................................................................. 49
2.4.3 The emergence of drug trafficking as a stand-alone policy issue ..................................... 52
2.4.3.1 The impact of the Susurluk scandal: evidence of state corruption ............................ 52
2.4.3.2 The impact of Turkey’s changing security discourse ................................................ 56
2.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 60
Chapter 3: The International Drug Control Regime ....................................................................... 62
3.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 62
3.2 The emergence of the international drug control regime .......................................................... 65
3.2.1 From 1909 to 1961, from regulation to prohibition ............................................................... 65
3.2.2 The US “War on Drugs” ................................................................................................... 71
3.2.3 The 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention ..................................................................... 76
3.3 The legal framework for law enforcement cooperation in the international drug control regime
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 79
3.3.1 United Nations Conventions ............................................................................................. 79
3.3.2 Drug control at the European level ................................................................................... 82
3.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 85
Chapter 4: Literature review: the internationalization of policing .................................................. 87
4.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 87
4.2 Nature of transnational/international policing .......................................................................... 89
4.3 The emergence of new security threats and international responses in the 1980’s and 1990’s 92
4.4 Two models of international/transnational policing: North America and Europe .................... 97
4.4.1 The US model of international/transnational policing ...................................................... 98
4.4.2 The European policing model ......................................................................................... 102
4.5 Pathways for the emergence of transnational/international policing ...................................... 108
4.5.1 Technology ..................................................................................................................... 109
4.5.2 organization: the role of bureaucracies in shaping international policing ....................... 110
4.6 Anti-drugs policing within transnational/international policing ............................................. 114
 iv 
4.7 Analysing influences that shape a state’s policing ................................................................. 117
4.8 Conclusion: relevance for the study of drug enforcement in Turkey ...................................... 119
Chapter 5: Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................... 122
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 122
5.2 Regime theory and its relevance to this study ........................................................................ 123
5.3 The use of regime theory in this study .................................................................................... 126
5.4 The different approaches in regime theory ............................................................................. 130
5.4.1 Rationalist perspectives on international cooperation, compliance and norm diffusion . 130
5.4.2 Constructivist perspectives on international cooperation, compliance and norm diffusion
 ................................................................................................................................................. 136
5.5 Using the theories to challenge “dominant ideas” about Turkey’s drug enforcement ............ 142
5.5.1 Testing the Americanization hypothesis ......................................................................... 144
5.5.2 Testing the Europeanization hypothesis.......................................................................... 146
5.5.3 Testing the persuasion and performance hypothesis ....................................................... 148
Chapter 6: The influence of the US on drug law enforcement in Turkey ..................................... 151
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 151
6.2 Turkey’s interaction with states and international treaties in respect of drug control ............ 153
6.2.1 Turkey’s role in the work of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs ......... 153
6.2.2 The opium ban of 1972-1973 .......................................................................................... 155
6.2.3 After the opium ban ........................................................................................................ 158
6.3 Explaining the US influence on Turkey through the lens of Ikenberry and Kupchan ............ 162
6.3.1 Ikenberry and Kupchan’s theory of socialization and hegemonic power ....................... 162
6.3.2 Weaknesses of this theoretical approach ......................................................................... 169
6.4 Turkey’s ambivalence towards drug trafficking: the micro-process of mimicking ................ 175
6.5 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 178
Chapter 7: The influence of the EU on drug law enforcement in Turkey ..................................... 181
7.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 181
7.2 The evolution of relations between Turkey and EU and EU member states .......................... 182
7.2.1 Relations before the start of the accession process ......................................................... 182
7.2.2 Relations following Turkey’s recognition as a candidate state to the EU ....................... 187
7.2.3 The current situation between Turkey and the EU / EU member states ......................... 194
7.3 Explaining the EU's influence with theories of changes through the accession process ........ 196
7.4 Weaknesses of Europeanization theories ................................................................................ 207
7.5 Using 'social influence' to explain change .............................................................................. 214
7.6 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 218
Chapter 8: Turkey’s approach to international police cooperation ............................................... 220
8.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 220
8.2 The nature of Turkey’s engagement in international drug control ......................................... 222
8.2.1 Turkey’s participation in diplomatic forums ................................................................... 222
8.2.2 Turkey’s international activity at the strategic and operational levels ............................ 225
8.2.3 TADOC ........................................................................................................................... 232
8.3 Explaining Turkey’s attitude with a socialization micro-process analysis ............................. 237
8.3.1 Evidence of a micro-process of persuasion ..................................................................... 238
8.3.2 The re-definition of Turkey’s role in the drug regime .................................................... 242
8.3.3 Explaining Turkey’s behaviour through a logic of gaining attention and recognition .... 245
8.4 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 247
Chapter 9: Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 249
9.1 Main contributions to knowledge ........................................................................................... 249
9.2 Areas for further study ............................................................................................................ 255
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................ 259
 v 
List of abbreviations 
AFSJ:   Area of Freedom Security and Justice  
BKA;  Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Police Office of Germany) 
BNDD: Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs 
CEE:  Central and Eastern European States 
CIA:  Central Intelligence Agency 
CND:  United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
DEA:  Drug Enforcement Administration 
EC:  European Community  
EMCDDA: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
EU:  European Union  
EUROPOL: European Police Office  
FBI:  Federal Bureau of Investigation 
G7/G8: Group of 7/Group of 8 Leading Industrial States 
INCB:   International Narcotics Control Board 
INTERPOL: International Criminal Police organization  
IR:  International Relations 
JHA:  Justice and Home Affairs  
JICA:  Japanese International Cooperation Agency 
KOM:  Anti-Smuggling and Organised Crime Department of Turkish 
National Police  
LSD:  Lysergic Acid Diethylamide  
MEDA: Euro Mediterranean Partnership  
MGK:  Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council of the Republic 
of Turkey) 
MIT:  Milli Istihbarat Teúkilati (National Intelligence organization) 
NPAA: National Programmes for the Adoption of the EU Acquis 
OC:  Organised Crime 
PKK:  Kurdistan Workers Party 
REITOX: European Information Network on Drugs and Drug Addiction 
(Réseau Européen d’Information sur les Drogues et les 
Toxicomanies) 
TADOC: Turkish International Academy on Drugs and Organised Crime 
TBMM: Turkish National Grand Assembly (Turkish Parliament)  
TNP:  Turkish National Police 
 vi 
TOC:  Transnational Organised Crime  
TUBIM: Turkish Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
UN:  United Nations 
UNDCP: United Nations Drug Control Program 
UNFDAC: United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control  
UNGASS: United Nations General Assembly Session on Drugs 
UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime  
UK:  United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
USA/US: United States of America 
 
 
 
 1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Few topics attract more debate and controversy worldwide than the recreational 
use of drugs. Despite the global promise made by states at the United Nations 
(UN) in 1998, and again in 2009, to spare no effort in moving towards a “drug-
free world”, there is  no consensus on the actual harmfulness of controlled 
substances on individuals and on how best to measure harmfulness, on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of criminalizing or de-criminalizing drug use, on the 
appropriate response to drug-related crime, or even on the concept of drug 
addiction (McKeganey, 2011; Pryce, 2012; Bewley-Taylor, 2012). The issue of 
how to prevent the production of illicit drugs is also highly debated. At one end of 
the spectrum, some argue for crop fumigation despite its devastating 
environmental impact and the subsequent alienation of affected populations, while 
at the other end of the spectrum there are those who advocate negotiating with 
farmers and local figures in the hope that they will turn towards alternative crops, 
despite the fact that this is a painstakingly long and unpredictable process (Jelsma 
and Vargas, 2000; Jelsma and Kramer, 2009; McKeganey, 2011). The 
international drug control regime is deeply divided on these matters.  
Nevertheless, there does remain common ground in the international community 
on a key aspect of the drug control regime (Bewley-Taylor, 2012: 2): the 
trafficking of illicit drugs. Carried out by organised crime groups, meaning that a 
small few gain huge profits while negatively affecting many, drug trafficking is 
nowadays accepted as a challenge to global security that can “only be met if law 
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enforcement authorities are able to display the same ingenuity and innovation, 
organizational flexibility and cooperation that characterizes criminal 
organizations themselves” (UN, 1994, quoted by Woodiwiss, 2003: 383). Much of 
the infrastructure of international crime control today would not exist if the 
production, trade, use and possession of opium, cocaine and cannabis for non-
medical purposes had not been progressively criminalized, starting in 1912 with 
the International Opium Convention and culminating with the 1988 United 
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 37-46). Much of international crime 
itself would not exist were it not for this criminalization: the drugs black market is 
the unintended but obvious consequence of prohibition (McAllister, 2000: 42; 
Pryce, 2012: 93-98). Much of international policing would not resemble what it is 
today, had it not been for launching of the War on Drugs in 1971 and the rapid 
expansion of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) beyond the United 
States of America (US) in order to train foreign enforcement agencies, collect 
information about drug traffickers and even circumvent local legislation that 
might restrict their involvement in operations, thereby irritating local 
governments and forcing them into establishing better police cooperation 
(Nadelmann, 1993; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 5). In other words, the 
internationalization of policing is intimately linked to the development of 
international drug control, and international police cooperation is an integral part 
of international drug control that states do not question. 
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1.1 Problematization 
This thesis analyses how one state internationalized its policing: Turkey. It seeks 
to explain how Turkish law enforcement, and in particular the Turkish National 
Police (TNP) has been collaborating increasingly with foreign counterparts; how 
Turkish legislation has been undergoing progressive harmonization with other 
states’ legislation to allow police and prosecutors to work together more easily; 
and how Turkey has entered into bilateral and multilateral agreements with other 
states and international institutions to allow its institutions to share information 
and improve and increase their work with others. It focuses on drug enforcement 
because of its particular relevance in the global rise of international policing and 
because Turkey has a unique story within the international drug control regime.  
Drug trafficking is an issue of particular salience for Turkish law enforcement 
because the country’s geographical location places it on the most direct route 
between Afghanistan, the largest poppy producer in the world, and Western 
Europe, the largest consumption market for heroin, as well as on the route 
between Europe and the Middle East where most synthetic drugs are produced 
and consumed respectively. Moreover, it is often believed that Turkish organised 
crime groups control the drug trade in Western Europe, whether or not they 
operate from Turkish soil. Turkey is also among the world’s largest producers of 
licit poppy used for medical purposes. There is, therefore, a clear interest on the 
part of Turkish authorities to protect their export market and to ensure that the 
poppy derivatives on its territory originate from a licit source.  
Today, combating drug trafficking is a priority of Turkish law enforcement, but 
this was not always the case. For the majority of the hundred years of the 
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international drug control regime's history, Turkish authorities were either openly 
opposed to regulation of the drugs trade or indifferent to trafficking, in the sense 
that they publicly opposed it while in practice putting few resources into fighting 
it. Today, on the other hand, Turkey is a leading country in the fight drug 
trafficking. This thesis, then, is interested in how and why drug control emerged 
as a priority for Turkey, and in particular for the TNP. It is ultimately interested in 
how and why making drug control a priority has transformed Turkey into an 
advocate of international police cooperation.   
The premise on which this work is based is that the sequence of events, 
mechanisms, and cause-to-effect relationships through which the change took 
place can be uncovered, and that the subsequent behavioural pathway can be 
explained (Young, 1999). The analysis is chronological, identifying three distinct 
periods between the late 1960s and 2012. It is also thematic to the extent that it 
considers whether the observed change in behaviour has been influenced by 
Turkey’s partners, the United States and the European Union, or whether domestic 
factors have played a more significant role or whether the change has been 
produced by a combination of these factors.  
Immediately after World War II and throughout the Cold War, the United States 
and Turkey enjoyed close relations, in particular militarily. Uslu notes that in 
many respects the United States-Turkey alliance represented the perfect example 
of a relationship between a superpower and a small state, but notes that there is 
also a lot of evidence to refute the theory that Turkey fell victim to American 
influence (Uslu, 2003: 2). The United States has also been an “undisputed driving 
force of international drug control” (Bewley-Taylor, 2012: 10) as well as an 
undisputed driving force of international police cooperation in the modern era 
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(Andrea and Nadelmann, 2006: 5). At the Helsinki European Council in 
December 1999, Turkey was granted formal candidacy status in its application to 
join the EU.  From this moment on, the concept of 'Europeanization' and 
surrounding debates have almost automatically been employed to assess the 
relationship between Turkey and different aspects of European integration (Alpan, 
2010). The latter involves a multitude of treaties and other arrangements to 
facilitate law enforcement cooperation, in particular in the area of drug control 
(Occhipinti, 2003; Elvins, 2003). This thesis will argue that Turkey’s relationships 
with both the United States and the European Union (EU) have played a role in 
the transformation of the TNP, and in behavioural change in respect of combating 
illicit drug trafficking; but not a sufficient enough role to conclude that Turkey 
has been pressured into updating its approach to drug control by one or the other. 
Other explanatory factors also have to be taken into account. It is argued that 
reputational concerns and pragmatic, career-oriented decisions by police officers 
at the TNP’s Anti-Smuggling and Organised Crime Department (Kacakcilik ve 
Organize Suclarla Mucadele Daire Baskanligi, KOM) are also crucial to explain 
the change. 
1.2 Area of academic contribution 
While the subject matter of this thesis is located within the discipline of 
International Relations, its two main research focuses, policing and drug control, 
are also of interest to scholars in criminology, sociology, and international law. 
Academic research on the internationalization of policing is growing, but the field 
is still relatively new and much remains to be understood about transfer processes 
of policy and practice between law enforcement agencies (Goldsmith and 
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Sheptycki, 2007: 394). Most existing research focuses either on the United States 
and Western Europe (Nadelmann, 1993; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006; Lemieux 
ed., 2010; Marenin, 1999), or on international policing in the context of peace-
keeping (Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2007), and it is generally undertaken within 
the fields of criminology (Lemieux, 2010) rather than International Relations. To 
the best of the author’s knowledge there are no studies available on the political 
science or International Relations dimensions of Turkey’s law enforcement, and 
this thesis seeks to contribute to that research agenda. Studies on drug control in 
Turkey are also few. Robins looked at drugs in general, both supply and demand 
(Robins, 2008 and 2009); Spain focused on a specific event, the ban of opium 
production between 1972 and 1974 (Spain, 1975); and Mansfield and Kamminga 
focused on Turkey’s licensing system (Mansfield, 2001; Kamminga, 2011). There 
is, therefore, a gap in existing academic knowledge between studies of 
international policing worldwide, of which a number have attempted to make 
general conceptualisation of the phenomenon (Deflem, 2002a and 2002b; Andreas 
and Nadelmann, 2006; Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2007) and case-specific 
knowledge about Turkish policing. This thesis seeks to make the link between the 
two.  
This thesis also borrows from a body of International Relations theory, namely 
regime theory, in order to better interpret the transformative process observed in 
Turkey. This choice is guided by two observations. Firstly, regime theory has not 
developed within a single research tradition or paradigm but rather across 
neorealist, neoliberal and constructivist approaches (Hasenclever, Mayer and 
Rittberger, 1996). Analytic eclecticism (in the sense defined by Sil and 
Katzenstein) thus appears as a possible way to proceed as it offers numerous 
 7 
 
theoretical tools available that seem applicable to this case study (Sil and 
Katzenstein, 2010). This thesis chooses to consider multiple perspectives on the 
case study in order to achieve a finer and richer explanation of the process 
studied, rather than filter the empirical evidence through one paradigm, with the 
resultant need to justify the choice of paradigm. The second observation is that 
such analytic eclecticism was used by Andreas and Nadelmann in their study of 
the internationalization of crime control (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 4-13) 
and by Bewley-Taylor in his study of the international drug control regime 
(Bewley-Taylor, 2012: 19), thus this thesis places itself in this same line of 
research. 
This thesis will demonstrate that Schimmelfenning’s contention that “eclecticism 
is the unintended result of research that seeks to explain specific events as well as 
possible” (quoted in Sil and Katzenstein, 2010: 191) applies to this case. 
Eclecticism, in this thesis, makes it possible to ask whether explanatory 
frameworks that are commonly used in the academic field of International 
Relations, namely the US influence on other states policy change and the impact 
of EU accession on policy change, tend to be filters that the research community 
frequently apply, but which frame explanations too narrowly. Specifically, this 
thesis will show that crafting an explanation of the internationalization of 
Turkey’s law enforcement around either US or EU influence is possible, but is not 
convincing. Rationalist theoretical frameworks that are normally best suited to 
evaluating external influence on a state’s policy change overlook crucial factors. 
The best way to understand the processes that transformed Turkey’s law 
enforcement is to focus on micro-socialization processes, events and changes that 
 8 
 
took place at the level of agents of the TNP, and which ultimately impacted on the 
state’s policy and practice. 
1.3 Method of enquiry 
This thesis postulates that there exists a causal chain, a specific sequence of steps 
to explain how and why Turkey’s approach to drug control changed radically in 
the space of forty years. In order to uncover the various elements of this causal 
chain and explain how they are linked, process-tracing is used (George and 
Bennett, 2006: 206). In particular, the empirical analysis relies on “theory-
oriented systematic process analysis” (Hall, 2003 and 2008), which is a refined 
version of process-tracing in which various sets of theories of causal explanations 
are used in the research design in order to go beyond a simple historical analysis.   
The analysis will consist of a range of observations made, as diversely as 
possible, that seek to explain “the outcomes of interest by going back in time and 
identifying the key events, processes, or decisions that link the hypothesized 
cause or causes with the outcomes” (Faletti, 2006: 5). This should involve looking 
for elements such as: the unfolding of situations; actions and events; traces of 
motivations (or other lower level mechanisms); evidence of (complex) 
interactions between causal factors and/or information about restricting/catalyzing 
contexts/conditions; and detailed features of a specific outcome. (Blatter and 
Blume, 2008: 319). According to Hall, theory-oriented systematic process 
analysis:   
“construes the task of explanation as one of elucidating and testing a theory that identifies 
the main determinants of a broad class of outcomes and attaches special importance to 
specifying the mechanisms whereby those determinants bear on the outcome. [...] The 
object is not to provide a complete explanation for why one outcome occurs at a 
particular time and place, but to identify the most important elements in the causal chain 
generating this class of outcomes. [...] This approach attaches less value to securing 
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precise parameter estimates for a few key variables seen as the ‘ultimate causes’ of the 
outcome and more value to identifying regularities in the causal chain through which the 
relevant outcome is generated” (Hall, 2008: 306).  
Two additional parameters have been decisive in the choice of this method of 
enquiry: the existing state of the available literature and the existing set of 
theories. Firstly, in the absence of a sufficiently developed literature, a wide 
variety of observations of a different nature needs to be collected and analysed. 
Process-tracing allows for this kind of work because it is: 
 “analogous to detective work, legal briefs, journalism, and traditional historical accounts. 
The analyst seeks to make sense of a collection of observations and disparate pieces of 
evidence that are often non-comparable, but where each element sheds light on a single 
outcome or set of related outcomes (Gerring, 2007: 178-9).  
Secondly, as noted above, regime theory offers a broad set of causal explanations 
which can be tested in this case, with a view to refining them. The aim of this 
thesis is not to develop a new theory, but to document the temporal unfolding of 
events and explain it with the help of existing theoretical tools (Blatter and 
Blume, 2008b: 33). This case study focuses on what various theories can help to 
explain best, and does not rule out the possibility that different paradigms may 
explain different aspects of the case. Thus, it does not seek to use the observations 
collected in order to assess which theory best explains the case throughout. It also 
shows that it is useful to challenge dominant ideas in International Relations, 
which have created generalizations and expectations that are not necessarily 
supported by closer analysis.  
1.4 Sources 
The empirical analysis in this thesis (Chapters Six, Seven and Eight) relies mainly 
on semi-structured interviews carried out in person in Ankara and Istanbul; and by 
phone between January 2011 and April 2012. Most interviews took place during 
two trips to Turkey in January-February 2011 and April-May 2011, while the rest 
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was arranged at the convenience of interviewees. They were carried out with 
former senior Turkish officials: the former Prime Minister and President 
Süleyman Demirel, the former Minister of Interior Sadettin Tatan, the former 
ambassador and former Deputy Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) Sumru Noyan, and Sevil Atasoy, a former member of the 
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). Interviews were also carried out 
with foreign police liaison officers based in Turkey and the Turkish police liaison 
officer in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK). 
Finally, interviews were carried out with senior and middle-ranking officers of the 
TNP and middle-ranking officers of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 
total, 39 interviews were recorded and in some cases informal follow-up 
discussions also took place. Informal contacts by phone and e-mail were also 
made with staff at the UNODC and at the EU Enlargement Directorate General. 
While the interviewees agreed to be identified, some requests for anonymity were 
made with respect to parts of their comments, therefore quotes in the analysis are 
attributed unless the interviewees specifically requested otherwise. Whenever 
possible, interviews were carried out in English. When interviews took place in 
Turkish, they were translated by the author. Most interviews were conducted 
following a common guide of questions prepared ahead of the field visits, and 
which constituted an inventory of the themes explored in the case study. 
Conducting semi-structured interviews allowed interviewees to elaborate on their 
personal experiences on the issues they were most familiar with, and this helped 
bringing out some elements which had not been foreseen prior to conducting the 
interviews (Bryman, 2008: 437-439).   
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Official documentation was sourced from the websites of the TNP, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of EU Affairs, the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly, the UNODC, the UN archives, and the EU. Additional published and 
unpublished documentation was also obtained from the TNP. Most of these 
documents are available in English and in Turkish while both versions were used 
during the research, English versions are referenced whenever possible. Access 
was requested to the official archives of records of Turkish views at international 
conferences, in particular the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
(CND). While this was permitted in theory, none were made available in practice.  
The theoretical and contextual sections of the thesis (Chapters Two to Five) are 
informed mainly by academic literature available in English, as well as by reports 
of independent think tanks, and by media articles in the Turkish press in both 
Turkish and in English.   
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter Two begins with a review of the drug issue in Turkey, focussing on the 
production, use and trafficking of drugs. The analysis reveals that since Turkey 
adopted its current poppy cultivation licensing system these three dimensions 
have evolved on separate paths. Three periods distinguish themselves: before, 
between and after key two dates, 1996 and 2005. In 1996 the Turkish National 
Security Council (MGK) included drugs in its list of threats to national security. 
Meanwhile, the Turkish state apparatus entered a period of reforms triggered by a 
series of corruption scandals. In 2005, the TNP gained full control over the 
Turkish International Academy on Drugs and Organised Crime (TADOC), a UN-
sanctioned international academy that had been run by the UNODC and the TNP 
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since its creation five years earlier. The year 2005 is also an important date in the 
EU-Turkey relations: formal accession negotiations were opened that year and 
quickly frozen because of Turkey’s policy on Cyprus, thus marking a slowing 
down of Turkey’s EU integration. This chapter provides the general background 
of the case study tracing the context of drug control in Turkey. It highlights facts 
and events that are analysed in detail in later chapters using the process-tracing 
method.  
Chapter Three explores the development of the international drug control regime.1 
The present system for international drug control was established with the core 
objective of preventing the production, trade, supply and use of narcotic and 
psychotropic substances for recreational purposes. It promotes a penal and 
prohibition-oriented approach to all aspects of the drug issue, and in order to 
operationalize their commitments states are expected to engage in police and 
judicial cooperation to apprehend and prosecute traffickers. This chapter clarifies 
                                                 
1 This thesis uses the term “international drug control regime”. It recognises that some authors 
adopt other terms, for example “global drug prohibition regime” (Bewley-Taylor: 2012). 
Nevertheless “international drug control regime” is preferred here, though the prohibitive nature of 
the regime is acknowledged throughout the thesis. This thesis does not discuss the adequacy, or 
lack thereof, of the regime's norms in tackling the problem of drug use in the way that authors who 
emphasize that aspect do (Nadelmann, 1988 and 2003; Woodiwiss and Bewley-Taylor, 2005; 
Bewley-Taylor, 2012, Pryce, 2012). Moreover, the thesis refers mainly to drug control, drug 
enforcement and drug control policy. These appellations refer only to supply reduction policies, in 
particular anti-trafficking. This needs to be distinguished from the term 'drug policy', which is 
common in academic literature. Whilst 'drug policy' should cover both supply and demand aspects 
of drug policy, it is used mainly to refer to policies concerning drug use, drug users, addiction and 
treatment. 
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the crucial role played by police cooperation in the operation of the international 
drug control regime. It also highlights the extent to which the United States was 
central to the development of the international drug control regime into its current 
prohibitionist form. Existing academic literature argues that states remain under 
the sway of the United States on drug-related issues. This provides the contours 
for the first hypothesis tested in this thesis, according to which US influence 
determined changes in Turkish drug control enforcement.   
Chapter Four reviews the existing academic literature on international policing. It 
explains how drug trafficking became a greater priority following the end of the 
Cold War, rising to the level of 'national security threat’ first in the United States 
and subsequently in Europe, and analyses the American and European 
international policing models. The chapter also takes stock of current debates on 
the nature of international policing and its transformation, thereby identifying the 
components and processes of international policing that will need to be explored 
in the case study. This literature review delineates the three hypotheses that will 
tested in the case-study of Turkey: firstly, that Turkish law enforcement changed 
under the influence of the United States; secondly, that it changed under the 
influence of Turkey’s accession to the European Union, and thirdly, that it 
changed as a result of domestic factors.   
Chapter Five explains the theoretical framework that underpins the empirical 
analysis in the following chapters. The chapter explains how regime theory 
emerged as a field of International Relations seeking to explain increased levels of 
cooperation between states on a growing number of issues and clarifies how the 
different traditions of neo-realism, neoliberalism and constructivism developed in 
parallel within regime theory and theoretical frameworks were proposed in each 
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research tradition. The chapter thus describes how various theoretical frameworks 
will be explored and challenged in the empirical analysis. 
Chapter Six argues that the United States been a source of transformation for 
Turkey’s drug control policies between the late 1960s until 1996, albeit a limited 
one. The role of the hegemonic USA and its relationship to Turkey is assessed. It 
points out that utilizing this explanatory framework leaves a wealth of evidence 
unexplained. The chapter then proposes to carry the analysis at the level of 
socialization microprocesses, and argues that during this period Turkey’s 
approach to drug control is best explained as a process of mimicking more 
influential powers within the international drug regime. 
Chapter Seven examines the influence of the EU accession process in the 
transformation of Turkey’s drug control between 1996 and 2005. Despite the fact 
that the EU integration has resulted in the development of a large panel of 
international policing practices, it is argued that the rapid transformation of the 
TNP over that period cannot be fully accounted for by the EU accession process. 
The chapter then proposes that a microprocess of social influence is more suited 
to explaining how the pragmatic career-oriented decisions of a number of people 
working at KOM proved decisive in the transformation of Turkey’s approach to 
drug control.  
Chapter Eight looks at how the TNP has been working to develop its offer of 
international capacity building in Central Asia and the Middle East, as well as 
South East Asia and Africa. It is argued that Turkey’s behaviour is characterized 
by persuasion of the validity of the norms and values of the international drug 
regime on the one hand, while on the other there are indications that the TNP is 
attempting to capitalise on its good reputation among law enforcement agencies to 
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promote Turkey as a leading actor on security matters beyond the issue of drug 
control.  
The conclusion appraises the outcomes of this thesis, identifying case-specific 
results and elements that can be generalised beyond the study of Turkish law 
enforcement. The thesis sought to explain the specificities of the transformation of 
Turkish law enforcement, and it successfully demonstrated that the personal 
interests of agents and the bureaucratic interests of the TNP were the drivers of 
Turkey’s law enforcement internationalization, while processes of 
Americanization and Europeanization carried much less weight. It then argues 
that the academic field of International Relations must challenge dominant ideas 
such as Americanization and Europeanization in most policymaking processes in 
other states, and advocates the use of research designs that combine research 
traditions rather than remaining within a single one.  
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Chapter 2:  Drugs in Turkey 
2.1 Introduction 
Ottoman Turkey was the only state to decline an invitation to the first 
international conference on drugs, convened in Shanghai in February 1909 
following great effort from the United States. Despite three years of intense 
diplomatic work between 1906 and 1909 by the US State Department to convince 
Great Britain, France, Japan, Germany, Russia, Portugal, Austria-Hungary, China 
and Siam (Thailand) and Persia to attend – on the basis that all the major 
producing, manufacturing and consuming states should all be represented – it may 
seem rather unusual, in retrospect, that the Ottomans alone did not agree to 
participate in the first ever intergovernmental meeting to discuss opium trade (Mc 
Allister, 2000: 28).  
One hundred years later, the picture is entirely different: the Turkish Republic is 
completing its second two-year National Action Plan – which incorporated both 
supply reduction and demand reduction – as a result of a ‘twinning’ capacity 
building project with the EU. Since 2006 it has seized more heroin in its territory 
than all EU member states combined, and it boasts the second highest seizure rate 
worldwide (KOM, 2008; the UNODC, 2009). Its first national drug strategy was 
implemented between 2006 and 2012. At the time of writing a second National 
Drug Strategy Document (covering 2013 until 2019) is due to for imminent 
publication.   
During that century drugs have never been far from the [centre of the] political 
agenda in Turkey. Maintaining the livelihoods of Anatolian opium farmers was an 
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important issue in elections in the early 1970s (Robins, 2007). In 1996 a fatal road 
traffic accident claimed the lives of a member of parliament, a notorious drug 
smuggler and a senior police chief, leading to the resignation of the Prime 
Minister (Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz, 2007; Robins, 2008). The drugs issue has also 
been important at the international level; in 1971 the United States threatened to 
reduce its funding to Turkey (which amounted to approximately US$180 million 
per anum in food aid and military grants) in order to coerce Turkey into banning 
opium production (Kamminga, 2006). At the CND in 2009, the Turkish 
representative said that Turkey would “do its share (...) to realize the balanced 
objectives set forth both in the Political Declaration and the Action Plan” that had 
been adopted by the UN General Assembly during its Special Session on Drugs in 
1998 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009).  
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the characteristics of debates on drugs 
in Turkey; or, more precisely, to determine the nature of drug issues, since it is a 
country in which drugs both licit and illicit are produced, manufactured, 
transported and used. The chapter examines different aspects of the production, 
use and trafficking of drugs, utilizing a historical approach to introduce the key 
elements of the current situation with a view to understanding how control over 
each of these aspects has developed in Turkey. It consists of a review and analysis 
of academic literature, official documents and reports prepared by the UN, the 
European Police Office (EUROPOL) and the TNP. The first section addresses 
opium production in Turkey throughout the twentieth century, both before and 
after its regulation by international agreements. The second section turns to 
address the issue of drug use in Turkey. The third section focusses on drug 
trafficking and – as this thesis is focused on efforts to fight drug trafficking – it 
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enters into greater details than the first two – analysing seizure rates and 
trafficking patterns in recent years; the involvement of Turkish organised crime in 
trafficking; and the emergence of drug trafficking as a policy issue for the Turkish 
authorities. This chapter is intended to provide a narrative framing the evolution 
of the drug question in Turkey, highlighting and explaining the background to key 
factors and events. This presentation of the narrative is important in order to apply 
the process-tracing method in following chapters, where these key factors and 
events are analysed against theoretical inputs and the extent to which various 
theoretical mechanisms can explain the case are assessed.  
2.2 Production of opium and opium derivatives 
This section analyses the evolution of opium production in Turkey. It seeks to 
explain how Turkish authorities have responded to the development of 
international norms curtailing opium production, and to show how in the early 
1970s they responded to US pressure to follow the example of Iran set by 1955 
and ban opium production.  
2.2.1 Attempts to protect domestic opium production by defending the right 
to trade and export; and opposition to mounting regulation 
It is believed that both opium and cannabis were cultivated in Anatolia by ancient 
civilisations, with poppy products used for food and medicine. Poppy cultivation 
was much more widespread than cannabis and became an integral part of peasant 
tradition. During the Ottoman Empire – which lasted from the fourteenth century 
until 1923 – it was an essential part of rural culture. There are records of 
consumption of Anatolian opium for recreational use between the sixteenth and 
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nineteenth centuries, and of various decrees by Sultans prohibiting the practice. 
Poppy and opium spread as a commodity of economic and geopolitical value 
under the Ottomans, but Evered mentions that “[c]enturies before the eleventh-
century arrival of Turkic peoples in Anatolia, poppies figured into both the 
ecologies of local communities and the region’s networks of trade.” (Evered 
2008: 297) During the nineteenth century, the Ottomans attempted to break into 
the Chinese opium market with the help of US merchants who exported Anatolian 
opium, although this was without great success as the majority of the opium 
consumed in China originated from India, which was then under British rule 
(UNODC, 2008: 20-1, Evered, 2008: 299).  
The beginning of the twentieth century saw a number of states take disparate 
interests in opium production and distribution. Whilst the Chinese authorities 
attempted to curb opium addiction, the British authorities sought to ensure that the 
British East India Company kept a strong hold over the lucrative Chinese opium 
market. The German and Dutch authorities, meanwhile, sought to ensure a 
constant supply of cheap raw material for their burgeoning pharmaceutical 
companies. The US authorities attempted not only to address drug addiction, 
which was associated with vice in political circles influenced by prohibitionists, 
but also to open Chinese markets to American industrial production. The 
influence of these factors on the emergence of the first international drug treaties 
will be addressed in Chapter Three. 
Given its dependence on the high value opium trade, the Ottoman Empire's 
economy was inevitably to be affected by these early negotiations on control 
measures for drug manufacture and trade. At the time of the Shanghai conference, 
the Ottoman Empire was the world's fourth largest producer of opium, producing 
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between 320 and 380 metric tonnes in a typical year, according to estimates 
presented at the conference (although this is still far behind China which 
produced around 35,000 metric tonnes in 1906) and it is likely that other nations 
wanted to ensure that the Ottomans did not retain the influence they had been 
enjoying. The British authorities in India, for example, justified their continuing 
export of Bengal-originated opium into China, which had officially banned it in 
the nineteenth century, by arguing that Persia or Ottoman Turkey would be able 
fill the gap on the Chinese market if India left (UNODC, 2008: 33).  Nevertheless, 
the good reputation of the Anatolian opium, which was highly concentrated in 
morphine, was well known, and it was in mainly exported to the United States 
and Europe.  
In the light of the above it may seem odd that the Ottoman authorities refused to 
participate in the Shanghai Conference and in the negotiations of the first 
international treaty, the 1912 Hague Opium Convention, which sought to regulate 
the trade of narcotics that were not designed for medical use. McAllister argues 
that the agenda of the first conferences, which focused on ways to curb 
recreational drug use because of the impacts of addiction on individual behaviour, 
while maintaining sufficient supplies for expanding European and American 
pharmaceutical industries, restricted discussion on measures to control the supply 
of drugs. Chapter Three will examine in further detail how the belief that reducing 
the availability of recreational drugs was the best way to eliminate demand 
became intertwined with economic considerations designed to protect 
pharmaceutical industries in the negotiations of international drug conventions. 
For now, it is important to note that, in this context, it was clear that the newly 
established regulation would be disproportionately detrimental to producing states 
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(McAllister, 2000: 32-3). It is likely that the Ottomans had no intention to agree 
to such plans and refused to attend. Evered, however, offers a different 
explanation for their refusal: he argues that throughout the nineteenth century, the 
Ottomans had attempted create a state-run control system for the purchase of 
opium from producers and its trade. Although not completely effective, the 
system included the imposition of taxes, which became a much needed source of 
revenue for the Ottoman state, and later on, the Turkish Republic. Any 
international regulation of production and trade would have entailed a reduction 
in the revenue that could be expected from these taxes, thus causing Ottomans to 
reject the idea of international regulation (Evered, 2008: 301).  
However all parties who signed the Versailles Treaty at the end of World War 
One were bound to adhere to the Hague Opium Convention. Thus, the newly 
created Turkish Republic automatically joined the convention. Thereafter, Turkey 
participated in the negotiations of the 1925 International Opium Convention, 
which also concentrated on controlling the trade in narcotics; and in negotiations 
for the 1931 Convention, which sought to limit narcotics manufacture to pre-
estimated medicinal and scientific purposes. In both instances, Turkey refused to 
sign the conventions at the time of their adoption but did so later.  
According to Robins, once it had ratified the International Opium Convention in 
1933, Turkey: 
“would remain an active participant in the ad hoc international efforts to create a 
standardized international control regime. Though [it] had fought a rear-guard action 
against the expansion of regulatory proscription policies, it had respected the provision of 
international convention-building once formally adopted.” (Robins, 2008: 632).  
However, the major change from the first years of the century was that by then 
Turkey had developed manufacturing capacities and the majority of manufactured 
drugs were being directed to the illicit market (McAllister, 2000: 92). Arguably, 
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Turkey held a strong bargaining position [internationally] because the high value 
of its morphine-rich opium for medicinal purposes attracted licit buyers who 
wanted to maintain low prices, and because its manufacturing capacities meant 
that it could disrupt efforts to lower illicit production. States advocating tight 
control of narcotics supplies needed to consider Turkey as a key actor if they 
wanted efforts to curb the diversion of production into the illicit market to be 
effective. 
2.2.2 The short lived US-imposed production ban and the opium licensing 
system 
In 1958 Turkey adopted a licensing system organised around a unique state 
controlled agency, which purchased all domestically produced opium before 
selling in on to foreign buyers. According to the 1961 Single Convention, Turkey 
was accepted as a ‘traditional opium producer’, which excluded it from the 
obligation of requesting permission from the UN Economic Social and Economic 
Council to export its opium production. The convention also contained a 
provision seeking to regulate international opium production by compelling states 
to limit production to licensed farmers, thus requiring stricter licensing than the 
system implemented in 1958. It is likely that Turkish authorities were reluctant to 
implement this latter measure as it was bound to displease farmers. Indeed, 
Turkey signed the 1961 Convention shortly after its conclusion, but it took until 
1967 for the ratification to be finalised. Thus, while the signature represented a 
show of good-will towards the international community, the slow pace of the 
ratification is indicative of a lack of will to implement its requirements. 
Moreover, as a result of its export privileges, Turkey did not have incentives to 
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enforce the farmers' licensing provision strictly for its opium to be authorized for 
sale to other states. By delaying the implementation of this licensing system, the 
Turkish authorities took the risk that Turkish produced opium may reach the illicit 
market fairly easily.  
In practice, this meant that surplus production was indeed directed to the illicit 
market. It was then turned into morphine, usually in Lebanon, and refined in the 
south of France by criminal groups known as the “French Connection”, which 
exported it to places of consumption – including the United States (Robins, 2007: 
21). By the end of the 1960s, this situation caused a diplomatic crisis between 
Turkey and the United States (Uslu, 2003). The US authorities were faced with a 
‘heroin epidemic’ in New York at the end of the 1960s, in part as a result of 
heroin abuse by American soldiers returning from Vietnam (McCoy, 2003; 
Kuzmarov, 2009). They pressured Turkey into banning its opium production 
completely (Musto, 1999: 248; McCoy, 2003). Robins and McAllister explain 
that the United States, where the “War on Drugs” had recently been launched by 
the Nixon administration, exaggerated the importance of Turkish opium in the 
overall illicit supply, for example by claiming that 80% of the heroin on the 
streets of New York had a Turkish connection (McAllister, 2000: 166; Robins, 
2007; Robins, 2008). Chapter Six will explore further the opium ban crisis and its 
impact on relations between Turkey and the United States, and explain that 
domestic political concerns dominated the US decision to get Turkey to introduce 
the ban (Nadelmann, 1990; Bertram et al, 1996; Woodiwiss, 2001; McCoy, 2003; 
Friesendorf, 2006). The increasing problems of heroin addiction in New York 
City were intensively reported in the US media and national politicians were 
eager to see government action (Erhan, 1996). In this context, the government 
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was eager to show actions and results at the time of the approaching mid-term 
elections (McCoy, 2003). 
At the time, an estimated 70,000 families in Turkey depended on opium 
cultivation and the issue was highly politicised, leading the Turkish government 
to postpone phasing out the cultivation until 1972. Moreover, it had become 
evident that no other crop would be as profitable as opium to the farmers and to 
the state, and that in any case it would take several years for new crops to be 
make returns on any investment (Spain, 1975: 298). Nevertheless, a change in 
power following the military coup in 1971 reversed the situation. In June 1971 the 
new government agreed, in return for an aid package of US$35 million and a 
promise that the United States would support Turkey’s loans and assistance 
request from intergovernmental institutions, to enact measures to prohibit all 
planting, cultivation and production of the opium poppy after 1972; to purchase 
the entire crop planted in the autumn of 1971; and to pass legislation that would 
prohibit all future poppy farming after June 1972.  
The eradication plan was a US-led initiative which improved US-Turkey relations 
and proved sufficient to reassure American political authorities. Despite Turkish 
authorities resisting American pressure to criminalise the cultivation of poppies 
altogether, the ban remained highly unpopular domestically (Kamminga, 2006; 
Evered 2008). This facilitated the later re-introduction of poppy cultivation. 
Indeed, the cultivation ban lead to a global shortage of opium for medical 
purposes and a rapid price increase on the licit market. Knowledge of this fact 
tamed US protestations when in 1973 the newly elected Turkish government 
declared its intention to remove the ban. Not only did cultivation effectively 
resume in September 1974, just two years after the implementation of the ban, , 
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but Turkey also received substantial support from the United States and the UN to 
develop its licit opium manufacturing capacities. Turkish-US relations also 
significantly improved (Robins, 2007). 
Today, Turkey’s licensing system is often considered as an example of best 
practice with regards to how licensing can effectively reduce illicit production 
(Kamminga, 2011). Robins suggests that it has led Turkey to place significantly 
greater importance to implementing its international obligations related to drugs 
than it has given to international obligations related to other forms of organised 
crimes. He also argues that from this point onwards, much more importance has 
been given to the law enforcement than to other aspects of the drugs issue 
(Robins, 2007 and 2008). 
On the other hand, the unpopularity of the ban amongst rural populations, the fact 
that it was implemented by a military-led government and the perception that it 
was an act of imperial pressure from the United States also meant that it was 
contentious issue at the level of domestic politics. Furthermore, Evered claims 
that politicians used the issue to return to power after the military coup:  he argues 
that for “many in rural, agrarian Turkey, the return of poppies was symbolic – if 
not tangible proof – of the republic’s return to democracy” (Evered, 2008: 303). 
Arguably, the importance of maintaining opium production in order to win the 
votes of affected farmers is likely have been an incentive for the authorities to 
establish an effective licensing system. 
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2.2.3 Licit opium production 
In the early nineteenth century the Ottomans first attempted to control opium 
production so that they could tax it (Poroy, 1981: 191). They designed the basis of 
a system through which producers could only sell their production to buyers of a 
state-run agency. This system was intended to allow the state to fix the price of 
purchase from producers and to centralise the trade; as well as to establish a tax 
on production. Evered explains that opium remained a central source of revenue 
for the state until regime change in 1923. In practice, however, the effectiveness 
of the system was limited by the fact that the Ottoman authorities had limited 
resources and could not always buy all the opium as soon as it had been 
harvested. This was further limited by the 1838 Balta Liman Treaty between the 
Ottoman Empire and the UK, through which the Ottomans agreed to dismantle 
monopolies in exchange for British help to restore their territorial integrity in 
Syria.  
The first narcotics control law was passed in 1928. It attempted to regulate all 
aspects of production and sale, under the supervision of the Ministry of Health 
and Social Services. Given the extent of debts that the Turkish Republic had 
inherited from the Ottoman regime, it is likely that there was little available for 
the state to invest either in modernizing and intensifying the production, or in 
controlling it effectively. Therefore, even if the revenue generated by opium 
production was highly valued, much of it still entered the illicit market easily. In 
1958, Turkey adopted its first opium growing licensing system and placed the 
production and the exportation of opium under government responsibility (Uslu, 
2003: 220). Evered argues that up until the 1970s, Turkish authorities were, on 
various occasions, pressed to quickly tighten control over opium production 
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because drug abuse and the perceived increasing incidence of drug-related crimes 
in Istanbul and other urban areas was attracting media and popular attention. 
These were, he argues, significant internal factors that influenced political 
decisions. Measures were taken to reduce the number of regions in which poppy 
could be grown. By 1970cultivation was allowed only in six provinces, as 
opposed to Ottoman times, when it was found throughout Anatolia, notably in the 
South East, where cultivation was more productive than in others where it was 
retained.  
The resumption of cultivation in 1974 was accompanied by a change in the 
production of opium, as discussed above. Instead of collecting the opium paste 
from poppy capsules by incising them early in their development so the paste can 
drip out, licensed farmers had to harvest the entire plant without incision and then 
separate the seeds from the capsules (they would keep the seeds for other use). 
Thereafter, emptied capsules were sold to a state-run agency for trade to 
pharmaceutical companies either in Turkey or abroad, and they would 
manufacture a product called “poppy straw”. This technique is thought to ease the 
control and policing over the production and traffic because capsules that are 
incised at some point of their growth turn into a different colour than those left 
unopened. Today, Turkey is the largest world producer of poppy straw (see figure 
1). The national poppy processing factory produces 75 tons of morphine each 
year, 95% of which is exported for an estimated yearly income of US$160 million 
(Kamminga, 2006; 4). Turkey’s licensing model is widely recognised as 
successful in preventing the diversion of the product into the illicit market. It is 
worth noting, however, that poppy production is undertaken by small-holder 
farmers – it is largely traditional and small scale. Plots for cultivation are 
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stipulated by state officials on a yearly basis, and state orders rotate plots among 
the farms. On average, licensed farmers cultivate 0.4 hectare of poppy per 100 
hectares (Mansfield; 2001:6). As a result, the activity does not provide farmers 
with revenues significantly higher than other crops. Yet poppy is believed to be 
valued by farmers as part of their cultural heritage (Evered, 2008; 305-6).  
The costs of the transition from loosely regulated raw opium to controlled poppy 
straw cultivation were borne by the US government and the UN (Mansfield 2001, 
33). According to Mansfield, the fact that Turkey was a key supplier of the licit 
opium market made it easier for the country to receive assistance, and the price 
increase on the international licit market caused by the few months of ban is 
likely to have strengthened its position. In 1981, the United States put in place the 
so-called ‘80/20 rule’, aimed at limiting the number of countries involved in licit 
opium trade, while guaranteeing that US medical needs were met at a reasonable 
price. This stipulated that “at least 80% of licit opium imported into the United 
States must come from India and Turkey and not more than 20% from Australia, 
Hungary, Poland, France and the former Yugoslavia” (Mansfield, 2001: 8). It 
appears, therefore, that the need for cheap and stable opiates for medical purposes 
has been a real incentive from the international level for Turkish opium licensing 
system to operate effectively.  
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Figure 1: reported harvest for licit poppy straw used for the manufacture of 
heroin, 1964-2006.(Source: the UNODC, 2009; collected from INCB official 
data.) 
2.2.4 Manufacture of opium derivatives, including heroin  
The 1923 Lausanne Treaty signed by the newly created Republic of Turkey; the 
UK; France; Japan; the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; Greece; and Italy 
required that Turkey pay the debts of the Ottoman Empire almost in full. This 
created a major burden on the state’s finances and the government became eager 
to develop its exports in order to improve its balance of payments. Moreover, a 
customs agreement between the parties to the Lausanne Treaty put greater 
pressure on the balance of trade, because it forced the government to keep taxes 
on imported goods low until 1929, with the result that Turkish business groups 
expecting tax increases after this date were eager to import as much as possible. 
Eventually, the 1929 financial crisis and the general economic slowdown of the 
1930s caused a reduction of exports while imports continued to rise. In these 
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circumstances, the government facilitated the opening of heroin producing 
factories in Istanbul with the help of Japanese investors (Erdinç, 2004: 54-57). 
The laws on opiates in Turkey at the time actually facilitated the establishment of 
these factories. Three opened between 1926 and 1929 and together they could 
produce monthly as much as ten tons of morphine and other alkaloids, including 
heroin. They were highly profitable and the Turkish state benefited greatly 
through the taxes on exports.  
Turkey was not a signatory to the 1925 International Opium Convention, which 
attempted to regulate the trade of opium. This created a gap that weakened the 
effectiveness of the international control regime. As a result, opium 
transformation factories that had been operating in Western Europe, in particular 
France, moved to Turkey and heroin could then be sold and exported back to 
these states (Block, 1989: 328). Moreover the 1926 Turkish Penal Code also had 
loopholes when it came to narcotics. It prohibited the production, import, sale, 
possession or export of “recreational substances”, with punishments including 
prison sentences and fines, but it did not stipulate what “recreational substances” 
were. Moreover, in 1930 heroin was included as a medical drug in the first 
Turkish codex (the official list of medicines allowed in Turkey), even though it 
had been banned for several years in other countries. This actually permitted the 
licit production of heroin.  
Erdinc argues that Turkish authorities were actively promoting the trade of 
heroin, both licit and illicit throughout this period for two main reasons (Erdinç, 
2004: 54-57). The first is that it provided a much needed income to the state, as 
explained above. The second is that members of the Turkish political elite had 
invested in these factories so they wanted to secure their personal gain. Finally, 
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the opium factories in Istanbul functioned with Western investors who were 
directly involved in the illicit market. For example, one factory was controlled by 
a French manufacturing company and it was well known to police authorities of 
various states that much of what was coming out of the Istanbul-based factories 
was actually falling straight into the illicit market, reaching Europe mainly via 
Egypt, as well as Lebanon. (Blok, 1989: 326-328). In 1933, police forces from the 
UK, the United States, the Netherlands and Germany collaborated to arrest a 
Greek citizen, and it is believed that he revealed the existence of an elaborate 
international network running from Turkey to the United States, through Lebanon 
and Marseille in France (Erdinc, 2004; Times, 1933). This network was the early 
stages of the "French Connection", which was to become famous in the 1960s 
(Blok, 1989: 329).  
Western countries were buying Turkish opium and the morphine produced in 
Istanbul, but it was well known that large amounts were bought by traffickers. 
The Turkish delegation at the League of Nations announced publicly during 
negotiations for stronger limitations on production that it had produced 2 tons of 
morphine and 4 tons of heroin in the previous six months, though the Opium 
Observation Committee of the League of Nations had not been notified of it as 
Turkey was not yet party to the 1925 International Opium Convention. Implicitly, 
it admitted that most of it had reached the illicit market. Block argues that during 
these negotiations, the Turkish delegation even attempted to trade its signature of 
the 1925 Geneva Convention against being guaranteed a substantial part of the 
quotas of production under discussion. In 1932, Turkey signed the International 
Opium Convention and therefore had to change its policies, which it did in 
principle. This followed intense pressure, from the United States mainly but also 
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the UK, France, Germany, the official buyers of Turkish opiates. In February 
1931, factories were officially closed until the state set up a system to control the 
transformation of opium and trade, which occurred in 1933. However, Erdinc 
argues that only one of the three factories ceased production during that time 
(Erdinc, 2004: 100).  
This section has demonstrated that for sixty years, Turkish authorities either 
resisted or ignored the emergence of international norms curbing the production 
of opium and its derivatives. As a traditional opium producer in the sense of the 
1961 Single Convention, it is one of the biggest world producers of licit opium, 
and the largest producer through the poppy “straw method”. Despite remaining a 
substantial source of revenue for the state, poppy production is no longer a 
sensitive political issue in Turkey. 
2.3 Drug use 
2.3.1 The importance of drug use as an issue in policy-making 
Since before the twentieth century, issues surrounding drug consumption have 
been much less known and understood than production, a trend that continues to 
the present day. A 2003 national assessment on drug abuse, conducted by the 
UNODC in partnership with national institutions concluded that even if research 
has been undertaken it has not been informing policy. It also noted “an apparent 
lack of a contemporary understanding of drug abuse patterns” (UNODC, 2004; 1). 
Nevertheless, surveys are few and far-between (as discussed below); data on and 
knowledge of drug abuse remains relatively low; and prevention and 
rehabilitation strategies have only been developed in the last few years (TUBIM, 
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2009: XV; TUBIM: 2011: 2-3). Robins identifies a number of explanatory factors 
for this apparent gap, pointing to a concentration of efforts on supply reduction 
rather than demand (Robins, 2009). Firstly, he notes that the importance placed on 
preventing the leakage of opium into the illicit market before, but mostly after 
1974, has led to a concentration of attention, resources and effort into the policing 
and prevention of trafficking. He argues that the power of law enforcement 
agencies, the police and the gendarmerie in national budget allocations has 
exacerbated that trend. He also notes that until 1996, there was effectively no 
national policy concerning drug abuse. Secondly, Turkish politicians have often 
expressed a belief that higher moral standards amongst Turkish youths when 
compared to Western youths mean that they use drugs less frequently. This also 
explains the general reluctance to understand and prevent drug abuse in a 
coordinated manner. Thirdly, when the decision was taken to set up a national 
strategy on drug abuse in 1996, the intricacies of the domestic political and 
administrative structures ensured that the institution in charge did not have 
enough political power to function efficiently or to impose its views. In this 
context, the will and determination of specific individuals has proved instrumental 
in the eventual emergence of a national policy. 
Today, the Turkish Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (TUBIM) is 
the national institution for all drug demand-related activities. It functions within 
KOM, which itself is within the TNP. It is the national focal point to the for 
REITOX, the European Information Network on Drugs and Drug Addiction, part 
of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA). It 
was established as the result of a “twinning project” set up between TUBIM and 
its counterpart in Portugal under the 2002 Pre-Accession Assistance Programme.  
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Robins identifies three elements that may lead to drug use continuing to be seen 
as an issue of relatively low importance: firstly, TUBIM has few resources and is 
understaffed compared to its European counterparts, so it may not be able to carry 
out its responsibilities; secondly, it is a relatively small institution within a much 
larger ministry which deals mainly with drug supply reduction; and thirdly, it has 
little contact with the health sector (Robins, 2009; 300-301, European 
Commission, 2012). Nevertheless, Turkey’s move towards EU accession seems to 
have catalyzed activity and has resulted in new policy-making in the area of drug 
demand – this is discussed in further detail in Chapter Seven, below.   
2.3.2 The reality of hard drug use in Turkey 
There are historical accounts of opium and cannabis being consumed in Anatolia 
throughout the centuries. There are also anecdotal accounts that Ottoman sultans 
imposed decrees prohibiting the consumption of opium in order to reduce opium 
addiction. Erdinç, meanwhile, describes how the opening of heroin manufacturing 
factories in Istanbul caused widespread heroin addiction in the city in the 1920s 
and early 1930s (Erdinç, 2004). A 2002 study carried out by the Turkish 
Psychologists’ Association and the previously mentioned 2003 the UNODC study 
were the first nation-wide data collection exercise on drug use, however (TUBIM, 
2008; 18). In 2007, a survey on substance abuse amongst school children was 
commissioned by the Turkish Grand National Assembly and in 2011 a national 
comprehensive survey was conducted, the result of which will be first published 
in TUBIM’s 2012 report to EMCDDA2.  
                                                 
2 This report was not published at the time of writing but the version communicated to EMCDDA 
was obtained.   
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The absence of in-depth knowledge on the issue until the 2002 and 2003 surveys 
were undertaken was highlighted by the UNODC:  
“Drug abuse is still viewed as a relatively small problem in Turkey, but health officials 
acknowledge that heroin and cocaine addiction are increasing steadily and that there is a 
potential of further growth. In the absence of epidemiological data and statistics, 
estimates by the local drug control and health experts on the real number vary between a 
few thousand abusers for the entire country up to half a million for the Istanbul 
population alone.” (UNODC, 2001: 53) 
Studies indicate that hard drugs abuse is less prevalent than in European countries 
and in Turkey's neighbours in Central Asia, although it is increasing, especially 
amongst youth. Cannabis is the most frequently used drug, followed by inhalants, 
synthetic opiates and heroin, and ecstasy is recorded at much lower levels but its 
use is said to be increasing in urban centres (UNODC, 2004: 5). The TNP 
considers, however, that the ecstasy it seizes is imported into Turkey for the 
domestic market (KOM, 2008: 21). It also mentions that it seizes increasing 
numbers of ‘fake ecstasy’ pills that are meant for the domestic market, which 
contain substances that are chemically close to ecstasy but not illegal in Turkey3, 
and are packaged in the same way as ecstasy pills. Manufacturers and traffickers, 
concludes the TNP, are well aware of the current domestic legislation and of the 
fact that there is demand for these drugs in Turkey (KOM, 2008: 22).  
The available data does not indicate a disproportionately high prevalence of 
opiate abuse that could be attributed to the ready availability resulting from their 
production in and trafficking through Turkey. Similarly, amphetamines, which are 
trafficked through the country in high volumes, are not subject to 
disproportionately high use. This suggests that reasons for the low but rising 
levels of drug use and drug addiction are sociological, and pertain to the nature 
and evolution of Turkish society; and the nature and evolution of drug use across 
                                                 
3 mCPP (meta-chlorophenylpiperazine). It is also called a ‘designer drug’, meaning that it is not 
illegal but it reacts likes other illegal substances.  
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societies. They are not dependent on the presence of a domestic poppy culture or 
of trafficking. The absence of this incentive for policy-making may also explain 
why there seems to have been considerably less attention paid to drug abuse in 
comparison to drug trafficking, which has remained high on the political agenda, 
as will be explained in the next section. 
2.4 Trafficking 
This section focuses on drug trafficking, which is a central issue for the remainder 
of this thesis. It begins with an outline of the kinds of drugs currently trafficked in 
and through Turkey. It then shifts focus to the groups responsible for trafficking, 
weighing various arguments about the involvement of the Kurdistan Workers 
Party (PKK), a Kurdish separatist group engaged in guerrilla-type warfare in the 
south-east of Turkey, and which is recognised as a terrorist group by Turkey, the 
EU and the United States; as well as considering and the involvement of Turkish 
organised crime. Finally, it analyses the rise of drug trafficking as an issue of 
concern in the Turkish political agenda.   
Echoing President Nixon’s claims almost 40 years ago that 80 per cent of the 
heroin reaching the streets of New York was of Turkish origin, it is now estimated 
that close to 80 per cent of the heroin transiting through Turkey originates from 
Afghanistan and the remainder from Iran (UNODC, 2009: 50). Cases of diversion 
of Turkish-produced opium from the licit programme to illicit activities have 
consistently been accepted as negligible: in 2000 the United Nations Drug Control 
Program (UNDCP) estimated that “from the date that the [licensing] system was 
put into practice in 1974 until now, no seizures of Turkish poppies have been 
reported in the country or abroad” (UNODC, 2001: 53). Afghanistan emerged as 
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an opium producer after Turkey’s opium stopped leaking into the illicit market 
(UNODC, 2008: 93), and Turkey’s strategic location on the historical Silk Road 
has made it particularly vulnerable to traffic from Afghanistan towards Europe 
and North America.  
Turkey therefore finds itself in a situation where it is a key producer of licit poppy 
and morphine at the same time as it devotes considerable resources to fighting the 
trafficking of opiates that are only transiting through the country. In 1999, the 
INCB estimated that up to 75% of the heroin reaching Western Europe had 
transited through Turkey. Even if more recent reports do not mention such high 
proportions, the figure speaks for itself about the volume of the trafficking, since 
only a small portion (difficult to measure with precision) is actually intercepted. 
In 2012, the European Commission wrote on its website that: 
“Most heroin reaches Europe via the Balkan routes, starting in Turkey via: (i) Bulgaria, 
FYROM, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia into Italy or Slovenia; (ii) 
via FYROM into Kosovo or Albania into Greece. A route via Ukraine and Romania is 
also gaining importance.” (European Commission, 2012) 
Opiates are not the only illicit drugs that transit in high quantities through Turkey: 
synthetic psychotropic substances produced in Western Europe travel towards the 
Middle East where they are popular. Moreover, chemicals used as precursors for 
the manufacture of opiates as well as synthetic drugs travel through Turkey from 
Europe towards Central Asia and the Middle East. The result is that nearly all 
borders of the country are both an entry and an exit point for one substance or 
another. 
2.4.1 Level of trafficking and levels of seizures 
Due to the obvious illegal and secret nature of this activity, it is impossible to 
evaluate with precision the level of drug trafficking through Turkey. Seizure 
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levels by law enforcement agencies can offer a rough indication, but these also 
depend on the commitment of law enforcement agencies to the task, on their 
actual success, and on the fact that it is at best possible to estimate routes taken by 
the drugs from the point of production to the point of consumption. There is no 
irrefutable scientific method to quantify the proportions of drugs that are seized. 
Crop cultivation surveys are used to estimate opium, cocaine and cannabis 
production, but it is more difficult to track the production of synthetic drugs 
(UNODC 2009: 9) and the lack of precision at this stage makes estimations 
further in the process even more uncertain. Nevertheless, the INCB estimates that 
4 to 6 tons of heroin pass through the country on a monthly basis, corresponding 
to a seizure rate of 15 percent put forward by the TNP (KOM, 2007). Turkey also 
seizes the greatest quantities of opiates in Europe – since 2006 it alone has seized 
as much or more heroin than all EU countries (KOM 2007: 8). According to the 
Turkish authorities, this reflects their level of commitment and success in 
countering trafficking, a point that will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 
Seven.  
Most seizures by the TNP occur in Istanbul and other major cities, especially 
those close to the borders where drugs enter in the country. Given that opiates are 
not widely consumed in Turkey but are intended for the European market, 
counter-trafficking efforts are targeting substances that are destined for export. 
This is completely different, for example, to the intentions of Iranian counter-
trafficking agencies, which concentrate on opium entering Iran because 
consumption levels are very high, rather than directing significant effort towards 
reducing the quantities of drugs leaving the country towards Europe, including 
from the domestic illicit production (EUROPOL, 2006; 3). 
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2.4.1.1 Opiates 
According to the UNODC 2012 World Drugs Report, in 2010 Turkey seized the 
fourth highest amount of opiates globally, following Pakistan, Afghanistan and 
Iran. Turkey has also been among the four countries seizing most heroin for the 
past ten years (UNODC, 2012, see figure 2) and these four countries have been 
topping opiates seizures for several years, which indicates that opiates are seized 
mostly close to the site of production (in this case Afghanistan) (UNODC, 2009: 
42). Following several years of increased seizures, rates dropped substantially 
in2010 and 2011. Several factors are thought to have caused this drop in seizures: 
a reduction in opium production in Afghanistan in 2009; the rising price of 
opium, which has pushed smaller trafficking groups to turn to other goods (in 
particular tobacco and fuel); and changing routes and modes of transport by 
traffickers, who increasingly use sea and air travel, thereby bypassing Turkey on 
the way to Western Europe (KOM, 2011:22). Seizures of morphine also declined 
substantially: in 2004 a record was set at 4730kg, most of which (4410kg) was 
seized in a single Istanbul operation; but since 2008, only one seizure has taken 
place (in 2009) (KOM, 2004: 38, KOM, 2011). The amount of raw opium seized 
is also very low, which is explained mainly by the fact that opium is transformed 
close to the source (UNODC, 20012). Moreover, although refining laboratories 
have operated in Turkey throughout the 1990s (mainly in the southeast and 
Istanbul), the last reported laboratory seizure took place in 2006 (KOM, 2006: 2). 
Laboratories are now reported on the Iranian side of the Iran-Turkey border 
(Department of State, 2008b and 2012b). 
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Figure 2: Principal heroin seizures worldwide Source: CND, 2012: 16. 
2.4.1.2 Other drugs: cannabis, cocaine, synthetic drugs  
All estimates reviewed indicate that the levels of trafficking of other substances 
such as cannabis/hashish and cocaine are well below the level of heroin 
trafficking. The fact that Turkey is not situated on obvious routes between 
producer and consumer countries renders it less prone to high levels of transit.   
Cannabis is imported into Turkey for the domestic market, in addition to some 
that is grown domestically. It is produced legally in Turkey for industrial 
purposes, although in much smaller proportions than poppy, which is partly 
because the content in Turkish-produced cannabis is significantly lower compared 
to cannabis grown elsewhere, meaning it is unattractive outside the domestic 
market. However, the TNP believes that the PKK is involved in its production and 
trafficking (Pek and Ekici, 2007; KOM, 2008: 16). Cannabis seizures have risen 
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in the past five years, though the TNP attributes this rise to better investigations 
and planning of operations rather than to a significant rise in production or 
imports (KOM, 2011: 27).  
Cocaine enters Turkey mainly by air, and according to the TNP it arrives most 
frequently from West African countries and Venezuela (KOM, 2011:20). 
Although amounts remain low, it is believed to be on the rise and there are 
growing concerns that Istanbul also might be an emerging hub for cocaine 
trafficking between West Africa and Europe.  
Synthetic drugs are mostly manufactured in Western Europe (Belgium and the 
Netherlands) or Eastern Europe and transit eastwards and southwards through 
Turkey towards the Middle East – though they are increasingly destined for the 
Turkish market.  .It is, however, difficult to single out a specific pattern, because 
the routes change quickly, and legislation concerning the components needed for 
the manufacture evolves, new substances appear in different places of production 
and consumption. For example, captagon producing laboratories were found in 
Turkey until 2007, but more recent seizures of captagon and of amphetamines 
used in its production have revealed that the manufacture has moved to Syria 
(KOM, 2008: 23; KOM, 2011: 31). 
2.4.1.3 Precursors and chemical substances 
Producing morphine and heroin requires large quantities of precursor chemicals 
such as acetic anhydride, a substance which is essential in the refinement of 
morphine to heroin. Since there is no legitimate production facility and no or little 
reported legitimate use of the substance in Afghanistan and its neighbouring 
countries, in which the majority of Afghan opium is transformed into morphine 
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and heroin, acetic anhydride has to be imported, in particular from European 
countries which are important producers of the substance. As a result, large 
quantities of precursor chemicals transit eastwards through Turkey. Moreover, 
chemicals used in the production of synthetic drugs also transit through the 
country on their way from Europe to Central and South East Asia.  
According to the 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention, some of these chemical 
substances are subject to specific regulations regarding their export, import and 
transit. This typically involves official inter-state notification that shipments are 
taking place. Turkish authorities have been calling on their European counterparts 
to increase their cooperation with Turkey and exchange more information. In 
2007, for example, it was reported that an illicit shipment of acetic anhydride that 
had been detected in Slovenia and was transiting through Istanbul could not be 
subjected to a “controlled delivery police operation” until its final destination 
because the Slovenian authorities failed to share the information they possessed 
(KOM, 2008: 23).  
In 2003 an agreement was signed between the European Community (EC) and the 
Turkish Republic regarding “precursors and chemical substances frequently used 
in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances”. 
According to the agreement, a greater number of chemical substances are 
controlled than required by the 1988 UN Convention; and there are specific 
provisions for administrative assistance and the exchange of information between 
countries. 
To conclude this section, it appears from this analysis of the substances trafficked 
in Turkey that it is mainly a country of transit and that the domestic market is 
beginning to be targeted. The analysis has also shown that trends can change 
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quickly and determining what causes these changes is difficult. Educated guesses 
can be made about the capacity of law enforcement to disrupt trafficking routes 
and other factors can be taken into consideration, such as the lower than expected 
supply of Afghan opium in 2009, but nothing can be ascertained. 
2.4.2 Patterns of trafficking: narco-terrorism and organised crime 
This sub-section analyses the official and academic literature on the involvement 
of the PKK in drug trafficking, and on the involvement of Turkish organised 
crime in drug trafficking. 
2.4.2.1 Narco terrorism: PKK 
There is an extensive literature on the relationship between drugs and terrorism 
but it remains an area where evidence is difficult to obtain and is often disputed 
on ideological grounds. The involvement of the PKK in drug trafficking is a 
typical example. Founded in 1978, the group adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology 
and in 1984 it launched guerrilla-type warfare against Turkish authorities, 
including suicide and car bombings; kidnapping foreign tourists; attacking 
Turkish diplomats in Europe,; and attacking symbolic representatives of the 
Turkish state in the southeast, such as teachers (Roth and Sever, 2007: 905). It 
was officially recognised as a terrorist organization by the European authorities 
only in 2002. The US authorities designated the PKK as a “Specially Designated 
Global Terrorist” group in 2001 (Department of Treasury, 2012).4  
                                                 
4  “The State Department designated the PKK as a Foreign Terrorist organization in 1997, 
and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in 2001 pursuant to Executive Order 13224” 
(Department of Treasury, 2012).  
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After it lost the backing of Syria in the 1990s, the PKK began financing its 
activities through drug trafficking. In particular, it drew on from two factors in 
order to develop its drug trafficking capacities (Robins, 2008; 635-637). Firstly, 
the policies adopted by the Turkish State to fight the PKK triggered the 
emigration of large numbers of Kurds, some of whom had radical political 
backgrounds. They subsequently settled in Western Europe and many were used 
by the PKK, be it forcibly or voluntarily, to distribute drugs (Pek and Ekici, 2007: 
143). Secondly, the PKK took advantage of the fact that European countries knew 
little about its involvement in the drugs business and about the related 
involvement of immigrant networks, but had observed the military repression of 
the PKK in the south-eastern Turkey and so focused on the human rights abuses 
that accompanied it. As a result, they acted leniently towards Kurdish 
populations, creating a sanctuary for the PKK’s activities to flourish (Robins, 
2008: 637).  
The involvement of the PKK in drug trafficking is widely reported in the media 
(see, for example, Today’s Zaman, 2010). Expert and academic literature on the 
involvement of the PKK in drug trafficking shows agreement that the group 
makes considerable profit from and finances its activities using drug trafficking, 
but disagree on methods used and the proportion it takes in the overall volume of 
trafficking (Boekhout van Solinge, 1998; Curtis and Karacan, 2002; Pek and 
Ekici, 2007; Robins, 2008). However, few downplay the PKK’s involvement in 
the way that Boekhout van Solinge does when writing that “the heroin trade from 
Turkey is dominated by Turks, even though the Turkish authorities try to make it 
appear as if mostly Kurds – the PKK in particular – are involved” (Boekhout van 
Solinge, 1998: 102). Curtis and Karacan point to the fact that while publicly 
 45 
 
available data distinguishes between PKK members, other ethnic Kurds and 
ethnic Turks so that “the PKK’s true share of the narcotics market in Western 
Europe cannot be ascertained precisely”, drug trafficking has been the 
organization’s most profitable criminal activity (Curtis and Karacan, 2002).The 
methods used by the PKK in drug trafficking are rarely touched upon, even in 
official reports such as those of EUROPOL, which in 2007 indicated a “rise of 
fundraising activities by the PKK in the EU” and the following year reported that 
“Belgian authorities arrested the EU leader of PKK/KONGRA-GEL on suspicion 
of financing terrorism via drug trafficking” without offering further analysis 
(EUROPOL, 2007: 30 and 2008: 4). Most studies limit the PKK's activities to the 
taxation of drug smugglers in Turkey and abroad. Robins, for example, writes that 
“DEA information indicates that the PKK is involved in the taxation of drug 
shipments and the protection of drug traffickers throughout the Southeastern 
Region of Turkey” (Robins, 2008: 634). Since 2008, the US authorities have 
designed the PKK as a drug trafficking organization under the “Foreign Narcotics 
Kingpin Designation Act”, according to which individuals and organizations 
designated face assets freezing and the impossibility to conduct financial and 
economic transactions under US jurisdiction (TUBIM, 2012; Department of 
Treasury, 2012). 
Relying on data and statistics collected by KOM in cooperation with INTERPOL, 
the DEA and other European law enforcement agencies; as well as on statements 
by PKK members and well known traffickers and media reports, Pek and Ekici 
found that the PKK has been involved “in every phase of the illicit drug business 
starting from cultivation to the coordination of distribution in the streets of 
European countries” (Pek and Ekici, 2007:142). Since 1984, 90 percent of the 332 
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operations launched by the TNP against terrorist organizations active in Turkey 
have found evidence of the PKK's involvement in drug trafficking. Pek and Ekici 
argue that the organization began by “taxing and commissioning drug traffickers 
and cannabis cultivators in southeastern Turkey, northern Iraq, the Bekaa Valley 
and north-western Iran.” To do so,it established illegal customs points on roads 
used to cross the mountainous borders between these regions, and it taxed 
families involved in drug distribution in Europe. Later, the PKK evolved and 
operations conducted by law enforcement agencies in Turkey and in Europe 
revealed that it was involved in producing opium, transforming morphine base 
into heroin in laboratories situated in south-eastern Turkey and dealt directly with 
distribution (Pek and Ekici, 2007; Ekici, 2007). Seizures made in PKK secret 
houses uncovered cannabis seeds, heroin or acetic anhydride (Ekici, 2007).  
Against this background, it appears the involvement of PKK in drug trafficking 
should not be reduced to a simple ‘tax against protection’ equation. As a result of 
the links it most probably maintains with organised crime groups, it will always 
be difficult to separate PKK-related narco-terrorism from criminal activities that it 
does not profit from, but it is clear that the PKK plays a major role in the drug 
trade in Turkey. Moreover, the PKK’s designation under the Kingpin Act is 
further international recognition that the PKK is implicated in trafficking directly 
and not only in levying taxes (KOM, 2008: 9). 
2.4.2.2 Organised Crime 
While the involvement of the PKK in drug trafficking tends to be a subject of 
interest, the role of Turkish organised crime has been much less studied. The 
involvement of organised crime groups from Turkey in drug trafficking is often 
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accepted as a given, but it is difficult to assess with precision. The European 
media frequently refers to the role of what it calls the 'Turkish mafia', an element 
of language echoed by Boekhout van Solinge, who wrote in 1998 that “it has been 
extensively documented how different Turkish Mafia organizations are having a 
relatively free hand in the international heroin trade”. However, such claims tend 
to be under-discussed and uncontested (Robins 2008: 631). 
This shortage of information is due to the fact that so little analysis of trafficking 
in Turkey has been undertaken – let alone drug trafficking. Icduygu and Toktas 
conducted a field sociological research on human trafficking, in which they 
attempted to go beyond geographical factors in explaining the importance of 
trafficking by analysing who is involved in trafficking and how they operate.  
They concluded that preconceived notions of trafficking being governed by 
strictly controlled, hierarchical organised crime groups is misrepresentative of 
human trafficking in Turkey. Similarly, the involvement of Turkish organised 
groups in drug trafficking is something of a grey area. The main element put 
forward to explain their strength and their involvement in international 
trafficking, which is rather descriptive and deterministic, consists in arguing that 
because Turkey is at the crossroads of East and West; and because it has long 
borders on the South-East that are porous and difficult to control, it is bound to be 
prone to trafficking and its population are bound to take part. Ethnic ties are also 
offered as an explanation for the disproportionate involvement of Turkish 
diasporas in trafficking in European countries. The strategic position of Turkey on 
the route between Central Asia and Middle East, and Western Europe certainly 
creates a ‘comparative advantage’ that is further increased by the conservation of 
close family ties between diasporas and home communities, but a review of the 
 48 
 
existing literature reveals that the perception that large-scale organised crime 
groups dominate over trafficking is at best based on anecdotal evidence. 
2.4.2.2.1 Turkish organised crime abroad 
In respect of Turkish organised crime groups operating in Europe, a review of 
EUROPOL reports provides most of the information available. Most details are 
found in the 2003 Organised Crime Report:  
“Turkish [organised crime (OC)] groups are engaged in drugs and arms smuggling, 
money laundering and protection rackets. While these groups continue to dominate the 
heroin trade in the EU impacting on the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany 
in particular, there are indications that other groups have begun to challenge them. In 
some cases, Turkish groups are described as importing heroin and retaining strategic 
control, while ethnic Albanian groups distribute the drug. The most remarkable change is 
the rise in the amount of soft drug trafficking by Turkish OC groups.  
Turkish groups are renowned for their hermetic nature, which resembles a network 
structure which is usually connected through family or blood ties. They have a strict 
division of roles, and have severe internal control mechanisms used to discipline 
members of their group. Turkish groups are associated with high levels of violence and 
intimidation, which is often directed at other Turkish nationals living abroad. 
It is worth noting that Turkish groups are increasingly known to collaborate with groups 
of different ethnicities and nationalities. This can be explained by the fact that many of 
the Turks settled in communities in the EU are now second generation, and have more 
familiarity with the host country. This has facilitated the development not only of Turkish 
OC, but also of these links to indigenous and other OC groups” (EUROPOL, 2003: 15), 
It is clear, then, that the existence of strong Turkish Diasporas is seen as a key 
factor in explaining the strength of trafficking from Turkey to Europe, but the 
reason for this claim is not clear. In their study of the involvement of ethnic 
minorities in drug trafficking in Western Europe, Paoli and Reuter agree that 
Turks dominate the heroin market but at the same time they point to 
misrepresentations of groups as large, centralised structures:  
“In Frankfurt, as presumably in other cities and countries, Turkish heroin entrepreneurs 
never made up a single trafficking organization; rather they formed a galaxy of 
independent dealing enterprises. Some of these were composed of just a few friends or 
associates. Many were family businesses, sometimes quite stable, that relied upon a large 
but changing pool of more recently arrived Turkish collaborators for the more menial and 
risky tasks. Additionally there are a few large-scale criminal organizations capable of 
organizing shipments of several hundred kilograms. Turkish traffickers in the market had 
varying roles.” (Paoli and Reuter, 2008: 20-21).  
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It appears, therefore, that the presence of Turkish organised crime in Europe is 
known but there is little knowledge about the conditions of its emergence and its 
modes of operation, except for the fact that the migration of Turks to Western 
Europe has contributed to its expansion. 
2.4.2.2.2 Domestic organised crime 
There is also little literature on organised crime groups involved in trafficking in 
Turkey Exceptions here are Erdinc’s history of heroin in Turkey through the 
twentieth century and Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz’s history of the Turkish Mafia 
(Erdinc, 2003; Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz, 2007). Erdinc attempts to explain why 
trafficking developed in the 1960s and he identifies the 1955 Iranian ban on 
poppy production as the trigger. According to him, the demand for Turkish opium 
caused by the ban was an incentive for small poppy producers to find ways to 
divert their yield towards small scale, illicit heroin laboratories within Turkey and 
smuggle the substance into Iran, initially just in small quantities. This new type of 
trafficking differed from the practice that had developed in the 1920s and 1930s 
when opium factories were operating in Istanbul. Until 1955, trafficking had been 
made possible by businessmen and high-ranking civil servants who were 
connected to organised criminals diverting legally produced morphine or 
alkaloids from the legal market. These individuals usually originated in France, 
Greece or other European countries and settled in Istanbul when the authorities in 
their home country began to crack down on the illicit manufacture of morphine 
and heroin (Block, 1989: 329). By the end of the 1950s, the diversion from the 
legal market into the illegal market took place right after the production and the 
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manufacturing was undertaken illicitly. Block identifies a similar situation in 
Europe between the two world wars:  
“At the beginning of this period, the illicit trade in refined narcotics depended to a large 
extent on diverting legally manufactured narcotics. organised criminals were typically 
located at the tag end of the drug-manufacturing and marketing process. In combinations 
with manufacturers or various and numerous middle-men in transportation and retail 
outlets, they diverted a portion of the product to supply de-certified consumers. Before 
the two decades were over, however, professional criminals were almost alone at the 
beginning of the process, owning clandestine drug factories around the world” (Block, 
1989: 315). 
Erdinc identifies multiple elements to explain this new trend. Firstly, some of the 
former workers of the opium processing factories of the late 1920s acquired the 
skill to prepare heroin and were willing to use it in underground laboratories. 
Secondly, the traditional methods used to sell Anatolian opium helped the 
development of trafficking through what are best described as 'family smuggling 
enterprises'. Farmers usually did not go to sell at specific selling points, but 
traders travelled through villages and agreed with farmers to buy all that had been 
produced over some or all their land. This trading system was quite flexible 
because it favoured agreements made through personal contacts rather than 
considerations of market prices for the given commodity on a large scale. It also 
meant that opium farmers knew middlemen between farmers and bigger buyers in 
cities and underground heroin factories operating in the country. Thirdly, the large 
flows of immigration towards Western Europe guaranteed that those involved in 
illegal production of opium would be able to rely on relatives to reach places of 
distribution and consumption of the substance. Through the years, the networks 
grew stronger to reach their current levels. 
From the 1970s to the early 1990s, organised crime groups also evolved out of 
ideologically-oriented groups formed in the early 1970s. Their emergence is well 
explained by Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz, and is examined further in Chapter Six, 
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below (Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz, 2007).  Turkey’s state institutions were 
dominated by the army and, against a backdrop of high levels of social violence 
(Karabelias, 1999: 133), promoted some ultra-nationalist gangs referred to as the 
Bozkurtlar (ülkücü), the 'Grey Wolves', to combat other violent groups. 
Meanwhile, the army, who had already staged two military coups in 1960s and 
1971, played a dominant role in the formation of governments and became 
increasingly politicised. The military came not only to assume sole responsibility 
for defining security threats and implementing national security policies, but were 
also seen as the only group capable of bringing order and stability to Turkey 
(Narli, 2011:2017; Karabelias, 1999: 133, 145).  Dominated by the military 
bureaucracy, the state secretly cultivated relations with these ultra-nationalist 
groups because it was felt that fighting the PKK and other leftist movements 
engaged in terror acts could not be achieved by constitutionally acceptable means 
(Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz, 2007: 179-180). These Grey Wolves developed 
criminal activities and grew close to organised crime groups, while benefiting 
from the protection of the state and the absence of democratic oversight over their 
activities (Robins, 2008; Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz, 2007). Robins argues that the 
parallel existence of a number of security agencies created tension and 
competition between them, which resulted in relative freedom and impunity for 
members of the gangs operating in the shadow of one or another state institution:  
“in such a context of opacity and violence, leading institutions had both mutated and 
fractured, to the detriment of policy coherence and both central and democratic control. 
(…) Thus, the competition inherent within different branches of the security state had 
acquired an additional edge because of the proliferation of new intelligence and special 
forces.” (Robins, 2008: 639-40) 
The importance of Robins’ analysis lies in the fact that it highlights how 
institutional arrangements, and especially their weaknesses, explain some 
characteristics of drug trafficking in Turkey: they created opportunities for certain 
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groups that were only loosely organised around a certain political ideology. While 
the Turkish state apparatus was, in Baran’s words “busy defending itself against 
communism”, the country became the key transit point for drugs sent to Western 
Europe (Baran, 2000: 139). 
2.4.3 The emergence of drug trafficking as a stand-alone policy issue 
2.4.3.1 The impact of the Susurluk scandal: evidence of state corruption  
Revelations of collusion between members of the government and organised 
crime groups that followed from the November 1996 car accident near Susurluk 
in western Turkey – in which three died near the town of Susurluk – have been 
key to policy changes and triggered a state clean-up.  News of the accident sent 
shockwaves throughout Turkish political life in Turkey and its impact has been 
analysed by several scholars. Their focus, however, has been on changes in 
political leadership and the corruption of politicians, rather than on the corruption 
of civil servants or the implication of state security agencies in crime.  
The key victim of the accident was Abdullah Catli, a former ülkücü and a gunman 
who built a strong reputation in the 1970s for his suspected implication in 
murders. He was already sought after by INTERPOL after escaping a Swiss jail 
where he was serving on sentence for drug trafficking. The other people travelling 
in the car were Huseyn Kocada÷ – a high ranking police officer who had 
participated in the creation of the police’s special security teams to combat the 
PKK; Catli’s girlfriend, who was travelling with him on a false identity; and the 
only survivor Sedat Bucak – a Kurdish traditional chief who was leading the 
state-sponsored, anti-PKK militia, and was at the time a junior minister in the 
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main conservative party in the coalition in power.  Investigations revealed that the 
car also carried a trunk-full of weapons issued by the Ministry of Interior, and that 
Abdullah Catli – who had been issued various fake passports – was carrying 
police identity and a weapons license issued by the Minister of Interior himself, 
Mehmet A÷ar.  
According to Baran, “the crash, for the first time, exposed the public to the 
structure of the long suspected criminal cell at the head of the State.” (Baran, 
2000: 137). Indeed, the accident soon became a national scandal, catching the 
attention of both public and media. It was investigated by the public prosecutor’s 
office and by an investigations commission of the parliament. The latter's report, 
however, revealed little of the actual links between organised crime and the state, 
leading Baran to conclude that it was a “missed opportunity”. Moreover, even 
after the resignations of the Minister of Interior and (later on), the Deputy Prime 
Minister Tansu Ciller, their successors did not take up the task of revealing the 
truth about the accident. Even Mesut Yilmaz, who became the Prime Minister in 
February 1997 with the involvement of the army, did not keep his promise to shed 
light on the scandal, and the investigation stopped at that stage. At a political 
level, therefore, the scandal did have an impact in the short term – probably 
because the case of collusion was so blatant. Yet its impact was not sufficient to 
result in major investigations into corruption and the involvement of politicians in 
drug trafficking (Meyer, 1998; Baran, 2000). Another sign that political 
authorities were unwilling to make substantial changes is the fact that the 
National Security Council, which was at that time the institution with most 
authority and was composed of a majority of military staff, discussed the matter 
only a year later in November 1997 and took the decision to designate organised 
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crime groups, in particular ultra-nationalist groups, as a "primary threat" to the 
security of the state in the summer of 1998 (Robins, 2008, 642). 
If business in the political arena went back to usual for some time, Robins notes 
that the scandal led to a 'clean-up' of institutions – especially the police and the 
National Intelligence organization (MIT). An estimated 60 people were removed 
from office in these two organizations, including the head of KOM (Robins, 2008, 
640). Key legislation was adopted in 1997 on 'controlled deliveries', the sharing of 
wire taping evidence, money laundering and casinos, and this helped police 
operations and investigations. High profile criminals who had built themselves a 
reputation for their links with the MIT or politicians were arrested in and after 
1998. Robins attributes this decisive change to the NSC decision to tackle the 
organised crime issue and "to remove any ambiguity in the states position on the 
gangs issue" (Robins, 2008: 643). 
A closer look into political developments between 1996 and 2000, however, 
seems to point to the fact that the process of ‘state clean up’ has been more 
gradual. It also indicates that the Susurluk accident and its repercussions alone 
cannot explain the effort that was put into ending corruption and the collusion 
between state institutions and organised crime. Shortly after the Susurluk 
accident, the government was forced to publicly accept the existence of the 
JITEM – a secretive section of the Gendarmerie which had been involved in drug 
trafficking and extra-judicial killings in the eastern part of Turkey, where the 
State had been fighting the PKK. This occurred after judicial proceedings against 
a criminal gang revealed the extent of the JITEM’s involvement in drug 
trafficking (Tezcur. 2009: 314; Duvaklõ, 2010; Erdo÷an, 2010).  
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On 28 February 1997, the army conducted what is commonly referred to as the 
‘post-modern’ coup, whereby they obtained the dismissal of the Prime Minister, 
Necmettin Erbakan, Tansu Ciller’s coalition partner, by means of a letter sent to 
the President of the Turkish Republic by the General Staff of the Army. Erbakan 
was replaced by Mesut Yilmaz, who pledged to fight organised crime and 
corruption, but his government collapsed due to a corruption scandal related to the 
privatisation of a national bank in the autumn of 1998. This came to light 
following the arrest of another criminal on INTERPOL's wanted list, Alaattin 
Cakici, was arrested in France in August of that year. A few days prior to his 
arrest, the TNP had informed the government of Yilmaz that Cakici was 
attempting to interfere in a national bid for the privatisation of the Turkish 
Commercial Bank which had just been finalised. When arrested, Cakici was 
carrying four Turkish passports, including one diplomatic. In September 1998, a 
member of parliament released a wire tapped phone conversation between him 
and the minister Eyup Asik, who warned him to flee his current hiding place. The 
investigation then revealed that the buyer of the bank and Cakici had worked 
together, and that during the bid the buyer had received the support of Yilmaz and 
his government (who had full knowledge of the deal). It also appeared that Cakici 
was complaining about the lack of government protection against his arrest so 
soon after having made Yilmaz an offer related to the bank’s privatisation (Baran, 
2000; 140-141). These revelations lead to a public outcry against corruption and 
triggered the fall of the government. They also revealed the ambivalence of the 
government on corruption, since it had pushed the adoption of new anticorruption 
legislation without seriously abandoning old methods. Arguably, had it not been 
for this second corruption scandal – linked to Turkey’s economic affairs rather 
 56 
 
than drug trafficking – and its repercussion on the political scene, the positive 
effect of the new legislation could have easily been overpowered by the 
continuing practices of collusion.  
During this period, the police also reached a level of expertise that allowed it to 
conduct successful operations against organised crime groups. It had, in the past, 
arrested a number of these key figures of organised crime but had failed to 
provide courts with sufficient evidence and they were released. Such events were 
widely reported by the press and were thought to increase their reputation further. 
The former head of the TNP, Saadettin Tantan, was appointed Minister of Interior 
in 1999 and is believed to have played a crucial role in reforming police practices 
during his tenure. Following his appointment, new senior officers were appointed 
to key positions and KOM was reinforced. A number of large scale operations 
concluded with convictions. These elements in detail will be discussed in Chapter 
Seven. 
2.4.3.2 The impact of Turkeys changing security discourse 
As in the case of drug use, there are few studies available on Turkey's anti-drug 
trafficking policies, with the notable example of Philip Robins' aforementioned 
work. This could be seen as something of an oddity in the Turkish context given 
that drug trafficking has been attracting considerable media attention for many 
years. However, several elements indicate that since approximately 1996, anti-
drug trafficking has emerged as a priority issue for Turkish authorities. Until then, 
it had been in a state of limbo because it did not fit the accepted definition of risk 
to Turkey’s national security at a time when attention in Turkey was given largely 
to national security matters (Bilgin, 2005). 
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Between the end of World War Two and the brief opium ban of 1972-1974, 
trafficking was not an issue of priority so long as the licit production was 
sufficient and foreign countries did not complain too much about the ongoing 
diversion for Turkey to react. The licensing system implemented after the ban 
undoubtedly had the unintended consequence of boosting the production of opium 
in Afghanistan. What is important here is that this new licensing system prepared 
the Turkish authorities to restrain leakages of Turkish poppy into the illicit 
market, but it did not prepare them to deal effectively with the massive influx of 
opium that started to enter its borders. Between the 1970s and the early 1990s, the 
problem of drug trafficking was absorbed into the larger issue of counter 
insurgency, and the collusion of state institutions hindered efforts to address 
trafficking meaningfully. Moreover, the PKK was heavily involved in trafficking 
from its inception and Turkish authorities prioritised fighting the organization as a 
whole from an anti-terrorism angle, while the authorities of Western countries did 
not give due credit to Turkey’s accusations against the PKK, including those 
about its involvement in drug trafficking. In this context, the national security 
discourse that prevailed at the time contributed to pushing the problem of 
trafficking into limbo, and resulted in it being little discussed by central policy 
makers. In addition, the military exploited ‘the fear of abandonment and fear of 
loss of territory’, claims which were linked to a geographically determinist, which 
argued that Turkey’s unique geographical location called for extraordinary 
security measures. This over-emphasis placed on national security, especially 
around the 1980 military coup and after the beginning of the fighting against the 
PKK, seems to have made it impossible for sufficient discussions on drug 
trafficking to take place. It also helped trafficking proliferate, because of the 
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unreceptiveness of European partners on the Turkish definition of national 
security. O÷uzlu and Kibaro÷lu describe fundamental incompatibilities between 
the Turkish and the European security culture, where the former works on a state-
centric basis while in the latter the main security referents are societies and 
individuals (O÷uzlu and Kibaro÷lu 2008: 947). Two reasons can be highlighted, 
based on the arguments presented earlier. Firstly, the Turkish army and security 
agencies collaborated with groups involved in trafficking and allowed them to 
operate with impunity in Turkey and in Western Europe. All activities were put 
under the cover of national security, which could not be questioned. Secondly, 
European countries opposed Turkey’s response to the PKK insurgency, its 
discourse on the PKK and the way it defended national security interests. and 
Such attitudes are likely to have contributed to allowing the PKK develop its drug 
trafficking activities in Western Europe and in Turkey – if not by to the extent 
that it was responsible for the majority of trafficking, at least significantly enough 
for it to become highly skilled in the operation. As a result, neither party had a 
genuine incentive to curb trafficking through the country.   
It would appear that around 1996, a combination of elements created the right 
environment for change. Firstly, the 1996 Susurluk scandal resulted in a new 
government, who introduced legislation designed to tackle drug trafficking; while 
the 1998-wiretapped conversation scandal ensured that they were adequately 
implemented. Secondly, as Robins’ argues, international pressures placed on the 
National Security Council to recognize organised crime as a key national security 
concern triggered changes (Robins, 2007). At the end of the Cold War, the 
breakdown of the Soviet Union upset the agenda of military agencies, since they 
found themselves without any defined target (this is analysed further in Chapter 
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Three). This new development created an opportunity for both European countries 
and, as Robins notes, the United States to criticise Turkey for its poor handling of 
trafficking; and to call for renewed involvement from Turkish authorities in the 
international efforts against drugs.  
In this context, had Turkey not demonstrated its goodwill by intensifying its anti-
organised crime and anti-drug trafficking efforts, it is likely that it would have 
faced continued international criticism. As a result, the National Security Council, 
the army and the political parties that supported the army as the main guardian of 
the Turkish Republic adopted an attitude of policy change that is, as Bilgin’s 
analyses it, typical of the Ottoman reaction against European pressures to 
modernize:  
“Although the norms of international society were viewed as threatening the internal 
cohesion and strength of the state, they were nevertheless adopted by Ottoman statesmen. 
According to Karaosmanoglu (2000: 207), ‘[Ottoman statesmen] used the policy of 
reform in two different ways. At times, they exploited it in order to attract foreign 
support. (. . .) Sometimes, however, in demonstrating commitment to modernization, 
Turks hoped to avert European interference” (Bilgin, 2005: 181). 
It is also important to note that this period coincides with the acceptance of 
Turkey’s candidature for membership of the European Union in December 1999. 
This candidature had already been debated intensely at the  domestic level 
between those in favour and ‘Euro-skeptics’, who believed that joining the EU 
would reduce Turkey’s control of its national security. It also triggered intense 
debate about which institutions could participate in defining national security 
(centring around whether this should be solely the role of the National Security 
Council), and about the lack of accountability of security agencies. Finally, 
Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, was arrested in 1999, meaning there was 
renewed hope regarding a solution to the Kurdish problem in certain quarters, 
where it was argued that cooperation with European institutions could be utilize d 
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to this end. In this context, it became possible to rethink strategies designed to 
combat the PKK, including targeting its drug trafficking activities.  
In the late1990s, then, various elements coincided to ensure that 'national security' 
could no longer be used to justify the authorities' lack of accountability, and the 
lack of specific efforts made regarding drug trafficking. In turn, it became 
possible for law enforcement institutions to reinforce themselves in this area, and 
the call for increased international cooperation – coupled with public pressure to 
rid the government and the institutions of corruption – strengthened them even 
further. Moreover, European institutions' demands that Turkey embark on 
reforms, particularly legislative reforms, in order for Turkey to comply with EU 
requirements, began to be acted upon. This meant that the necessary legal 
instruments to develop a stand-alone policy on drug trafficking were 
progressively being put in place. 
To conclude this section, then, the analysis above has traced the emergence of 
drug trafficking as an issue on Turkey’s political agenda around the years 1996 to 
2000, between the Susurluk scandal and Turkey’s recognition as a candidate to 
EU membership. Many changes took place in this period, which are related to the 
aftermath of the Susurluk scandal and to the fact that Turkey’s national security 
discourse changed radically, affected as it was by domestic events like the PKK 
insurgency and international events like the fall of the Soviet Union. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the context for the current situation with regards to the 
production of poppy and manufacture of opiates, the consumption of illicit drugs 
and the trafficking of drugs in and out of Turkey. From the outset, it must be 
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noted that some areas are well documented, for example with regards to the 1972 
opium ban and the Turkish-American relations in that period while others have 
not, so far, been subjected to sustained analytical and academic review. 
Based on this broad overview, it appears that the production and trafficking have 
dominated the political agenda throughout the twentieth century, while the issue 
of drug use has only recently emerged. It also appears that as the drug prohibition 
regime developed, Turkey only reluctantly joined in international efforts, but 
today it can be regarded as one of its main proponents. While in the beginning of 
1930s morphine and heroin were openly produced in Istanbul, Turkish authorities 
are now at the forefront of anti-trafficking efforts and are actively demanding 
increased international cooperation, especially when it comes to precursor 
chemicals, in the spirit of the norms of the international drug regime. 
This chapter has shown, then, that domestic and external factors coincide with 
regards to the handling of trafficking by Turkish authorities. In the following 
chapters, these phenomena will be analysed in order to identify the causal 
mechanisms that can explain Turkey’s radical change in its approach to 
international drug control in the space of four decades. 
In this chapter, several references were made to the international drug regime. 
The next chapter will analyse this regime. By explaining how its norms were 
agreed upon by States in a series of international treaties, it will show that the 
enforcement of anti-drug trafficking has emerged as the cornerstone of the 
regime. 
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Chapter 3: The International Drug Control Regime 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the development of the international drug control regime. 
Before embarking in the analysis of the specific case study of Turkey’s drug law 
enforcement, the focus of this thesis, it is important to understand the context 
surrounding the Turkish case. Taken together with Chapter Four, this chapter 
provides an understanding of international drug controls and the international 
policing of drugs. In particular, given this thesis' focus on anti-drug trafficking 
measures as representative of the internationalization of Turkey’s law 
enforcement, this chapter demonstrates why international police cooperation is a 
crucial part of drug control today. As the theoretical approach adopted in this 
thesis is regime theory, it is important to establish from the outset which regime is 
considered in this analysis and what its characteristics are. 
This chapter adopts an historical and analytical approach to explain how 
international police cooperation gradually became the backbone of the 
international drug regime. It also explains how the United States successfully 
pursued particular objectives in order to globalise both the prohibitive approach to 
drugs and the activities of its law enforcement agencies; to the point that the 
international drug regime has been heavily influenced by the American 
prohibitive paradigm since its inception. Given that Chapter Six, below, assesses 
the extent to which American power influenced Turkey’s drug enforcement, it is 
necessary to establish beforehand why American influence on the international 
drug regime has been so strong. 
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Three UN conventions are at the heart of the international drug regime: the 1961 
United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended in the 1972 
Protocol (from hereon the 1961 Single Convention); the 1971 United Nations 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances (from hereon 1971 Psychotropic 
Convention); and the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (from hereon 1988 UN 
Drug Trafficking Convention). According to these conventions, some substances 
are dangerous to individuals and states and measures must be taken to protect 
both from their harmful effects. These substances, namely opium and its 
derivatives; cocaine and crack; cannabis; and a range of synthetic psychoactive 
substances including amphetamines, Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD) and 
ecstasy, are referred to as “drugs” or sometimes “narcotics” – although neither 
term is wholly accurate. While the latter is too narrow (not all substances 
identified in the conventions are narcotics), the former is too broad, as it can be 
used to refer to all mood-affecting substances including alcohol, tobacco or 
coffee. It is, however, commonly used to label this group of substances because it 
has come to evoke what is prohibited, illicit and dangerous to use (Pryce, 2006). 
The conventions are not self-executing, therefore, in order to ensure protection 
against the harmful effects of drugs, states need to take certain measures, which 
can be grouped in three categories. The first two, supply reduction demand 
reduction, both work from a belief that it is possible to stop individuals from 
consuming drugs and thus eliminate the drug market. The final approach is that of 
harm reduction and focuses on minimising the deleterious effects of drug abuse 
on individuals and societies. In the conventions supply reduction measures 
overwhelmingly dominate, placing an obligation on states to prevent drugs from 
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reaching users. The path chosen to do so is the criminalisation of all acts that can 
lead to drug use. Therefore, law enforcement institutions find themselves at the 
heart of states’ actions against drugs. The conventions also recognise that the drug 
trade is a cross-border problem and call on states and law enforcement institutions 
to work together to combat it. In practice, this translates into an expectation that 
law enforcement institutions will cooperate. It is because cross-border 
cooperation is the core element of drug control that it has been chosen as a case 
study to examine the phenomenon of the internationalization of policing in 
Turkey. 
Drugs have not always been perceived as an international danger by all states; this 
view gradually came to dominate as the regime emerged (McAllister, 2000; 
Andreas and Nadelmann, 2007; Hershinger, 2011). Criminalisation and 
punishment of illicit cultivation, production and supply have not always been 
conceived as the primary solution to drug use, but today virtually every state has 
criminal sanctions in place for such activities. The academic literature exploring 
how this happened is vast. Some argue that it was a result of the hegemonic role 
of the United States (Bewley-Taylor, 1999; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2008); 
whilst others emphasize the construction of discourses arguing that drugs 
constitute a threat to global security (Herschinger, 2011; Crick, 2012);and  the 
influence of particular individuals in spreading these ideas, and on the diplomatic 
processes that led to the drug treaties (Bruun et al, 1975; McAllister, 2000).  
The history of international drug control has been the subject of extensive 
academic interest (Nadelmann, 1990; Bewley-Taylor, 1999 and 2012; McAllister, 
2000; Boister, 2001; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2007) but for the purpose of this 
thesis revisiting it is useful in order to understand how and why international 
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police cooperation has come to play the central role in states’ compliance with the 
obligations emanating from the international conventions that are the foundation 
of the international drug control regime. In the first section, this chapter draws on 
these academic works to highlight how the regime progressed from regulation to 
prohibition and criminalisation. In the second section, attention is given to the 
legal framework of the regime in order to explain how law enforcement 
cooperation has become the key feature of the regime. 
3.2 The emergence of the international drug control regime 
3.2.1 From 1909 to 1961, from regulation to prohibition 
When the first international conferences to discuss international agreements 
regulating opium production and distribution were called, in Shanghai in 1909 
and then in The Hague in 1911, few states were in favour of setting up a strict 
control regime. Many had economic interests in the existing opium trade, 
including the UK, which traded Indian cultivated opium in China. Germany, 
Switzerland and the Netherlands were also reluctant because they were 
developing pharmaceutical industries and so had an interest in the continuation of 
opium production. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, western 
states began to view with concern the negative side effects of drug use on 
individuals and society. The knowledge of the phenomenon of addiction was 
growing, but there was also a growing awareness of the potential to developing 
analgesics from the derivatives of opium and coca leaves; and states were eager to 
protect the burgeoning pharmaceutical industry. As McAllister explains, in the 
majority of the western world “the question was not whether access to drugs 
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should be regulated but what level and type of regulation was appropriate” 
(McAllister, 2000:16; emphasis in original). The push towards the prohibition of 
all non-medical use of opium came from the United States, where economic and 
moral interests in prohibiting the trade of opium were rising. Following the US 
acquisition of the Philippines in the Spanish American war of 1898, Americans 
sought to challenge Europe's domination of trade in China, particularly the British 
opium trade. At the same time, the Philippines population of opium smokers was 
a cause for concern. The American Episcopalian bishop of the Philippines Charles 
Brent, who had the confidence of William Tafts, the governor of the Philippines, 
and of American President William McKinley, soon began to lobby for the full 
prohibition of opium on the island and beyond. His message resonated with the 
stories brought from China by missionaries who witnessed the extent of addiction 
there. Brent was to become one of the first 'moral  entrepreneurs' who perceived 
non-medical drug use, such as smoking opium, as a vice and who promoted 
prohibition as a measure to protect individuals and societies (Musto, 1999; 
McAllister, 2000; Crick, 2012).  
At the Shanghai conference it was agreed to limit opium use to medical purposes 
and to control its export and its harmful derivatives. Boister argues that the 
Shanghai Commission, which had been convened at the request of the United 
States, was the first instance of the United States taking the lead in international 
drug control (Boister, 2001: 27), and that they were influenced by a small number 
of key prohibitionists, such as Brent. These prohibitionists opposed opium 
consumption on moral and racial grounds, feeling that the practice was foreign to 
the American Protestant way of life. Furthermore, it was felt that after the United 
States had taken control of the Philippines, the state had risen on the international 
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stage and that as “a world power it had a moral obligation to rectify what it 
perceived as the immoral use of narcotics” (Bewley-Taylor, 1999: 11). Thus, the 
US administration was increasingly convinced that in order to stop drug use on its 
territory it needed to ensure that none entered its borders and that the best way to 
achieve this was to limit its production to medical purposes and endeavoured to 
convince other states to adopt the same approach (Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, 
2012: 73). In this regard, Bewley-Taylor writes: 
“Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States has been consistent in its 
intention to confront the issue of drug use from the prohibitionist perspective and locate 
the source of domestic problems beyond the boundaries of American society. The 
intention was to deflect blame for domestic drug problems and eliminate behaviour 
deemed sinful by a Protestant culture. (Bewley-Taylor, 1999: 6) 
Nevertheless, the mix of geopolitical, commercial and moral considerations meant 
that intense diplomatic work was required for agreements to be reached. Initially, 
these agreements constituted a system controlling the licit production of drugs in 
order to avoid their diversion into an illicit market, the main concern at the time 
(Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, 2012:173).  
The development of the international drug control regime is usually divided into 
two periods: before and after the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
(Bewley-Taylor, 1999; Albrecht, 2001; Crick, 2012). In the first period, several 
rounds of negotiations took place and several international treaties were signed 
with varying degrees of success, until the Single Convention was drawn up to 
streamline provisions of previous texts into one. Signed in January 1912, the 
Hague Opium Convention restricted the trade in raw and prepared opium and 
provided for less extensive restrictions on manufactured drugs such as heroin and 
cocaine as Germany argued vehemently against further restrictions, believing they 
would compromise the business of its pharmaceutical industry. After 1920, the 
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Hague Opium Convention granted the responsibility of supervising the execution 
of the agreements to the League of Nations and created an Advisory Committee 
on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, whose remit was to collect 
and analyse information on drug traffic and to encourage compliance with the 
convention, sealing the involvement of international organizations in drug control. 
Following the replacement of the League of Nations by the UN the latter took 
over this supervisory duty. Today the CND supervises the execution of the 
conventions, whilst the INCB has a mandate similar to that of the Advisory 
Committee (Boister, 2001: 28). The 1931 Convention for Limiting the 
Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs introduced the 
idea of a classification of different substances in a schedule where the levels of 
control are based on ‘addictive propensity’ of the substances, and a licensing 
system for the manufacture of different drugs, which are still in place today 
(Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, 2012: 74). It also encouraged states to communicate 
on large trafficking cases (Boister, 2001: 31), thus introducing the notion that 
international police cooperation is a way of executing states obligations. At this 
stage, the regime was decisively oriented towards the control of drug supply and 
was premised on the belief that it would be possible to dry up excessive capacity 
and reduce the illicit drug market (because prices would go up and put off 
potential users, thereby eliminating demand). This belief continues to drive the 
regime today, encapsulated in the idea of a 'drug-free world', which was the motto 
of the UN Special Session on the Drug Problem in 1998.  
The 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous 
Drugs contained the first to call to penalise drug-related activities and to define 
related offences so that national penal systems could be harmonised to ease 
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international cooperation. The convention contained specific provisions relating 
to law enforcement action and cooperation, but never entered into force. The 
treaty was promoted by the League of Nations and did not have the backing of 
individual states. Indeed, if states did not oppose the idea of an anti-trafficking 
treaty per se, only a few chose to ratify it. It then became unworkable when 
World War II began (McAllister, 2000: 123). This shows that, at the time, states 
were still reluctant to be constrained by international law when defining domestic 
penal offences. Nevertheless, the 1936 convention had an effect because it “had 
the effect of making illicit drug trafficking a crime of international character, and 
the punishment and prevention of illicit traffic became the concern of the 
community of nations” (Renborg, 1957: 102, quoted by Boister, 2001: 39). 
Finally, the 1953 New York Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation 
of the Poppy Plant, the Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in and 
Use of, Opium restricted the right to export opium to seven traditional opium 
producing countries around the world, of which Turkey was one. (Boister, 2001: 
41). This list of traditional opium producing countries is still valid today. 
The 1961 Single Convention was a watershed for several reasons. Firstly, by 
unifying in one document provisions that had previously been contained in a 
number of documents, including the 1936 convention which had not come into 
force, it codified existing provisions into a coherent text, simplified the existing 
drug control machinery (Boister, 2001: 42). Secondly, it anchored the drug 
control regime in a supply-reduction orientation more strongly than previous 
agreements by focusing on the drug producing countries (Crick, 2012: 4). Thirdly, 
it strengthened the prohibitionist nature of the regime by proscribing completely 
the use of a range of psychoactive substances for non-medical purposes, including 
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the plants that are the raw material for the production of narcotic drugs, which 
meant that it prohibited practices that were deeply entrenched in the culture of 
producing countries, such as chewing coca leaves in the Andean region (Bewley-
Taylor, 1999; Hershinger, 2011; Crick, 2012). Until 1961 the drug control regime 
had revolved around the control and regulation of licit drug production, but with 
the Single Convention it began to revolve around what states should do to 
suppress the illicit drug market. Fourthly, according to Crick, with the Single 
Convention, the message that illicit drugs constitute a danger to mankind had 
finally been universally accepted, with the Preamble of the convention stating that 
“addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is 
fraught with social and economic danger to mankind” (Crick, 2012).  Fifthly and 
as a result of branding drugs as having 'evil' effects on individuals, the Single 
Convention called for “the provision of facilities for the medical treatment, care 
and rehabilitation of drug addicts”, something that allowed a degree of manoeuvre 
for states who wished to develop demand reduction measures to accompany the 
supply reduction measures the convention required. Nevertheless, this provision 
was not seen as central to the agreement (Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, 2011: 75). 
The 1961 Single Convention was complemented by two additional agreements a 
decade after its signature. The 1971 Psychotropic Convention was modelled on 
the 1961 Single Convention and extended the ban to cover illicit substances such 
as amphetamines, barbiturates and LSD, which fell outside the scope of existing 
controls. In 1972, the UN adopted a protocol amending the 1961 Single 
Convention in order to remedy the situation whereby the United States, which had 
been the main sponsor of the 1961 Single Convention during its drafting, refused 
to ratify it – arguing that the text was not strong enough. The 1972 Protocol did 
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not overhaul the system in place but rather “fine-tuned existing provisions relating 
to the estimates system, data collection and output, while strengthening law 
enforcement measures and extradition, and the functioning of the INCB” 
(Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, 2012: 78-79). The 1971 Psychotropic Convention, on 
the other hand, ended the long period during which the potentially harmful effects 
of psychotropic drugs had been consistently downplayed by Western governments 
because they were the manufacturing states. They had sought to protect their 
pharmaceutical industries and so concentrated on traditional drugs like opiates 
and coca, which were produced outside the Western world. By the 1960s, 
however, evidence of the addictive nature of psychotropic substances could no 
longer be ignored. The 1971 convention, McAllister explains, broke little new 
ground in drug control and pharmaceutical firms lobbied their governments 
heavily to ensure that controls would be as limited as possible, but it represents an 
international sanction that psychotics are liable to abuse and addiction and should 
be treated accordingly (McAllister, 2000: 226-239) 
3.2.2 The US War on Drugs 
In 1971, US President Richard Nixon announced that drugs were ‘public enemy 
number one’ and launched the 'War on Drugs'. Sworn into office two years earlier 
on a programme in which 'law and order' featured prominently, Nixon drew on 
the long-standing association between drugs and crime in the public mind to 
garner support for his decision to multiply law enforcement agencies’ 
involvement on curbing drug trafficking domestically and internationally 
(Bertram et al., 1996: 106). At the time, the US largest cities were facing serious 
upsurges in drug abuse and drug-related crime was a growing concern. Moreover, 
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it was known that substantial numbers of American soldiers fighting the Vietnam 
War used drugs (mainly heroin and marijuana), and there was a fear that they 
would bring their addiction back to the US (McCoy, 2003; Friesendorf, 2006; 
Kuzmarov, 2009). 
With the War on Drugs, the American administration reframed a domestic 
problem of addiction as a foreign policy matter, in a scaling up of the discourse of 
early prohibitionists for whom drug use was seen as 'foreign' to American 
Protestant culture. In this discourse, drug addicts and drug traffickers were 
sources of danger threatening to spread crime and societal decay (Crick, 2012). 
Drugs were thus represented as a threat to the state, not simply the individual. 
Furthermore, whilst drug traffickers were an expression of this menace, the real 
danger was seen to come from states with lax enforcement of anti-drug laws. 
One of the main – and arguably one of the most visible – effects of launching the 
War on Drugs was the boost it gave to the drug control administration and law 
enforcement agencies. In 1973, the DEA was created through a merger of the 
previous Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Office of Drug Abuse 
Law Enforcement, the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence and the Customs 
Service Drugs Investigation Unit (Bertram et al., 1996: 107-108). Friesendorf, 
like Crick, asserts that launching the War on Drugs helped to increase presidential 
control over law enforcement and most importantly helped restructure and enlarge 
it considerably (Friesendorf, 2007; Crick, 2012). Nadelmann adds that the War on 
Drugs provided the opportunity to expand the presence of US drug enforcement 
agencies abroad. DEA agents stationed overseas were an expression of the US 
government’s “commitment to international drug enforcement and its willingness 
to assist foreign police agencies”, and they served as a constant reminder to both 
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the host government and the US ambassadors with whom they were co-located 
that “drug enforcement was now a high-level foreign policy objective” 
(Nadelmann, 1993: 141-142, emphasis in the original text). International police 
assistance and training became a key feature of the War on Drugs after 1974, 
when the US Congress terminated the existing police assistance programme, the 
Public Safety Program that had been created in 1962, amid concerns that its 
police advisers were associated with torture in countries where they operated. It 
allowed two exceptions: the fight against international drug trafficking and the 
fight against terrorism (Cottam and Marenin, 1989; Nadelmann, 1993: 111-124). 
Cottam and Marenin assert that this exception meant that the public safety 
programme stopped in name but continued in practice as part of the DEA’s 
activities (Cottam and Marenin, 1989: 606-607). Nadelmann, meanwhile, states 
that: 
“Where once U.S. police assistance had focused on developing police capabilities in 
general and counterinsurgency capabilities in particular, it now focused almost entirely 
on drug enforcement agencies and tasks. A foreign police interested in obtaining U.S. 
training and funds had little chance of success if it could not establish some connection 
with drug enforcement.” (Nadelmann, 1993: 119-120).  
Understanding how the War on Drugs started and how it evolved after Nixon’s 
departure from the US presidency is important because the policy also affected 
how the global drug control regime evolved a decade later. During their time in 
office, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter took less interest in the policies instituted 
by Nixon. However, they did not bring an end to it either and drug law 
enforcement budgets continued to escalate whilst the federal anti-drug 
bureaucracy built by Nixon continued to strengthen (Bertram et al., 1996: 109-
110). Under Reagan’s presidency, the War on Drugs was greatly intensified, 
however. Bertram et al. assert that at the beginning of the 1980s, patterns of drug 
use were changing, with a radical rise in the use of cocaine and the arrival of 
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crack cocaine – which was becoming increasingly prominent in Black and 
Hispanic neighbourhoods in particular. At the same time, Reagan had been 
elected by a right-wing electorate with conservative Christian moral values, which 
had grown impatient with the permissive attitudes towards drug use of the 
previous decades. This resurgence of conservatism facilitated the resurgence of 
the War on Drugs, and it was declared a priority mission in June 1982 (Bertram et 
al., 1996: 112). The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was given a mandate to 
provide guidance to drug enforcement agencies, and the Posse Comitatus Act – 
which outlawed military involvement in civilian law enforcement – was amended 
in 1982 to allow military involvement in the War on Drugs. In 1983, the US 
Congress was urged by the Nixon administration to lift the prohibition of 
international police training adopted in 1974, leading to a surge in assistance 
programmes, which were run not only by the DEA but also by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, the State Department and the Defence Department, thus 
mobilizing a large section of the American law enforcement apparatus 
(Nadelmann, 1993: 120). In 1986, Reagan added drug trafficking to the list of 
threats to national security in a directive that authorized the US military to 
intervene abroad in order to fight drug production (Youngers and Rosin, 2005). 
Throughout the 1980s, the War on Drugs developed along two axes, first by 
attacking traffickers directly using the full spectrum of US law enforcement 
apparatus including the military and secondly by trying to undermine the illicit 
trade and its proceeds through anti money-laundering efforts.  
The intense militarization of the War on Drugs became most visible in the 1990s 
with the involvement of the US military in Latin America (Bewley-Talyor, 1999: 
186-199; Youngers and Rosin, 2005). While Reagan had supported crop 
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eradication and fumigation programmes throughout Latin America, in particular 
in Colombia (McCoy, 2003: 444), his successor Bush launched the 'Andean 
Initiative', which provided training and support for the military and civilian law 
enforcement forces of Latin American countries by their American counterparts. 
Youngers and Rosin contend that with the end of the Cold War, the American 
military, intelligence and civilian law enforcement apparatus found itself 
searching for new security threats in order to justify its activities and the War on 
Drugs effectively filled a vacuum (Youngers and Rosin, 2005). These vested 
interests and their strong administrative structures made it very difficult to 
deescalate the approach and soften the rhetoric (Bertram et al., 1996: 117). The 
militarization of the War on Drugs began before the collapse of the Soviet bloc, 
but the two events collided when large criminal organizations emerged rapidly at 
the end of the Cold War and became involved in drug trafficking. At this point, 
the threat represented by these powerful traffickers was referred to as the threat of 
'narco-terrorism' (Crick, 2012). Drug trafficking thus became the central concern 
because it was seen to pose risks not only to individuals, but also to the United 
States, and to the entire international community. Moreover, as part of its efforts 
to internationalize its War on Drugs, the US administration lobbied international 
organizations for new international anti-money laundering measures (Scherrer, 
2009:14-15). The rationale behind focussing on money laundering was to fight 
activities that supported the drugs trade. As Scherrer explains, money laundering 
was portrayed as “the motor which made criminality of all kinds possible” – a 
transnational threat to be fought because “criminal organizations could not 
operate without access to financial resources and they were exploiting existing 
weaknesses in international financial control systems” (Scherrer, 2009: 19). 
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3.2.3 The 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention 
The adoption of the 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention represented a new 
phase for the international drug control system as the threat drug trafficking and 
drug-related organised crime posed to national security took precedence over the 
dangers they posed to individuals. Albrecht goes so far as to argue that this 
convention, the most recent, is not really a drug convention, 
“but an international convention on international criminal law in the field of drug control 
with emphasis on particular strategies, among them forfeiture policies, money laundering 
control, judicial aid, extradition, control of precursors of drugs and police cooperation, in 
particular as regards, controlled deliveries.” (Albrecht, 2001: 53). 
The 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention can also be seen as a successful 
attempt to implement what had failed in 1936: an international agreement seeking 
to suppress the illicit traffic (Boister, 2001:52). Other aspects of drug policy were 
not dealt with in much detail in this convention and the provisions of the 1961 and 
1971 agreements remained in place.  
Limiting drug control to criminal law and criminal enforcement as the convention 
did clearly reveals that the United States had a strong influence on the direction 
that the regime was taking. According to Bewley-Talyor, the 1988 UN Drug 
Trafficking Convention followed the spirit of the War on Drugs so closely that the 
agreement was an example of the Americanization of international law (Bewley-
Taylor, 1999: 178). Moreover, it can be argued that with the adoption of the 1988 
UN Drug Trafficking Convention, the War on Drugs approach to the drug 
problem was legitimized under international law and therefore received a form of 
recognition by other states as the correct way to enforce drug control. Not only 
did this make it difficult to criticize states that adopt such an approach to drug 
problems, but it also seemed to retroactively justify the US expansion of its law 
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enforcement and its presence overseas; and to make drugs a high priority issue in 
foreign relations, as it had done through the 1970s and 1980s.  
When analysing drug policies at the level of other states, as this thesis seeks to do, 
one needs to reflect on the extent to which policymakers in those states made 
decisions because they agreed with the provisions of the drug control regime and 
worked at complying with their obligations under the drug conventions, and the 
extent to which they did so as a result of the direct influence of the United States 
through the DEA presence and activities on their territory. This question is 
addressed in relation to Turkey in Chapter Six.  
This chronological review of the emergence of the international drug regime also 
shows how the notion that drug use is a danger to people may have been the 
motivation of early proponents of the drug control regime, but that it has since 
been superseded by other concerns, such as the risks for states associated with the 
rise of criminal organizations; the existence of sources of funding for terrorist 
organizations; and ultimately the risk of disrupting peace and security in general. 
The initial impulse came from 'moral entrepreneurs' such as Bishop Brent, who 
found support for their cause in the US administration, which then took on the 
task of inscribing drug prohibition in international law. Prohibition de facto 
placed law enforcement at the heart of compliance with the conventions. Though 
there has been no new international drug treaty or convention since 1988, this 
does not mean that the regime's norms and values have not been debated and 
challenged since. Jelsma explains that the 1998 General Assembly Special 
Session exposed a long-standing conflict between states who wished to preserve 
prohibition and those who sought a more pragmatic approach to drugs – in 
particular with regard to their public health dimensions (Jelsma, 2003). In the past 
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two decades, voices questioning prohibition have been heard with increasing 
regularity, leading Bewley-Taylor to declare that the international consensus 
around prohibition – which was at its peak in 1988 – has fractured (Bewley-
Taylor, 2012). Several states have begun to make national policy choices that 
deviate from their obligations under conventions. This aspect, which is the subject 
of Bewley-Taylor’s study, is not dealt with in detail here because it does not relate 
to police cooperation directly and because there is no international treaty to 
update the 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention. Yet it is important to mention 
that it is likely to continue to influence the future developments of the regime, and 
because harm reduction and demand reduction measures have been gradually 
integrated in the EU Drugs Strategy, as discussed below. Chapter Two, above, 
also highlighted that in Turkey supply reduction policies are well established, 
while drug demand policies are still developing, and that TUBIM, the institution 
in charge of drug abuse in Turkey, recognises that the current drug legislation in 
Turkey is “prohibitive”, but that it is evolving to include increasing demand 
reduction efforts (TUBIM, 2012: 30). 
To conclude this section, it has become apparent that the existence of the 
international drug control regime depends on prohibition in theory and practice. 
The 1961 Single Convention unified the regime that had been established through 
a series of treaties, providing a single system of control for the supply of drugs; 
and the 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention – deeply influenced by the law 
enforcement practices of the US – strengthened the criminalisation of illicit 
practices. The next section will explore the ways in which international 
cooperation has been placed at the core of the system of implementation of the 
regime provisions. 
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3.3 The legal framework for law enforcement cooperation in the 
international drug control regime 
This section analyses how the regime works and sheds light on why law 
enforcement cooperation is key to implementing what is requested of states under 
the existing agreements, in particular the 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention. 
3.3.1 United Nations Conventions  
The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs is the core treaty of the 
international drug control regime not only because it consolidated into a single 
document provisions of the various treaties that had been adopted prior to that 
date, but also because it redefined the drug control regime from aiming for the 
international regulation of the drugs trade to aiming for a global prohibition of 
illicit drugs (Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, 2012). It is in this treaty (as amended by 
the 1972 Protocol) and in the 1971 Psychotropic Convention that the main rules 
and norms of practice of participating states are set.  
The 1961 Single Convention requires that states criminalise actions in relation to 
drugs (specifically the “cultivation, production, manufacture, extraction, 
preparation, possession, offering for sale, distribution, purchase sale, delivery on 
any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, 
importation and exportation of drugs”, Article 36). By doing so, it generates state-
level activity well beyond the simple fact of changing the law. Indeed, because 
the 1961 Single Convention is not self-executing, states themselves must pass the 
necessary legislation, adopt policies and provide institutions capable of 
implementing the agreement’s provisions. In this case, the 1961 Single 
Convention requests states criminalize all drug-related activities. Therefore, law 
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enforcement institutions are required to have responsibility to investigate, make 
arrests and collect evidence that can be used in court when suspects are 
prosecuted. Ultimately, the capacity of the judiciary to prosecute and convict 
people relies on the prior involvement of the police.  
Entitled 'Action Against Illicit Traffic', Article 35 encourages international 
cooperation for the repression and the prosecution of illicit trafficking, and the 
1971 Psychotropic Convention uses the same language in its Article 21 (with 
regard to the illicit trafficking of psychotropic substances). Boister notes that 
paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article 35 require states to “assist each other” and 
“cooperate closely” in the fight against illicit drug trafficking, but neither 
specifies the nature of this cooperation (Boister, 2001: 287- 293). This leaves 
ample room for interpretation regarding the form and degree of cooperation, 
ranging from informal exchanges of information to the signature of mutual legal 
assistance treaties. The 1961 and 1971 conventions also promote international 
technical assistance designed to enable countries to meet the required standards. 
The Commentary of the Single Convention falls short of saying that there is an 
obligation on parties to provide technical assistance to others to fight drug 
trafficking (Boister, 2001:287). It does, however, mean that the United States' 
proposals to train and financial support other states' law enforcement personnel 
cannot be criticized from a legal point of view, because it is a response to the 
provisions of the convention, even though interventionist policies can be 
negatively judged from a political point of view). Similarly, the establishment of 
the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control5 (UNFDAC) following a proposal by the 
                                                 
5 UNFDAC was integrated in the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) in 1990. 
In 1997, UNDCP was combined with the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division to form the Office 
for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, which took the name the UNODC in 2002. 
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United States to increase states’ compliance with the 1961 Single Convention; 
and the fact of the majority of its budget consists of US funds (Bewley-Taylor, 
1999: 167; Department of State, 1971: 158) can be justified on the basis of the 
convention’s call for international technical assistance.  
The 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention was drafted to deal with international 
trafficking in illicit substances. Its approach reinforced the reliance on law 
enforcement authorities to implement its provisions, including giving guidance on 
what measures should be taken (De Ruyver, 2002: 11). The general aim of the 
convention was to increase multilateral action and international cooperation, seen 
as a prerequisite for efficient drug trafficking control (Albrecht, 2001: 53). Article 
9 was dedicated to police cooperation and established a “general obligation on 
Parties to cooperate internationally with the purpose of enhancing the 
effectiveness of ‘law enforcement’ action” against drug trafficking offences. 
Boister notes that this general obligation means states must provide investigative 
assistance, establish joint teams and provide specific drug enforcement training to 
their law enforcement and customs personnel (Boister, 2001: 281-464, see in 
particular 329-346). States were also encouraged to exchange personnel, appoint 
police liaison officers and engage in international cooperation in training and 
research. Moreover, Article 10 on “international cooperation and assistance for 
transit states” established an obligation to support transit states directly or 
indirectly through international and regional organizations. This article recognised 
that in some states illicit drugs were mainly transiting towards destination states, 
and that this obliged other states who had the capacity to assist them to provide 
technical cooperation, for example through training programmes.  
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The 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention also made provisions for the specific 
law enforcement measures that should be used in the course of investigating and 
prosecuting drug trafficking. These included seizures and confiscations; 
controlled deliveries; the monitoring and control of precursors used in the 
manufacture of drugs; and the control of commercial carriers, maritime transport, 
free trade zones and free ports. Boister argues that it is clear that these measures 
have their roots in consumer countries and in particular the United States, where 
they were first developed informally by law enforcement agents before being 
legitimised first by domestic legislation and then through international law. He 
adds that “the crystallisation of these strategies and tactics into international legal 
provisions has been a political process conducted by senior government officials 
concerned as much with overcoming state sovereignty as overcoming illicit 
trafficking.” (Boister, 2001: 464). In effect, the 1988 UN Drug Trafficking 
Convention did not simply define a concept of international law enforcement 
cooperation already mentioned in the 1961 and 1971 conventions, it made it the 
backbone of international drug control. In practice, this meant that for law 
enforcement agencies, while actively engaging in countering drug trafficking a 
multitude of opportunities for agents to work with foreign colleagues arose. It also 
meant that those investigating drug trafficking cases became the international 
representatives of their entire institution. 
3.3.2 Drug control at the European level 
The Council of Europe and the EU also have agreements relating to drugs. In 
terms of a legal framework, the Council of Europe primarily puts into operation 
certain provisions of the UN conventions, such as the 1995 agreement in illicit 
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traffic at sea, which is designed to implement Article 17 of the UN Drug 
Trafficking Convention (De Ruyver et al, 2002: 13). The Council of Europe also 
has a structure to address drug control: the Pompidou Group (named after the 
French President who suggested its creation in 1971) which was formally merged 
into the Council of Europe in 1980. Essentially an intergovernmental policy-
oriented forum focusing on consolidating international cooperation, (De Ruyver 
et al, 2002: 13,18 ) it is important insofar as it represents the first initiative taken 
by European states to cooperate on drug matters, thus marking the birth of 
European drug control cooperation (Elvins, 2003: 84). Indeed, it was from this 
initiative that EU member states developed further avenues for cooperation in the 
field of drug control. This process is described and analysed at length by Elvins, 
who argues that attempts to build law enforcement cooperation on drug matters 
between member states emerged after 1985, when it was agreed that the TREVI 
group, a meeting of officials from the justice and interior ministries of member 
states initially created to discuss anti-terrorism matters should begin to discuss 
drug control matters (Elvins, 2003: 84). The rationale behind this decision was 
not concern over the health and social aspects of drug use, but fears that the 
abolition of borders between the EC’s countries following the adoption of the 
Schengen agreement in 1985 and the Single European Act of 1986 might put 
member states at risk from a sudden upsurge in trafficking. Elvins believes that 
this decision demarcated drug control as a field of discussion in its own right at 
the European level. This is not to say that the work of the TREVI group was to 
reinvent drug control policymaking, however.  
In the 1986 Schengen Convention, Title III Chapter 6 makes provisions related to 
illicit drug trafficking and requests that states, “in compliance with the existing 
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UN Conventions”, should take measures “for the prevention and punishment of 
the illicit traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances” (Schengen 
Convention, quoted by De Ruyver et al, 2002: 14). In 1993, the European Council 
established a European Drug Unit to facilitate cooperation between member states 
in their fight drug trafficking. Based in the Netherlands and staffed with liaison 
officers from all member states, this became EUROPOL in 1998 with the 
adoption of the EUROPOL Convention.  
The Maastricht, Amsterdam and Lisbon treaties of the EU have incorporated the 
work of the TREVI group into the EU's institutional structure. This includes drug-
related provisions to increase police cooperation and judicial cooperation. 
Binding and non-binding legal documents frame the EU's approach to drugs, 
among which the EU Drugs Strategy best encapsulates the European approach to 
drugs. This approach deviates to a certain extent from the international regime 
because it places a greater emphasis on public health concerns and harm 
reduction. The 2005-2012 Drugs Strategy even mentions public health concerns 
before security concerns:  
“Considering the Treaties, other relevant European policy documents and the experience 
of the last decade, the Council identifies two general aims with regard to drugs. They can 
be summed up as follows: 
 the EU aims at a contribution to the attainment of a high level of health protection, well-
being and social cohesion by complementing the Member States’ action in preventing 
and reducing drug use, dependence and drug-related harms to health and society.  
 the EU and its Member States aim to ensure a high level of security for the general 
public by taking action against drugs production, cross-border trafficking in drugs and 
diversion of precursors, and by intensifying preventive action against drug-related crime, 
through effective cooperation embedded in a joint approach” (EU Drugs Strategy, 2004: 
5)  
International police cooperation, however, remains at the heart of the supply 
reduction aspect of the EU Drugs Strategy.  In 2004, the European Council 
adopted two framework decisions: one “laying down minimum provisions on the 
constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug 
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trafficking”; the second “laying down rules for the monitoring of trade between 
the Community and third countries in drug precursors”. Moreover, there are also 
framework decisions on police cooperation on matters other than drugs –  most 
notably establishing cross border joint investigative teams and information 
exchanges. Therefore, the police forces of EU states also function in a framework 
where international police cooperation is seen as the key to the efficient control of 
drug trafficking, and there is an array of measures at their disposal enabling them 
to work with their European counterparts.  
3.4 Conclusion 
Ever since the International Opium Commission gathered in Shanghai in 1909, 
one message has remained constant and it provides the foundation for the 
international drug regime: drugs are a danger and states must prohibit their use by 
citizens. The regime has emerged as states seek ways to minimize the problems 
caused by drugs, and today it is based on two interconnected tenets: firstly that the 
best way to reduce problems caused by the use of proscribed drugs is to minimize 
the scale of the illicit market; and secondly that this can be successfully achieved 
through prohibition-oriented supply-side measures (Bewley-Taylor, 2012:4). As 
the main sponsors of this prohibitionist approach, the United States gradually 
imposed its view. This has led to the three basic treaties underpinning the regime, 
which seeks to ensure that the illicit production, supply and use of narcotic drugs 
are suppressed by criminal law. As a result, law enforcement agencies are the 
main state institutions responsible for taking appropriate actions to ensure state 
compliance with the rules of the regime. Thus, the extent to which a state 
complies with the regime can today be seen by observing the penal sanctions it 
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imposes for drug-related crimes, and by the level of institutional cooperation by 
its law enforcement agencies in combatting drug trafficking. This creates a 
paradox, however: while there is a wealth of evidence that prohibition has failed 
to suppress illicit drugs, states can be seen to fully adhere and comply with the 
regime norms and values. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, 
Turkey is indicative of this paradox: there is little evidence that there its law 
enforcement agency's adherence to the drug control regime has resulted in a 
decrease in drug trafficking. 
Having determined that international law enforcement cooperation is a key 
element of the international drug regime, the next chapter will focus this 
phenomenon and identify its characteristics, observe how it has changed over the 
years, and consider what the main drivers for change have been. This will 
determine how an analysis of Turkey’s policing will be carried out in the 
subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter 4: Literature review: the internationalization of policing 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the phenomenon of 'policing internationalization'. Like 
Chapter Three it explores the background to Turkey’s transformation in policing 
and seeks to provide the reader with a general understanding of the 
'internationalization of policing'. As academic works in this area are plentiful, this 
chapter takes the form of a literature review in order to extract important ideas 
about the phenomenon of internationalization of policing put forward by other 
authors. These ideas are integral to the analysis of the case study in the following 
chapters. In particular, the analysis highlights the arguments presenting the United 
States as uncontested leader of the internationalization of policing – a hypothesis 
tested in Chapter Six. It also identifies the arguments according to which the EU 
integration process is a driver of the internationalization of Turkish policing – a 
hypothesis tested in Chapter Seven. 
Academic interest in the practices, institutions, and evolutions of policing; along 
with its political rationale and the implications it carries for the conduct of 
domestic and international affairs is relatively recent. Sheptycki dates it back to 
the 1960s (Sheptycki, 2000: xi), but a growing interest in this field of study can be 
identified since the mid-1990s. Studies that draw from criminology, law, political 
science and International Relations offer a wealth of information about, and 
explanations for, the emerging trend of internationalization of policing, or 
'transnational policing' (Sheptycki, 2000: Newburn, 2008: Goldsmith and 
Sheptycki, 2010). Drug control is at the core of this emerging style of policing, as 
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was discussed in Chapter Three and today remains “the flagship of transnational 
law enforcement” (Sheptycki, 2000: 202).  
This literature review is intended to help to make sense of the external influences 
that have shaped policing in Turkey by explaining how they became important 
enough to be considered as potential influences to others. It also offers an analysis 
of a number of issues about the nature of international policing, factors that have 
enabled policing to become internationalized, and the implications of 
internationalization on common understandings of what a nation state is. All of 
these elements are important insofar as they provide a basic framework for 
understanding international policing something necessary for the following 
chapters, where the analysis focuses on the elements deemed relevant for the 
specific case-study without going into further detail regarding their importance as 
markers of Turkish policing's internationalization.  
The first section sheds light on what is actually meant by the term 
'transnational/international policing'. The second section focuses on the way in 
which the security agenda of the United States changed radically at the turn of the 
1990s to incorporate the so-called 'new threats' of drug trafficking and organised 
crime, a change that had global effects. In the third section, the North American 
and European models of police cooperation are presented. The fourth section 
adopts a more sociological approach and discusses theories regarding the role of 
intelligence technologies and the bureaucratisation of police forces in the 
emergence of transnational policing; while the fifth section examines the place of 
drug enforcement within transnational policing. The sixth and final section 
reviews a recent study, which attempts to conceptualise vectors of influence at 
play when a police force receives foreign assistance. The conclusion offers an 
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overview of these areas of study and analyses their importance for the Turkish 
case. 
4.2 Nature of transnational/international policing  
In order to initiate this literature review, this section clarifies what is meant by the 
terms 'transnational policing', 'international policing', 'international police 
cooperation' and the 'internationalization of policing'. As this thesis is based on 
the premise that Turkey has internationalized its policing and that it increasingly 
attaches importance to international police cooperation, the meaning of these 
concepts has great significance.  
Some authors prefer using 'transnational' to 'international' policing in describing 
“a rising tide of international collaboration in policing transnational crime”, a 
phenomenon whereby states work to “extend the reach of law enforcement 
systems beyond borders” (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 224). The phrase 
'transnational policing' seems to be broadly accepted alongside 'international 
police cooperation', where the latter is one element of the former. Authors 
invariably refer to the concept of the modern state developed by Max Weber, 
which defines the state as “a human association that successfully claims the 
monopoly of legitimate violence in a given territory” (Scheptycki 2000: 3; 
Deflem, 2002a and 2002b; Friedrichs, 2008: 5; Walker, 2008: 141). They also 
note that the evolution towards a form of policing that transcends the nation state 
system is altering the most common understanding of statehood. Hereafter, the 
use of 'international' or 'transnational' will be chosen to reflect the choice of each 
author, though the distinction made by Walker is useful:  
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“The term transnational is preferred to international for an important reason. If we are 
concerned with policing other than policing that is authorised and practised within the 
territorial and institutional confines of the state, then only some such policing can be 
properly labelled as international. That is to say, policing beyond the state often does take 
the form of ‘international’ or (more correctly) ‘interstate’ policing – police co-operation 
and common action between officials and bureaucracies who owe their authority and 
allegiance first and foremost to the discrete states in questions – yet it may also take a 
different form. For some form of policing beyond the state are not reducible to co-
operation between actors whose main reference point is their state of origin, but may 
instead involve networks which owe authority and allegiance to other non-state ‘polities’ 
or political communities.” (Walker, 2008: 119).  
Andreas and Nadelmann argue that the internationalization of law enforcement is 
characterized by “the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral agreements; the 
creation of bilateral and multilateral law enforcement organizations, working 
groups and conferences; the inclusion of liaison officers in foreign countries” 
(Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 224). Goldsmith and Sheptycki focus on policing 
aspects only and argue that the forms of transnational policing are “liaison 
networks: personnel exchanges; foreign training programmes; technical assistance 
programmes; joint operations; intelligence sharing agreements; peacekeeping; and 
capacity-building programmes” (Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2010: 11). Looking 
beyond these categorizations, Den Boer notes that law enforcement agencies, 
cooperate across borders because doing so results in the sharing and pooling of 
information, policing concepts, methods and practices, leads to the “convergence 
of organizational models and styles of policing” (Den Boer, 1999: 70). Goldsmith 
and Sheptycki's analysis offers greater depth: they identify five pathways that can 
lead to a harmonized model: contact, communication, contagion, conversion and 
convergence, all of which impact on a broad range of questions: “institutional 
needs assessments, the establishment of priorities, agendas for reform, choices of 
partners, choices of technology, selections of strategies and tactics, and so on” 
(Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2010: 11).  
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This raises the question of which model is at the heart of this process of 
harmonization. Den Boer argues that there has been a degree of competition 
between police organizations across within states, and notes that scholars agree 
that the process of internationalization is above all a process of Americanization 
(Den Boer, 1999: 68). Invariably, these scholars refer to Nadelmann’s seminal 
work on US law enforcement, which describes the aggressiveness of the US 
approach in convincing foreign governments to modify their laws; and sign 
extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties and other forms of cooperative 
arrangements (Nadelmann, 1993; Bigo, 2002a:  86; Andreas and Nadelmann, 
2006; Walker, 2008: 139). As an example, Den Boer writes:  
“Senior Dutch and Belgian officials would not deny that some centralization initiatives 
have been modelled on the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and even 
seem to suggest that pressure by American diplomats encouraged the creation of national 
undercover teams and support services” (Den Boer, 1999: 68).  
 
Deflem’s work, a historical analysis of international policing beginning in the 
nineteenth century runs contrary to these claims, however, arguing that the 
internationalization of policing took place in Europe long before it became an 
American enterprise, and that the United States imported European policing 
models (Deflem, 2002a: 216). Andreas and Nadelmann acknowledge that Europe 
has played a role in the internationalization process (and continues to do so), but 
argue that it does not compare to that of US law enforcement: “although the EU 
plays and activist role in creating regional and international law enforcement 
institutions, it would not be much of an exaggeration to say that much of the 
internationalization of crime control has in practice meant Americanization” 
(Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 243).  
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Having clarified what various authors mean when using the terms of 
'transnational' or 'international policing', 'international police cooperation' and 
'internationalization', the following sections explore related issues in greater 
detail. In particular, the reasons why internationalization is often seen as a process 
of Americanization is explored by reviewing how the US policing model 
developed in section three, whilst Deflem’s approach is explicated in greater 
detail in section five.  
4.3 The emergence of new security threats and international responses in the 
1980s and 1990s 
This section presents the reasons identified for the emergence of organised crime 
on national security agendas. It was noted in Chapter Two that throughout the late 
1970s and 1980s Turkey faced a rapid surge in organised crime, which was 
closely linked to political groups in power, and whose activities spread to Western 
Europe. The majority of scholars who have analysed the issue, however, argue 
that states' concerns regarding their national security were not primarily caused by 
the growth of organised crime groups. There are a number of complimentary 
explanations as to why international crime control has grown so rapidly since the 
1980s and in particular during the 1990s. Firstly, it is observed that challenges to 
state security changed following the end of the Cold War and the following 
process of globalization. Economic liberalisation and globalisation are blamed for 
easing the task of transnational criminal organizations and for creating incentives 
for international criminals. Governments had been devoting attention to an 
increasingly wide array of transnational activities, including the trafficking of 
illicit narcotics, arms and people; money laundering; and the trade of counterfeit 
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products, stolen property, ivory, endangered wildlife, toxic waste, arts and 
antiquities (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 5; Winer, 2006: 106). This provided a 
rationale for the reinforcement of legal controls and their international imposition, 
despite the fact that the enforcement methods called for had proved unsuccessful 
so far: 
“Blaming the influx of drugs into the United States on trade liberalisation has also helped 
law-enforcement agencies to deflect criticism, and has served as a convenient rationale 
for more resources to be devoted to border control. (…) In short, a new political and 
bureaucratic rationale has emerged to escalate further, rather than re-evaluate, the 
viability of policies that have long histories of failure” (Andreas, 2002: 49). 
Secondly, Rees notes that the traditional distinction between internal and external 
security began to blur as states faced these new challenges. These transnational 
activities could not be treated as domestic sources of lawlessness, which would 
normally be the responsibility of the police, and states could not single-handedly 
maintain safe domestic spaces from a dangerous external world (Rees, 2006: 389-
392). As a result, police and military matters could no longer be strictly separated 
and internal security agencies had to recognise the necessity of working together 
and pursuing cooperation with their foreign counterparts. 
Thirdly, building on Nadelmann’s original study, Andreas and Nadelmann 
deconstruct any attempt at such a simplistic functional explanation, arguing that: 
“The globalization of crime control (...) cannot be entirely or even primarily explained in 
terms of the functional need to respond to the globalization of crime. It is equally valid to 
turn this common explanation on its head. The underlying impetus of all international 
criminal law enforcement activities is the initial fact of criminalization by the state. New 
laws turn once legal cross border activities into criminal activities, resulting in a sudden 
and sometimes dramatic overall increase in transnational crime” (Andreas and 
Nadelmann, 2006: 225).  
Several authors have thus examined the emergence of the concept of organised 
crime in national and international security agendas, offering insights as to how 
countries gradually came “under pressure to respond in a uniform manner in 
accordance with numerous international agreements, conventions, guidelines” 
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(Beare, 2003: xi; see also Den Boer, 1999b; Berdal and Serrano, 2002; 
Woodiwiss and Bewley-Taylor, 2005; Scherrer, 2009; Allum et al., 2010; 
Woodiwiss, 2000, 2001 and 2007). A constant theme throughout their work is that 
responding to transnational organised criminal activities became a priority less 
because this type of crime had grown, than because its consequences had been 
overstated – if not fabricated (Nadelmann, 1993; Andreas and Price, 2001; 
Andreas, 2002; Beare, 2003; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006; Woodiwiss and 
Hobbs, 2009; Scherrer, 2010). Indeed, as was noted in Chapter Three, in the 
United States fears about increasing levels of drug consumption was only partly 
responsible for the War on Drugs, which was largely lead by Nixon and Reagan's 
desires to satisfy their electorates. This also contributed to the changing profile of 
those perceived to represent security threats, with Colombian cartels, Japanese 
Yakuzas and Asian Tryads gradually becoming seen as state enemies. Meanwhile, 
the state – along with its laws and institutions – was seen as an institution in need 
of strengthening, regardless of its failures thus far (Woodiwiss, 2001; Naylor, 
2002).   
Andreas and Nadelmann and Price argue that a gap had been created with the 
disappearance of purely military threats prevailing during the Cold War, which 
was conveniently filled by organised crime-related concerns (Andreas and Price, 
2001; Andreas, 2002; Andreas and Nadlemann, 2006). More specifically, 
Youngers and Rosin contend that the War on Drugs was revived in the 1980s to 
fill a vacuum in the security agenda (Rosin and Youngers; 2005). Rather than 
moving financial and technological resources traditionally allocated to security 
purposes to other matters, law enforcement matters were elevated into the security 
agenda (Andreas and Price, 2001; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006). Military 
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hardware, technology and intelligence were increasingly devoted to police 
operations, in particular anti-drug trafficking. Walker concurs with this analysis, 
describing the implications it has on the allocation of state resources and 
technologies:  
“In the post-Cold War era we have seen a significant reconfiguration of US security 
strategy in response to the end of bipolarity. Security threats, and security resources, can 
no longer be compartmentalised into the domestic and the global (....) instead these 
threats are perceived as more fluid and more various, requiring new security rationales 
and operational methodologies, but still drawing upon old institutions and rhetorics. (...) 
We see significant technological change in the conversion of military hardware for police 
missions, and organizational change in increased linkages and overlaps between police 
and intelligence communities” (Walker, 2008: 139-140)  
Gradually, the discourse evolved and the term 'organised crime' became prevalent, 
despite the fact that it referred mainly to drug trafficking (Scherrer, 2010). Winer 
recounts that in October 1995 President Clinton issued a directive declaring 
international crime to constitute an international security threat just the day before 
he spoke at the UN General Assembly calling on all states to join together and 
develop strategies to combat transnational crime (Winer, 1998). Soon after the 
new threat of drug trafficking and organised crime reached the American security 
agenda it was discussed internationally. Scherrer demonstrates that the United 
States used its leadership in the Group of 7/Group of 8 Leading Industrial States 
(G7/G8) to place drug trafficking and money laundering on the agenda for 
discussion at the forum’s meetings throughout the 1980’s (Scherrer, 2009). She 
contends that it was relatively easy to justify action against money laundering 
(made easy by economic globalisation), as it was at the heart of transnational 
crime. Nevertheless, it remained intrinsically linked to anti-drug efforts: tackling 
money laundering was presented as a way to address the proceeds made out of 
drug trafficking, though it stopped short of going against the trafficking itself. 
This helps clarify how drug trafficking, the sole objective of the War on Drugs, 
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came to be replaced by the broader notion of organised crime in the American and 
international discourse. Scherrer, Woodiwiss, Den Boer and Anderson thus 
conclude that whilst the United States initially failed to convince other countries 
to join the War on Drugs, they succeeded once they modified their discourse and 
adopted the vague term 'organised crime'. This new terminology was officially 
endorsed internationally in 1994 at the Ministerial Conference on International 
Organised Crime held under the auspices of the UN, something understood as a 
great success for the US administration in ensuring that other states adopt their 
law enforcement policies and practices. (Woodiwiss, 2003: 26-29; Scherrer, 2009: 
21-22,).  
In the aftermath of the 11th September 2001 attacks, the need to improve 
international law enforcement was undisputed, but Winer and Rees point out that 
in fact “changes were already well under way when global terrorism took the 
centre stage as the great threat to an interconnected world”. (Winer, 2006: 106; cf. 
Rees, 2011). The threat of terrorism most probably accelerated the pace at which 
cooperation was being developed by United States and the EU, both of which had 
begun “internationalizing the powers of their law enforcement agencies and 
building networks amongst them for sharing information” quite some time before 
(Rees: 2011: 390). 
The existing literature therefore demonstrates that international crime control 
penetrated the international security agenda following the end of the Cold War, 
through a gradual redefinition of the concept of national security itself. The 
historical malleability of this concept, and others such as organised crime, have 
allowed for matters of law enforcement to be alternatively integrated or excluded 
from internal and external security agendas (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 235-
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237). The first tangible indication that Turkey underwent a similar process came 
in 1996 when its National Security Council (MGK) placed drug trafficking on its 
agenda and declared it a national security threat. Within the following two years, 
the MGK had also updated its National Security Policy Document, in which it 
included the ultra-nationalists gang ülkücü as a threat to national security and 
requested the government to act against organised crime (Robins, 2009: 642). 
This reveals the gradual emergence of the discourse on drug trafficking and 
organised crime in the Turkish context, an issue addressed at length in Chapters 
Six and Seven. 
4.4 Two models of international/transnational policing: North America and 
Europe  
Lemieux argues that “when it comes to international police cooperation, national 
police agencies in North America and in Europe are clearly operating differently” 
(Lemieux, 2010: 278). The historical foundations and legitimacy of police 
systems have driven the development of police cooperation strategies, which 
Lemieux classifies under two opposing paradigms: one economic, driven by 
performance and operational outcomes; and another political, operating through 
political leadership and aimed at building institutions. (Lemieux, 2010: 278-280). 
This section summarizes the key elements of both models, focusing on the United 
States and the EU. This choice should not be construed as implying that these are 
the only two regions where police cooperation is ongoing (see, for example 
Lemieux, 2010, Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2009). Rather, notwithstanding the fact 
that they are the most studied in academic literature, they are of most relevance 
for the case of Turkey given its historical links with the United States and the 
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ongoing process of accession to the EU. In the following chapters, this thesis 
seeks to ascertain the extent to which US law enforcement or EU law enforcement 
have played a determining role in Turkey’s internationalization of policing, and 
so it is important to determine what these two models are and how they have 
become internationalized. 
4.4.1 The US model of international/transnational policing 
That US law enforcement agencies pioneered the internationalization of policing 
in the latter part of the twentieth century is undisputed, as shown by Nadelmann’s 
study (Nadelmann, 1993). US agents were increasingly stationed in foreign 
countries and together with US officials they worked to persuade foreign sates to 
harmonize their criminal justice systems in order to accommodate the 
requirements of the US criminal justice system. He writes: 
“The United States has provided the models, and other governments have done the 
accommodating. It thus would be quite fair, in describing the evolution of drug 
enforcement and many other domains of law enforcement around the world since the 
1960’s, to substitute the word “Americanization” for “harmonization”. (…) No other 
government has acted so aggressively in collecting evidence from foreign jurisdictions, 
apprehending fugitives from abroad, indicting foreign officials in its own courts, 
targeting foreign government corruption and persuading governments to change their 
criminal justice systems. Nor has any government devoted comparable diplomatic 
resources to pursuing its international law enforcement agenda during the past few 
decades. The US government has, more than any other government, proved willing and 
able to intrude on the prerogatives of foreign sovereigns, to challenge foreign political 
sensibilities, and to circumvent and override foreign legal norms”  (Nadelmann, 1993: 
470-473). 
Several authors agree with this point, noting the extent to which the United States 
put pressure on other states first to adopt international standards on law 
enforcement cooperation, such as in the 1988 Vienna Convention (Naylor, 
2002;Woodiwiss, 2001; Rees, 2006), but it is also important to understand how 
American law enforcement developed.  
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In his study of organised crime, Woodiwiss describes how it came to be seen as a 
major American problem because ‘moral panics’ were fabricated and exploited 
throughout the twentieth century, in particular during Nixon’s War on Drugs, and 
during Reagan’s time in office from 1980 to 1988 (Woodiwiss, 2003; Woodiwiss 
and Hobbs, 2009). The significance of organised crime and its consequences on 
the wellbeing of the American population was exaggerated in official reports and 
in the media as well as in journalistic essays and popular literature. In a manner 
quite similar to the portrayal of drug use as alien to American culture, organised 
crime was painted as an alien conspiracy (as discussed in Chapter Three). 
Woodiwiss, Naylor and Paoli describe how the Mafia mythology was created in 
the first part of the twentieth century and reinforced after the World War II 
(Woodiwiss, 2001; Paoli, 2002; Naylor, 2004). 
“From the 1930s (…) a line on organised crime began to emerge that was less critical of 
established laws and institutions and by the 1950s the consensus opinion on organised 
crime saw it in terms of Mafia conspiracy - an outside threat to otherwise sound U.S. 
laws and institutions. The Mafia conspiracy theory was updated in the 1980s to include 
other conspirational entities, but official U.S. thinking about organised crime keeps to the 
simple formula. Forces outside mainstream American culture threaten U.S. laws and 
institutions and therefore these laws and institutions need to be strengthened.” 
(Woodiwiss; 2001: 227) 
As a result, a rhetoric of organised crime policing developed, which called for 
concerted international policing (Woodiwiss and Hobbs, 2009: 124). The purpose 
was to justify the approach to drugs and crime developed by American drug 
enforcement agencies to the American public and foreign administrations. 
Andreas makes a similar argument regarding the fabrication of the threat of 
organised crime, showing how it transformed the American security agenda. His 
point of departure is that the exaggeration of organised crime served narrow 
political and bureaucratic interests (Andreas, 2002: 48) following the 
disappearance of the Soviet threat at the end of the Cold War. Drug trafficking 
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thus represented the first 'new' security threat placed under “the broad (and 
conveniently vague) label of organised crime” (Andreas, 2002: 48). It was noted 
in Chapter Two that during the 'opium crisis', which opposed Turkey to the 
United States – and in order to launch the 'War on Drugs' – the Nixon 
administration inflated the threat posed by Turkish-originated heroin. The 
political and bureaucratic interests of the Nixon administration in making this 
move are analysed in detail in Chapter Six. 
Andreas and Price describe how US international law enforcement became 
militarized during the Reagan and Bush administrations: a change they describe 
as a shift “from war fighting to crime fighting” (Andreas, 1997; Andreas and 
Price, 2001). Admittedly, Caribbean and Latin American neighbours have been 
the primary focus of this switch, but the pressure the Nixon administration placed 
on Turkey in the early 1970s was also a sign that these efforts extended beyond 
the Americas.  
Friman offers an interesting insight into US pressure on Japan throughout the 
1980s, arguing that US diplomacy insisted on every possible occasion that Japan 
should be active in the War on Drugs. Whilst Japan did cooperate, this was more 
due to a desire to work more closely with the United States regardless of the issue 
than because drugs were of particular concern to them (Friman, 1991). The study 
undertaken by Alain, meanwhile, shows that there have been some formal police 
cooperation agreements, notably between the United States and Canada, but that 
there is heavy reliance on ad-hoc cooperation for specific operations (Alain, 2001: 
115-116).  
Cottam and Marenin studied the evolution of U.S. police training assistance 
between the Nixon and the Reagan administrations, showing that even though 
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training programs were highly contentious and drew criticism because of the 
frequent associations of US police trainers with torture and human rights 
violations perpetrated by foreign police forces they were training, fighting 
international drug trafficking provided a justification for granting assistance to 
other states (Cottam and Marenin, 1989). Assisting with police reform in the 
states of the former Eastern bloc was seen as crucial in the consolidation of 
democracy, and Marenin studied the effects of the end of the Cold War on US 
international police aid programmes (Marenin, 1998). He argued that the 
increasing amounts of police aid were motivated by the perceived risks associated 
with growing networks of transnational organised crime and international 
terrorism. Responding to the new threat environment, the United States offered to 
provide more training and assistance to states fighting terrorism and various forms 
of organised crime, especially drug trafficking (Marenin, 1998; Lia, 2007: 5). The 
International Law Enforcement Academies that opened in 1996 in Budapest and 
Bangkok are run respectively by the FBI and the DEA for the specific purposes of 
countering these threats (Bayley, 2001). 
It appears, therefore, that drug trafficking has always been a main driver of the 
American efforts to internationalize their law enforcement, and that US 
authorities have acted at every level in order to have other states join in their 
efforts and adopt their operational methods. Most analysts, however, highlight the 
failure to acknowledge that these approaches to law enforcement have not had the 
desired results. Nadelmann argues that the United States is obsessed with 
controlling drug trafficking and Falco argues this amounts to an addiction to 
failure (Nadelmann, 1988; Falco, 1996). Cottam and Marenin contend that 
assistance to foreign police training was a central objective in foreign policy 
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under several administrations from Kennedy to Clinton, as it was thought to be an 
effective instrument for promoting the goals of democracy, but that the results 
have been to teach foreign police forces techniques of secrecy, brutality and 
repression (Cottam and Marenin, 1989; Marenin, 1998). For Dolan, the 
September 11 attacks pushed drug trafficking further up on the security agenda by 
exploiting the narcoterrorism nexus and merging the 'War on Drugs' with the 
newly declared 'War on Terror' (Dolan, 2005). He notes that the “narcoterrorism 
policy has elevated the potential for the United States to use its diplomatic weight 
to force governments to enact stricter antidrug policies” (Dolan, 2005: 468).  
This section has revealed the centrality of anti-drug trafficking in the US model of 
international policing, which is an element that is useful for the empirical analysis 
in the Chapter Six of this thesis for a two main reasons. Firstly, it strengthens the 
case for choosing as a hypothesis the claim that Turkish policing has 
internationalized because it has been the target of US pressures and incentives to 
adapt and harmonise to the US model. Secondly, the fact that Turkey has been 
operating the international training academy TADOC since 2000, with praise 
from the US government, also indicates that Turkish policing may be following 
US law enforcement in its steps not only by adopting its modus operandi in 
dealing with drug trafficking but also in the way it behaves internationally. 
4.4.2 The European policing model 
This sub-section analyses how the EU gradually developed its own international 
policing framework – an issue that has been extensively addressed by a number of 
scholars. The aim is to show how this European international policing model has 
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developed to gain enough significance for this thesis to test the hypothesis that 
change in Turkish policing was due to Turkey’s membership bid to the EU. 
Police cooperation among EU member states has been the object of study from its 
first steps in the 1970s until the present day. There is extensive academic 
literature on the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Pillar of the EU instituted by the 
1992 Maastricht Treaty (see for example Den Boer and Walker, 1993; Anderson 
and Den Boer, 1994; Anderson et al., 1995; Monaco, 1995); and on the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), which replaced it following the 
Amsterdam Treaty (see for example Anderson, 2000; Monar, 2000; Anderson and 
Apap, 2002; Mitsilegas et al., 2003; Occhipinti, 2003; Balsacq and Carrera, 2006; 
Friedrichs, 2008). Literature concentrating on the changes brought by the Lisbon 
treaty is also developing (see for example Guild and Geyer, 2008; Monar, 2010). 
Several authors have also analysed and elaborated theories on how the EU 
developed its internal security policy and the instruments chosen to respond to 
security concerns such as drug trafficking, organised crime, and terrorism. 
Ensuring effective police cooperation has, without doubt, been considered a 
leading strategy. The creation of EUROPOL and the implementation of the 
Schengen Information System are good indicators in this regard; as are the 
adoption of bilateral and multilateral treaties to facilitate regional cooperation 
(Bellanova, 2008; Guille, 2010) and the operation of Joint Investigative Teams 
(Block, 2008). It should be noted most in most of these studies, the focus is on 
whether new arrangements diminish oversight and accountability mechanisms 
that would normally exist at the national level. This question is not the central 
concern of this research, however, and so the following section concentrates on 
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the issues of how and why police cooperation increased dramatically as part of the 
construction of the European Union. 
Den Boer and Walker established a multi-level system to explain developments in 
European policing which is still useful today:  
“First, there is a series of public rationales which have set a favourable ideological 
climate for the intensification of police co-operation. Secondly, there are a number of 
underlying influences which provide a deeper explanatory sub-text for these 
developments. Thirdly, there is a set of facilitating conditions which have expedited the 
process of development. Finally, we should recognize that as macro-political initiatives 
filter down into the complex interorganizational setting of European policing, they may 
in due course develop their own practical momentum” (Den Boer and Walker, 1993: 8).  
With regards to public rationales, in the final two decades of the twentieth 
century, the European understanding of internal security changed rapidly.The 
pattern here has striking similarities to those observed in the US, and one should 
not rule out the claim that US foreign policy influenced European policy makers 
(see for example Woodiwiss and Hobbs, 2008: 106). As in the US, the fall of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War led to a blurring of the distinction of 
internal and external security because the threat of a 'conventional' military attack 
disappeared. Meanwhile, policy analysts and policy makers developed the “idea 
of a security continuum which makes connections between general categories of 
illegal activities: terrorism, drug trafficking, organised crime, transfrontier crime, 
illegal immigration, asylum-seekers and minority ethnic groups” (Anderson and 
Apap, 2002: 5).  
One element which did not affect the United States, but is presented as a catalyst 
for the change of approach by EU member states is the perceived threat attached 
to the progressive abolition of borders between countries (Den Boer and Walker, 
1993: 9; Anderson and Apap, 2002; Mitsilegas et al., 2003: 42-60). Fears 
associated with the potential existence of a new array of illegal activities once 
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both individuals and goods could move freely across Europe pushed policy 
makers to present organised crime and illegal immigration as the new threats to 
the well-being of European citizens. Walker emphasizes the fact that the 
perception of the threat is more important than the threat itself:  
“Much of the public perception about the need for cross-border police cooperation has 
been focused on the activities of so-called ‘transnational organised crime’ (TOC). 
Organised crime has indeed become the major policy concern in transnational criminal 
justice circles across Europe. The threat of TOC represents a ‘condensation’ of insecurity 
problems in a few key concerns, most notably illegal immigrants and drugs. The tenor of 
these discussions is usually very emotive and the direction of policy development is 
worrying” (Walker, 2001:145). 
Academics focussing on this process of 'securitization' (Balzacq, 2011) argue that 
the new threats became highly politicized, providing a ‘public rationale’ for the 
development of cooperation in the field of security. According to Anderson and 
Apap:  
“Internal security risks, previously tackled at the national level, bounded by 
psychologically reassuring state borders, came to be regarded as a legitimate field for 
European cooperation. The third pillar of Maastricht (almost exclusively regarded as a 
sphere of law enforcement cooperation) and the area of freedom, justice and security of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam were the result. Justice and Home Affairs has been, since 1999, 
the most dynamic area of activity of the EU” (Anderson and Apap, 2002: 6). 
It should be noted that, as in the US context, both the validity of these perceived 
threats and of the security continuum it engendered have been strongly criticized 
in academic literature. According to Bigo: 
“The internal security field at the European level connects questions of terrorism with 
organised crime, and/or with serious cross border offences, with money laundering and 
drug trafficking, with mafia activities, with human trafficking, with illegal migration, 
with religious radicalization, with asylum seekers, with urban riots (see the Prüm Treaty, 
Council declarations on terrorism, and declaration of ministries of interior of some of the 
member states) without any clear evidences that these elements are interrelated. They 
repeat it again and again as a new “faith” for a new “god” (Bigo 2008: 105). 
In respect of underlying influences, Den Boer and Walker argued in 1993 that the 
push for greater police cooperation took place at a time when there was a general 
ethos for integration among European governments (Den Boer and Walker, 1993: 
10). Occhipinti argues that policing integration resulted from integration in other 
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areas (and following the enactment of the Amsterdam Treaty) around a decade 
later (Occhipinti, 2003: 4-6). He contends that understanding the rapid 
development of police and judicial cooperation through the prism of inter-
governmentalism actually fails to explain much of it. For him,  
“a strong case can be made that cooperation on JHA, especially since the mid-1980s, can 
be explained in terms of “functional spillover” which has been the central component of 
neofunctionalist theory. The concept of spillover (…) implies that cooperation in one area 
of European integration leads to cooperation in another. In the case of JHA, for example, 
it can be shown that the creation of the Schengen free-travel area contributed to the need 
for a deepening of collaboration on crime fighting in the EU.” (Occhipinti, 2003: 5-6) 
Occhipinti’s argument is shared by others. Andreas, for example, argues that the 
EU’s economic integration provided as strong a political impetus to the 
development of cooperation against organised crime as did the unintended 
dangers of economic liberalisation (Andreas, 2002: 48). Mitsilegas et al. go 
further by emphasising that the provision of integrated security measures, such as 
police cooperation, became a structural political project in the construction of the 
EU. They observe that the main impetus for the rapid development of the EU 
security arrangements have come from: 
“a combination of increasing transnational challenges, a powerful spillover effect for 
economic integration, national interests in a “Europeanization” of certain national 
problems and the emergence of AFSJ as a major political project in its own right with its 
own legitimising rationale” (Mitsilegas et al., 2003: 161). 
There is a growing body of literature pointing to the fact that the EU prioritisation 
of police and justice cooperation has resulted in a highly complex, 
institutionalised and hierarchical system. Two observations are made in this 
regard. Firstly, the system is complex because it intertwines traditional 
institutional agencies (which are marked by a vertical form of governance) with 
smaller scale initiatives (formed of horizontal, network-types of governance). It 
also intertwines strictly formal arrangements, such as rules of cooperation 
between EUROPOL and national police agencies, and informal arrangements, 
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such as the day-to-day cooperation that is noted to take place among liaison 
officers stationed at EUROPOL or in other European capitals (Den Boer, 2010: 
42-61, Block, 2010). Block argues that both formal and informal channels of 
communication are important. It can be argued that these take place at two 
different levels: at the high bureaucratic level where negotiations over European 
agreements take place, and at the operational level. Secondly, some of the most 
recent work on European security tends to argue that elite forms of cooperation 
are developing fastest (Guille 2010b: 25-40). For example, Guille argues that so 
far as the operational level is concerned, the proliferation of agreements, 
guidelines and rules for cooperation have actually produced a malfunctioning 
system; whereas cooperation tools subjected to less legislation produce far 
superior results (Guille, 2010a: 259). These two elements are important because 
they highlight that in order to understand how policing changes it is important to 
look beyond formal agreements to focus on practice and the behaviour of agents. 
In order to identify whether an elite exists within law enforcement agencies 
regrouping agents are involved in international cooperation, it is important to look 
at how the institution itself functions. The following chapters will demonstrate 
that these elements are of great importance in analysing of the Turkish case. Den 
Boer and Walker also argue that trust and respect would develop between police 
authorities as the level of knowledge about each other’s goals and practices 
increase (den Boer and Walker, 1993: 11). However, this issue is barely addressed 
in more recent studies, with the exceptions of Mitsilegas et al., who mention it in 
the context of the EU accession processes, and Block, who studies the role of 
liaison officers (Mitsilegas et al., 2003: 160; Block, 2010). Given Turkey’s status 
as a candidate to the EU and the difficulties associated with the process, such as 
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the freeze of negotiation of certain accession chapters and the openly negative 
opinion on Turkey’s accession by some member states’ policy makers and heads 
of states, the question of trust, and what might foster cooperation in practice is a 
very important one. This section has analysed the existing literature on the US 
and EU international policing models. It has been noted that the expansion of 
police and judicial cooperation within the EU followed a different path than in the 
United States, even if public rationales and securitization discourses tended to be 
similar. It has also clarified that the pathways through which they might have 
influenced Turkey’s policing would differ from one another. In the case of US 
influence, a “general fixation with drug trafficking” (Andreas and Nadelmann, 
2006: 5) seems to be the main driver of international policing. In the case of EU 
influence, the internationalization of policing has become a major policymaking 
area within the development of the AFSJ, and this must be considered within the 
broader context of Turkey's attempts to integrate ahead of accession to the EU. 
4.5 Pathways for the emergence of transnational/international policing 
This section presents sociological rather than political theories regarding the 
internationalization of policing. The focus here is on certain conditions that – it is 
argued – must be in place in order for internationalization to occur. Den Boer and 
Walker argue that police cooperation develops in an environment where certain 
'facilitating conditions' are present: the use of particular technologies, and the 
adoption of certain organizational structures (Den Boer and Wlaker, 1993). These 
two elements have been explored in the greatest depth by Deflem, although 
Sheptycki also engages with them to a degree (Deflem, 2002a; 2002b; Sheptycki, 
2001). The analysis of the Turkish case will determine whether these facilitating 
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conditions have been present (or at least whether they have been observable), and 
so it is important to establish what they are in detail here.  
4.5.1 Technology 
Sheptycki notes that information technology has been “the motor of 
organizational change in contemporary policing” (Sheptycki, 2001: 146). For 
Deflem, meanwhile, mastery of technology presents a way for police agencies to 
become independent from their political centres and to engage in cooperation 
(Deflem, 2002b: 470). It was noted earlier that a consequence of the elevation of 
drug trafficking and organised crime such that they are seen to present significant 
security threats resulted in the tightening of links between law enforcement and 
intelligence communities (Andreas and Price, 2001: 36, Woodiwiss and Hobbs, 
2009). The unprecedented developments in surveillance and information 
technologies of the past decades are recognised as having opened many 
possibilities in this regard and to have greatly increased the power of police 
agents. It has changed the way in which policing is performed and organised as 
profoundly as it has changed the way in which crime is committed. For example,  
in his study of cross-border operations Sheptycki notes that “much of the work 
carried out by police agents is concerned with obtaining, classifying, and 
analysing a wide variety of data produced in the context of nearly ubiquitous 
control system surveillance relating to traffic in the border region” (Sheptycki, 
2001: 148). New technologies have led to the development of what can be called 
‘intelligence-led policing’, as they rely on surveillance and information sharing to 
the greatest extent and as quickly as possible. Deflem contends that technology 
can also become a site of cooperation: police agencies that do not possess the 
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latest technological tools and knowledge may be inclined to acquire them through 
collaboration with organizations that do. 
4.5.2 Organization: the role of bureaucracies in shaping international 
policing  
Beyond analysing the importance of technology in international policing, Deflem 
designed a comprehensive analytical framework for the internationalization of 
policing. He grounds his analysis on the theoretical model of bureaucratization 
rooted in Max Weber’s sociology (Deflem, 2002a: 3; 2202b: 455), and posits that 
as bureaucracies, modern police agencies evolve gradually towards independence 
from “their political centres on the basis of professional expertise and acquired 
knowledge” (Deflem, 2002b: 456). Deflem’s theory is composed of two elements. 
Firstly, he argues that the greater independence police institutions achieve from 
their political centres, the greater the chances are that they engage in police 
cooperation. Secondly, he argues that the greater the desire of police institutions 
to fight international crime, the greater the chances are that they will cooperate 
with other organizations. He goes on to propose that the element that will make 
cooperation possible is “police technology”, which incorporates technical know-
how and administrative methods. Police agencies establish and share technical 
apparatus before having acquired knowledge about international crime. Once the 
system of knowledge is in place the information emerges, thus defining particular 
crimes as a risk to be dealt with. In this regard, he argues that “[i]nternational 
crime functioned as a professionally defined construct that was real in its 
consequences of expanding international police organization and facilities” 
(Deflem, 2002a: 222) In other words, the development of modern policing is 
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technology-driven and it is precisely this technological drive and the 
accompanying systems of knowledge that leads police agencies to engage 
internationally. 
Deflem’s analysis differs from other approaches as it adopts a sociological 
approach rather than a legal or political one, although it does not necessarily 
contradict them. For example, in his study of the making of the EU’s anti-drug 
policies, Elvins develops an analysis pointing to the role of bureaucracies or sub-
state agents in installing drug control at the heart of transnational policing (Elvins, 
2003). His work retraces the historical development of anti-drug policies from the 
creation of the Pompidou group to the inclusion of drug control in the agenda of 
emerging European institutions (the TREVI group, then the JHA Pillar of the EU, 
through to the establishment of EUROPOL). He contends that national experts 
from interior and justice ministries and law enforcement agencies were given a 
critical role in defining the EU’s anti-drug policies. Given their area of expertise, 
the result was that they focused on law enforcement:  
“At a period when the broader political backdrop created the conditions for a more 
‘technocratic’ emphasis on the drug issue at the European level, as political makers were 
pre-occupied with the wider implications of extended integration, the result was an 
institutionalised response focused on enforcement.” (Elvins: 2003: 122) 
Thus, in addition to Deflem’s theory centred on the technical know-how and the 
bureaucratic independence of police agencies, Elvins draws on theories of 
'epistemic communities' to argue that European national agents managed to 
influence political processes because they had an arena within TREVI and other 
JHA working groups of the European Council through which they could present 
their expertise to decision-makers. In turn, the existence of these arenas allowed 
the experts to develop stronger networks, making their positions even more 
legitimate to decision-makers: 
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“Many of the initiatives put in place have given police and customs officials a 
significantly expanded range of opportunities through which to express their views 
leading to the development of an intense inter-governmental network between interior 
ministries and police” (Elvins, 2003: 152). 
The emergence of the European security apparatus was therefore an essentially 
technocratic process through which European policy-makers agreed to experts’ 
assessment of drug trafficking and organised crime. 
Walker’s analysis of “the patterns of transnational policing” differs slightly, as he 
argues that explanations of “the possibility of transnational policing” are not 
solely political but relate to the development of the professional field of law 
enforcement (Walker, 2008: 122-134). He argues that factors conducive to 
policing beyond the state are for the most part pragmatic. This pragmatism is both 
political and professional: on the political front, it drives cooperation in order to 
address “the forms of cooperation between deviant groups that cause crime to 
ramify across borders”. Professionally, this pragmatism operates because 
“typically police officers have a more immediate sense of the urgency of 
particular avenues of co-operation than do their political masters” and because 
they “can find solidarity, trust and empathy with foreign colleagues born of 
similar working conditions and priorities” (Walker, 2008: 122-123). Walker’s 
analysis is relevant here not so much because it follows paths similar to Elvins’, 
and to some extent Deflem’s, but because it shows that the functional argument 
whereby the growth of transnational crime calls for more transnational policing 
should not be discredited entirely. Indeed Whilst Walker agrees that it does not 
provide a credible explanation, it is clear that the functional argument is 
constantly present in the minds of policy makers and professional experts. Elvins, 
for example, shows that through the 1970s and 1980s European policy makers’ 
central concern was a belief that the removal of controls at national borders would 
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in itself give rise to more transnational crime towards and within the EU (Elvins, 
2003). 
It was mentioned earlier that in recent years a new “internal security discourse” 
has become a leading factor in European integration. Walker, among others, has 
shown how the establishment of a bureaucracy in the field of JHA has both 
shaped this discourse and contributed to its success in influencing policymakers. 
He argues that these bureaucracies have a vested interest in the consolidation and 
extension of their own structures and have therefore developed a rhetoric of 
urgent threats, aimed at giving European political elites: 
“a conveniently reductionist way of viewing the complex problems associated with (...) 
the prospect of sharing the privileged European space with outsiders, with more specific 
concerns about the development of  criminal organizational links across internal and 
external borders” (Walker, 2008: 130-131).  
This security discourse does not function alone, he argues, but is matched by an 
explicit project on the part of policy-makers to build a European ‘polity’ – “a 
‘state-like’ entity, even if not a full-blown state” (Walker, 2008: 131). Policy-
makers have thus been using the new internal security discourse to secure broader 
political legitimacy for the polity-building projects: “a strong element within the 
politics of the EU dramatises what Europeans have in common, even if it is an 
identity which emphasizes what Europe is not – the other beyond the borders – 
than its positive features” (Walker, 2008: 133-134). Therefore, Walker goes 
further than Elvins and Deflem in arguing that even if the experts in transnational 
law enforcement proposed a discourse calling for greater transnational policing, it 
is a shift in the macro-political environment that has made possible the practical 
application of this discourse. 
To conclude this section, it appears that the 'facilitating conditions' for the 
emergence of international policing that have been examined in the literature 
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relate to access to modern technological tools and high level human capacity by 
law enforcement agencies; to the capacity of sub-state agents to influence 
policymaking; and to the existence of self-interest that these agents find in 
engaging in international cooperation. This section has highlighted the importance 
of analysing international law enforcement not only from a state-centred, top-
down approach; but also from an agent-centred, bottom-up approach. This offers 
a different angle of study for the Turkish case from the two that have been 
emerging so far: the hypotheses of Americanization or Europeanization are state-
centred hypotheses, while the above has demonstrated the necessity to looking for 
other factors that take place domestically and at smaller levels than the state. The 
process tracing method, insofar as it is intended to uncover causal chains and 
mechanisms, will provide the leverage to study all of these possibilities.6 The 
following section turns to analyse another way of studying international policing 
by looking at the issues it addresses, and shows that drug control is seen as a core 
domain for international policing. 
4.6 Anti-drugs policing within transnational/international policing 
This thesis is based on the premise that analysing Turkey’s drug control efforts is 
sufficient to draw broader conclusions about Turkish policing, even though other 
areas in which significant international cooperation also exists such as trafficking 
in persons and illegal migration, terrorism, trafficking in counterfeit goods or 
other types of organised crime. This section seeks to clarify why anti-drug 
trafficking is perceived to be central to international policing, such that 
generalisation is possible in this case.  
                                                 
6  See Chapter One, p.8 and Beach and Pedersen (2010: 3).   
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Anti-drug trafficking has always been at the very heart of international policing in 
the United States and in Europe, but many other issues have been attached to it, 
either through political opportunism in the case of the emergence of the term 
'organised crime' or through the development of perceived connected threats. For 
example, authors interested in the establishment of EUROPOL note that the 
portfolio of the agency, which started as the European Drug Unit in 1993, was 
gradually enlarged as negotiations on the EUROPOL convention advanced. As its 
legal basis for action grew, EUROPOL’s mandate became increasingly vague, 
giving it increasing leeway (Walker, 2008: 129). Elvins argues that anti-drug 
trafficking was “partly an instrumental device in establishing what has become 
the lead institutions on the building of a much broader security apparatus” 
(Elvins, 2003: 122), and in his conclusion proposes that “drug trafficking has 
provided an important legitimizing principle for the building of a European 
security apparatus at a formative stage in its development” (Elvins, 2003: 122). 
Similarly, Sheptycki argues that “by the end of the 1990s it was clear to 
knowledgeable observers that action against drug trafficking had become the site 
for the convergence of policing systems in Europe” (Sheptycki, 2000: 214). 
Similarly, Elvins argues that integrating drug trafficking into security agendas, 
thus recognising it as a “high policing issue”, has allowed a number of new 
discourses to emerge regarding activities linked to drug trafficking, which would 
ultimately serve to integrate national security agendas: 
“The conflation of different kinds of transnational security threats has seen drug 
trafficking steadily become positioned as part of a broader set of problems on the 
argument that it is a significant component in an integrated pattern of activities 
undertaken by organised criminals” (Elvins, 2003: 181-182). 
The observation that drugs control is so deeply entrenched in decision making 
regarding international crime control in general also calls for an analysis of the 
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reasons why drug control seems to be so attractive, and why governments tend to 
favour this kind of extended state control. Sheptycki argues that drug prohibition 
has become “integral to the fabric” of the current transnational system (Sheptycki, 
2000: 216). Transnational policing now goes far beyond anti-drug trafficking, and 
is held by an extensive range of supporting regimes, those that govern extradition 
and mutual legal assistance for example. This suggests that because drug control 
is at the very basis of the existing policing system beyond the borders of state its 
usefulness or validity is no longer questioned. 
This question is similar to the one Andreas and Nadelmann ask about what makes 
the success of a global prohibition regime. They argue that key factors are the 
existence of a dominant power; the existence of a moral consensus on the 'evil' of 
activity in question; and that regime proponents seek to suppress undesirable 
activities and maintain moral boundaries around the acceptable behaviour of 
states in international society (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 228-229). In 
respect of the drug prohibition regime, they argue that the norm of anti-drug 
trafficking has the capacity to transcend politics, as have other prohibition 
regimes before, and as others may do in the future. 
Bull offers a slightly different perspective on this question (Bull, 2007). Her 
analysis does not focus on the enforcement aspects of the regime, but seeks to 
explain the political rationalities that led the regime to rely almost exclusively on 
law enforcement for its implementation. She argues not only that have drugs been 
'problematized' exclusively along the lines of supply reduction, but also that the 
rhetoric invoked in so doing has removed the possibility of other ways to  
'problematize' it. For her, the credibility of demand reduction has been recurrently 
challenged: there cannot simply be a two-pronged approach of supply and 
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demand control because they operate on contrary assumptions about the nature of 
drug use and the possibilities for its regulation (Bull, 2007: 164). Her analysis is 
interesting here because it refocuses attention on the fact that the first stated goal 
of the drug prohibition regime is to regulate drug use, and that all other discourses 
on supply reduction and anti-trafficking, and progressively on the fight against 
organised crime, money laundering and all other aspects of international crime 
control, were supposed to achieve that goal – yet what has been achieved seems to 
be a self-justification of the importance of enforcement measures. In this sense, 
Bull shares much of the analysis made by Woodiwiss, who showed in several 
studies how policy-makers and members of the US executive had consistently 
sidelined comments that would contradict the enforcement discourse (see in 
particular Woodiwiss and Hobbs, 2009; Woodiwiss, 2007). 
In conclusion, it can be drawn from this section that the existing literature on the 
role of anti-drug trafficking in international policing supports the premise of this 
thesis: that anti-drug trafficking efforts in Turkey are at the heart of Turkey’s 
policing internationalization. It was noted in Chapter Two that until today Turkey 
has adopted a limited policy on drug demand reduction, and this thesis adopts the 
approach of Bull, among others, to argue that the law enforcement bias in 
responding to drug use is due at least in part to the fact that the norms and rules of 
the international drug regime are biased in this way.  
4.7 Analysing influences that shape a states policing 
This section focuses on the work of Goldsmith, Llorente and Rivas, who analyse 
foreign assistance in Colombian policing. It is of particular interest because this 
work seeks to make sense of the nature and extent of foreign influence on 
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policing policy and practice in a given state (Goldsmith, Llorente and Rivas, 
2010). This is the only study that was identified in the existing literature that 
focused on influences on policing.  In order to conceptualise the phenomenon in 
question the authors argue that it is important to look at ideas, institutions and 
practices regarding policing in the way they are transmitted, which calls for a 
careful analysis of questions of power in transnational relationships; and in the 
way they are received, which necessitates looking at questions regarding 
resistance, the impact on local power relations and the legitimacy of existing 
practices. The theoretical framework they propose builds on Deflem’s by adding 
three elements. Firstly, they argue that the extent to which institutional 
independence from bureaucratic centres drives the involvement in international 
cooperation should also be considered vis a vis transnational power relations. 
Indeed, Deflem does not engage in issues regarding the un-evenness of power 
relations. Thus, they propose that in the support of foreign governments or other 
actors may mean that domestic autonomycomes “at the price of acceptance of 
foreign agendas” (Goldsmith, Llorente and Rivas, 2010: 78). Secondly, they 
argue that Deflem is wrong to suggest that the chances of international 
collaboration are determined by the extent of common organizational interest, as 
this implies that police organizations have a completely free choice in their 
actions. Rather, they argue that some actions are undertaken not out of choice but 
out of obligations in particular those resulting from international treaties and laws. 
As such, the extent to which international treaties call for international action also 
plays a role. The third element they introduce (connected to the first two) relates 
to the importance of analysing the domestic and regional contexts in which 
cooperation between two police forces take place. They argue that Deflem only 
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considers the context of friendly relationships between states, which they believe 
is a false assumption in many cases. They argue that this influences the 'reception' 
dimension in particular, where members of the police agency and even the general 
public may be at odds with official discourses.  
Despite the efforts they make to develop this theoretical framework, in the second 
part of their study the authors focus largely on foreign assistance to Colombian 
policing, rather than applying their framework. Thus, it is difficult to assess its 
possible generalisation beyond Colombia, but it can nonetheless serve as a useful 
guide of elements to look for in the analysis of the case of Turkey’s policing. In 
particular, the question of accepting foreign support to guarantee a certain degree 
of operational autonomy will be highly relevant to the analysis of whether 
Turkish law enforcement internationalized through a process of Americanization. 
4.8 Conclusion: relevance for the study of drug enforcement in Turkey 
This literature review has revealed how the development of international policing 
is a highly complex phenomenon that is driven by a multitude of factors of a 
political nature, but also of a technical and organizational nature. The objective of 
analysing what other scholars have written about international/transnational 
policing and what theories they have proposed to explain its development was to 
be able to extract from their work the features that can be expected while studying 
the internationalization of policing in Turkey. The exercise also served to build 
hypotheses regarding the influences on the internationalization of Turkish poliing. 
These hypotheses are drawn from the conclusions of leading scholars of 
international policing, therefore by validating or refuting them the analysis of the 
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case study in the next chapters will situate itself within existing academic 
literature.  
Firstly, it was noted that once the US administration placed countering drug 
trafficking high on its national security agenda it spared no effort in seeking to 
influence other states to do likewise and to adopt their own vision and practices of 
law enforcement. It would be surprising not to find this as a relevant factor in US-
Turkey relations throughout the same period. One question that will need to be 
examined, however, is whether it was the only factor driving this transformation, 
or whether it was one among many. 
Secondly, it was noted that in order to achieve its accession into the European 
Union, Turkey needed to integrate an extensive amount of European law, 
including in the domain of judicial and police cooperation and border control. The 
main question to consider in this regard is to understand the extent to which the 
European accession process is driving the changes observed in Turkish policing. 
Thirdly, it will be important to examine whether the internationalization of 
Turkish policing may have been boosted by the development of organizational 
interests to fight drug trafficking within the institutions in charge, in particular the 
TNP. For example, the fact that some officials who had the opportunity to 
integrate international networks gained a great deal of influence over decisional 
processes may well be an influence on Turkish police internationalization. Should 
this be the case, it would point this research towards theories highlighting changes 
not at macro-levels but at micro-level; theories that do not take states as the unit 
of analysis, but which look deeper into the roles and behaviours of state 
institutions. It is important to note, however, that the presence of this element 
does not exclude either of the first two elements from being present 
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simultaneously. Indeed, with the exception of some recent studies on 
transnational policing (Sheptycki, 2000; Newburn, 2008), it seems that scholars 
who have studied this field adopted two easily distinguishable approaches. They 
either focussed predominantly on the political aspects and the general 
international implications or on institutional or ‘bureaucratic’ aspects, and 
analysed how the profession and policing practices were evolving. This thesis, on 
the other hand, argues that both elements are important and need careful analysis, 
including a consideration of how these two facets interact. On the basis of these 
hypotheses, the next chapter explains the theoretical framework for the case-study 
analysis that follows. 
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Chapter 5: Theoretical Framework 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops a theoretical framework that will be used to interpret the 
empirical data collected in this study. It has two main functions. Firstly, it 
connects the three previous chapters, which presented the background to the case 
study examined in this thesis, to the case study itself, which will be carried out in 
the following three chapters. Secondly, it presents the theoretical tools available 
for the study of International Relations which have been selected in this study, 
and shows why they are relevant to this case. 
In Chapter Three it was shown that since 1909 a web of international treaties to 
control activities related to illicit drugs, from cultivation to use and possession, 
have come to form an international drug control regime. The concept of an 
'international regime' is constructed by political scientists in order to understand 
international cooperation around a specific issue. In this context, the first section 
of this chapter offers an overview of regime theory and explains why it has been 
chosen for the theoretical underpinning of this thesis. It emphasizes the breadth 
and diversity of the theoretical field. The second section will specify which 
concepts of regime theory are used in the case study, namely regime compliance, 
regime effectiveness and norm diffusion, and the third section will show that 
different research tradition have established different ways to use these concepts 
that do not necessarily oppose each other. 
 Chapter Two, which discussed the drug issue in Turkey, clarified that the object 
of this research project is the attitude of a specific state and not the regime as a 
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whole. Chapters Three and Four also highlighted how important the United States 
has been in the emergence of the international drug control regime and 
demonstrated the continued US influence on international police cooperation. It 
also analysed the rise of the European model of international police cooperation 
as the EU’s AFSJ developed. Thus, the fourth section of this chapter explains how 
the dimensions of the possible American and European influences will be 
scrutinized in the following empirical analysis.  
5.2 Regime theory and its relevance to this study 
Regime theory appeared in the 1970s as political scientists sought to explain how 
rule-based cooperation emerges and how international institutions affect state 
behaviour and collective outcomes. Levy, Young and Zürn, argue that "the 
principal claim of regime analysis is that states may generate institutions in 
identifiable issue areas that affect their behavior and foster cooperation, even if 
short-term interests would dictate deviation." (Levy, Young and Zürn, 1994: xi) 
In the early years of regime analysis, scholars focused on regime formation. Their 
main analytic concern was to understand the consequences of the apparent decline 
of American dominance in the realms of international economics and security, 
and to counter neorealist claims that institutions are a necessary ingredient of any 
theory of world politics (Levy, Young and Zürn, 1994: viii). Regime scholars 
were interested in what motivated states to instigate cooperation, and two main 
approaches dominated: the power-based approach of realists and the interest-
based approach of neoliberals. Both realists and neoliberals applied a rationalist 
understanding of the state, according to which the state acts as an 'individual' 
capable of making rational choices: it is a unitary actor behaving among its peers 
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by calculating costs and interests. A third, knowledge-based approach was 
developed at a later stage, largely by constructivists theorists, for whom power 
and interests are not the only explanatory factors of cooperation. They argued, for 
example, that the implementation of agreements by states and their compliance or 
lack thereof to regime rules could not be adequately explained by a rational 
choice perspective. Realists and neoliberals showed relatively little interest in 
explaining states’ compliance to norms and rules established by regimes, the 
question was posed more in terms of evaluating whether a minimum level of 
compliance was a condition for the existence of a regime (Krasner, 1983; 
Rittberger, 1993). Studies on when and why states comply with regime rules were 
brought into the debate by constructivists (Checkel, 1999 and 2001; Chayes and 
Chayes, 1993, Tallberg, 2002), and these triggered an interest in understanding 
the role played by regimes in the states’ behavioural changes. 
Most of the research on the question of implementation and compliance, and on 
the question of effectiveness and consequences of international regimes has been 
developed with regard to environmental regulatory regimes and, to a lesser extent, 
trade regimes (Young and Zürn, 2006; Victor and Rausitala, 1998; Underdal and 
Young, 2008). However, much of the theoretical interpretation and 
conceptualisation arising from these studies that is likely to be of relevance to 
other regimes, including the international drugs prohibition regime. Analysts of 
regimes have developed generic hypotheses about the formation, the operation 
and the effectiveness of regimes related to the environment, while recognising 
that the concerns motivating their study and the conclusions they were drawing 
were not limited to environmental cooperation (Victor, Raustiala and Skolnikoff, 
1998: 15).  
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Since its emergence, regime theory has developed in many directions, as 
Breitmeier, Young and Zürn note: 
“regime theory provides an umbrella that is broad enough to encompass a wide range of 
epistemological preferences and theoretical perspectives. There is room for those who 
focus on the roles of power, interests, or knowledge to interact constructively with one 
another in analyses of the formation and operation of specific regimes (Hasenclever, 
Mayer, and Rittberger, 1997). Regime theory has no difficulty accommodating the 
contributions of constructivists as well as an array of analysts who regard themselves as 
positivists (Rittberger, 1993; Young, 1999b)” (Breitmeier, Young and Zürn: 2010: 2, see 
also Gale, 1998: 278). 
This thesis relies on the variety of perspectives within regime theory to be able to 
challenge the assumptions and expectations that characterize the most commonly 
used explanations of how international drug control functions and how policy 
changes take place in Turkey. The choice of regime theory to comprehend the 
issue of international drug control is not original, however. Nadelmann resorted to 
regime theory when developing the concept of a prohibition regime (Nadelamnn, 
1990), which he uses in his later works (albeit without discussing the concept 
itself any further) (Nadelmann, 1993; Andreas and Nadelamnn, 2008). Bewley-
Taylor follows Nadelmann’s definition of drugs control as a prohibition regime 
and studies the role of the United States in the formation of the regime. His first 
study is largely influenced by neorealist thinking and seeks to demonstrate how 
the hegemonic power of the United States expresses itself through the drug 
control regime by channelling its coercive policies through the UN (Bewley-
Taylor, 2001). In his recent work on the drug control regime, he also works on the 
basis of American hegemonic power over the international drug control regime 
and explains how other states have been challenging the inability of the current 
regime to solve the drug problem (Bewley-Taylor, 2012). A number of scholars 
have also used the concept of regime, or of a prohibition regime, to address 
international drug control although they have not addressed in detail the 
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theoretical underpinning of this concept (see for example Boister, 2001; Drucker, 
2003; Fazey, 2003). Grounding this study in regime theory, therefore, helps to 
situate it within an existing body of literature. This thesis seeks to draw from and 
build on this existing work while at the same time seeking to challenge recurring 
assumptions by exploiting a range of regime theoretical explanatory tools that go 
beyond the neorealist approach. 
5.3 The use of regime theory in this study 
Chapter Three described how the present system of worldwide drug control was 
gradually built up to become an international prohibition regime. The UN 
conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988 prescribe the rules to be obeyed by state 
parties domestically and in their relations with each other. States have agreed to 
regularize their cooperation around the issue of drug control, meaning it can be 
regarded as a set of “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-
area”. (Krasner, 1982: 185). Virtually all discussion of international regimes 
proceed from this definition, despite the fact that it has been widely criticised, and 
[that] many have attempted to modify or clarify the concept (Hasenclever, Mayer 
and Rittberger 1996: 179-183). The definition of an international regime adopted 
here is that of Levy, Young and Zürn:  
“Regimes are social institutions consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, 
procedures and programs that govern the interactions of actors in specific issue-areas” 
(Levy, Young and Zürn, 1994: xiii). 
This definition avoids lengthy debates to reach a unique and consensual definition 
of the concept of regime (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1996: 179-183). It 
encompasses both the importance of states’ recognition of "agreements as having 
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a continuing validity", and of related "observed behaviour" (Keohane, 1993: 26-
29), meaning that the regimes influence the behaviour of states by giving rise to 
social practices in international society.  
Regime theorists have studied a wide range of issues relating to how regimes are 
formed, how they function, and how they fail or break down. In this thesis, the 
focus is placed on 'regime effectiveness'. It is therefore important to clarify how 
this concept has developed and what it encompasses. Regime effectiveness has 
been studied by Young in particular (Young, 2002; Young and Levy, 1999) in an 
attempt to understand why “some regimes can range along a continuum from 
ineffectual arrangements, which wind up as dead letters, to highly effective 
arrangements, which produce quick and decisive solutions for the problems at 
hand” (Young 1999:1). The inability of the prohibitive policies of the 
international drug control regime to reduce the scale of the illicit drug market are 
well known, for example, but states are usually keen to argue that existing drug 
conventions are “effective and appropriate”, and that they “provide a workable 
framework for cooperation” (Bewley Taylor, 2012: 11).  
This poses a range of questions about what constitutes a measure of effectiveness. 
Young and Levy identify various approaches to interpret regime effectiveness: 
problem solving, legal, economic, normative and political approaches (Young and 
Levy, 1999). The first emphasizes the degree to which the regime alleviates the 
problem and relates to the concept of performance. The second approach 
emphasizes the degree to which obligations are met, the third focuses on whether 
a regime generates the desired outcome whilst accruing the least possible cost, 
and the fourth on whether a regime generates fair or just outcomes or outcomes in 
accordance with other normative principles. Finally, the political approach, which 
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has been broadly accepted by regime scholars as the most important refers to the 
degree to which regimes "cause changes in the behavior of actors, in the interests 
of actors, or in the policies and performance of institutions in a way that 
contribute to positive management of the targeted problem" (Young and Levy, 
1999: 5). In this sense, the effectiveness of a regime is not equated to its ability to 
eliminate the problem at hand (which relates to the regime's performance): rather, 
a regime can result in helpful or unhelpful effects. In order to separate these two 
notions, scholars also refer to regime 'consequences': "Regimes can and often do 
produce consequences whose effects are felt beyond their own issue areas, 
whether or not they succeed in solving the problems that motivate their creators to 
solve them" (Young, 2006: 7). Because regimes do not operate in an institutional 
vacuum, impacts beyond their immediate issue area are likely to occur, whichcan 
be understood as unintended side effects of regime operations, or as "products of 
indirect efforts to influence either domestic or international affairs" (Young, 
2006: 13). 
This thesis builds on the political approach as it assumes regime effectiveness to 
refer to regime 'influence' on state behaviour. It is important to note, however, that 
it also accepts Young’s assertion that “the debate about whether international 
regimes matter is essentially over”, and that “while regimes matter, the ways in 
which they matter, the extent to which they matter and the conditions under which 
they matter are variables whose values range widely” (Young, 2004: 3). This 
thesis, therefore, does not test whether the international drug control regime is 
effective in curbing drugs; but rather how, in what conditions, and through what 
mechanisms Turkey has been influenced to change its policy and practices 
relating to drug control. 
 129 
 
It is posited that Turkey’s change of behaviour is an indication of the drug control 
regime's 'effectiveness'. What remains unexplained, and is therefore at the centre 
of this thesis, is the mechanism, or mechanisms, of such effectiveness. Observable 
phenomena of regime effectiveness are the actions and decisions taken by the 
actors of the regime, mainly states’ actions (or lack thereof) in meeting their 
obligations. These actions, which constitute the behaviour of actors, can be 
interpreted from different angles and are relevant to the study of regime 
compliance, norm diffusion and socialization in particular. 
Checkel and Heinze both note that it is not possible to clearly separate norm 
diffusion research from compliance research or from other studies that seek to 
focus specifically on other mechanisms such as socialization, social learning, 
policy transfer, policy convergence, and – as will be discussed later – 
Europeanization (see in particular Börzel and Risse, 2012). The same concepts are 
used by scholars who borrow concomitantly from rationalist and constructivist 
epistemologies to construct explanatory frameworks (Checkel, 2001: 556; Heinze, 
2011: 5). This thesis follows in this spirit, as it seeks to use rationalist and 
constructivist approaches not in opposition to each other, but alongside each other 
in order to fine-tune the explanation of processes studied. Even if at first sight it 
seems that the theoretical frameworks are distinct and incomparable, it is assumed 
that they look at the same 'objects' from different angles, meaning that when 
combined they highlight the finer details of the object of study. Following Zürn 
and Checkel, it is assumed that building bridges between the various approaches 
in this manner is useful (Zürn and Checkel, 2005: 1045). It is all the more useful 
in the context of this study as it seeks to explain a specific case by using existing 
theory rather than by developing new theoretical tools. It aims to show that 
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dominant explanations of drug control and of Turkey’s policymaking tend to rely 
on established ideas, such as the “Americanization of international policing”, or 
the “Europeanization of Turkey”, and that these need to be revisited. 
To conclude this section, it appears that regime theory provides an adequate 
theoretical framework for this thesis because the concept of regime effectiveness 
has been developed for the study of processes of state behaviour change on an 
issue that is subjected to international norms and rules. There are, however, 
several approaches that exist alongside each other to explain regime effectiveness. 
The next section maps out these different paradigms and identifies how they can 
be used alongside each other in this thesis. 
5.4 The different approaches in regime theory 
This section begins with a presentation of the rationalist approaches, both 
neorealist and neoliberal; and constructivist approaches to regime theory. The 
second part of this section details how they will be used in the empirical analysis. 
5.4.1 Rationalist perspectives on international cooperation, compliance and 
norm diffusion 
Early theorists of international regime theory, including Ruggie, Keohane or Nye, 
Krasner, Haas and Young, adopted a rationalist approach to explain the 
emergence of rule-based international cooperation (Hasenclever, Mayer and 
Rittberger, 1996: 177).  Whether neorealist or neoliberal, all were rational choice 
scholars and they agreed on a set of assumptions regarding the state and 
international society: the latter being formed exclusively by the former, who act 
as individual actors. They disagree, however, on what motivates states in their 
 131 
 
decisions to cooperate, and on the significance of international institutions in 
explaining forms of cooperation. Neorealist scholars argue that power structures 
and power differentials are the key explanatory factors for the formation and the 
operation of regimes. They contend that regimes are established by actors who 
hold most power relevant to the issue area in question, and that they operate so 
long as the power structure amongst actors remains unchanged. In this 
perspective, the international agreements on which regimes function reflect the 
interests of the most powerful. The regimes in question have no independent 
effect because even if they appear to be effective they only constitute part of the 
influence of the hegemon onto other actors. The most powerful actor is in a 
position to dictate the rules of cooperation, to manipulate other actors into 
cooperating (through threats or promises, for example) and to terminate 
cooperation if its interests change. It was noted in Chapter Three, for example, 
that Bewley-Talyor contends that the United States has been the driving force of 
international drug control. He writes: 
“Continuing US dominance was demonstrated by the key role its delegations played in 
construction and ultimate form of the later drug control treaties., including the amending 
protocol instigated by the Nixon administration to strengthen the Single Convention in 
1972. More recently, that the motif for the 1998 UNGASS [United Nations General 
Assembly Special Session on Drugs] not only US conceptualization of the issue but also 
bore a remarkable resemblance to President Clinton’s then recent domestic 
pronouncements on the issue, was emblematic of the continuing influence of the USA 
within the functioning of the regime three decades after the Single Convention came into 
force” (Bewley-Taylor, 2012:11). 
Power-based approaches do not consider that cooperation between actors is 
impossible, but that it is limited to cases where it is primarily in the interest of 
dominant actors to further common objectives. They rely on the vision of the 
international system as anarchic, meaning that each actor seeks to exploit the 
capabilities or the wealth of others in order to enhance its own power. To do so, a 
relative loss in some relationships will not necessarily keep powerful states from 
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cooperation, provided the relative losses are outweighed by absolute gains. 
(Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996) 
Neoliberal approaches to regime theory focus on power differentials as identified 
by realists, but they emphasize that states pursue absolute and relative interests 
and will join or instigate an international regime if cooperation helps them 
realising interests they might have in common. Neoliberals thus view cooperation 
as far more likely to occur than do realists. Indeed, the general proposition of the 
neoliberal approach is that cooperation would be difficult to achieve in the 
absence of international regimes because the costs for states when creating or 
joining regimes are outweighed by the benefits they reap from fulfilling their 
interests through cooperation. Neoliberals differ from the realist perspectives 
insofar as, for them, states are essentially egoists and are insensitive as to how 
well the other actors do so long as their own interests are fulfilled. This results in 
a second major difference: if states are insensitive to how well others do, then 
both strong states and those with fewer capabilities can have interests and attempt 
to pursue them successfully. In this sense, the power that states have is treated as 
an assumption rather than a variable. 
Neoliberals argue that regimes begin by altering the incentives for action. This 
must occur before they can affect states' interests or values, which are understood 
as given and independent of when regimes are formed. Keohane identifies several 
reasons for this, although all are connected and they should not be considered 
separately (Keohane, 1993: 29-31). Firstly, regimes reduce the cost of 
transactions: since there are clear, pre-established rules for action states need not 
renegotiate a path for action every time. Secondly, regimes allow for better 
information flows, especially with regard to scientific knowledge, which may be 
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useful for states in the given issue area. This further reduces the costs of action for 
states that may not have had the opportunity to access such information otherwise. 
Thirdly, when regimes function on clear rules they reduce the fear of cheating and 
increase the cost of non-compliance: regimes are likely to have integrated 
compliance monitoring and/or sanctioning mechanisms, which create greater 
incentives for conforming to the expected behaviour. Because actors’ behaviour is 
more likely to be known to others, the incentive to cheat or defect is lowered. 
Regimes can thus be said to reduce uncertainty and make it possible for states to 
work in an optimal situation, which occurs when two actors seeking the same 
objective cooperate rather than seeking to unilaterally become better off and/or 
making the other actor worse-off. 
For neoliberals, the operation of regimes impacts on other areas. They can “alter 
the underlying capabilities of states, whether by reinforcing the dominance of the 
rich, powerful states or by dissipating the hegemon’s resources” (Keohane, 1993: 
29). This constitutes a shift in capabilities at the international level, but Keohane 
argues that it also impacts upon regimes at the domestic level:  
“Regimes can have other effects on states: by altering bureaucratic practices and rules (or 
‘habits’); by promoting learning about cause effect-relationships; by altering ideas about 
the legitimacy and value of practices; by becoming embedded in higher level normative 
networks; by increasing the political salience of certain issues; by changing the balance 
of political influence within domestic politics; or by enhancing the political or 
administrative capacity of governmental or non-governmental organizations within 
countries (Keohane, 1993: 29-30).” 
What is apparent in Keohane’s argument is that neoliberal scholars accept that 
regimes can be determinants of collective outcomes independently from states, 
which realists do not see as possible. Whilst realists and neoliberals begin from 
the assumption that states are rational and unitary actors on the international 
scene, they diverge on the willingness of states to enter into cooperative 
arrangements. Thus they differ also along the same lines on the reasons why 
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states comply with regime rules and on how norms are spread among regime 
actors.  
Young identifies two causal mechanism models of regime effectiveness that apply 
a rationalist perspective (Young, 1999: 20). The first mechanism considers 
regimes as 'utility modifiers': actors that factor into a utilitarian calculus the costs 
and benefits of regime rules (and of resisting the rules), and which alter their 
behaviour “if and when social practices make it worth their while to do so” 
(Young, 1999: 22). The second model considers that regimes affect behaviour by 
mitigating collective-action problems that stand as a barrier to the realization of 
joint gains. States change their behaviour only when doing so offsets the costs of 
keeping the same behaviour, it is a strategic decision. This views states as having 
the capacity to weigh the costs and benefits of behaviours (which functions as a 
capacity to predict the consequences of compliance and non-compliance), and so 
rationalists apply a logic of consequentiality. Although this may appear as a 
straightforward application of the rationalist approach, the difficulty lies in the 
possibility of defining precisely what constitutes a relevant cost or benefit for a 
state within the issue area considered.   
For neorealists, there is only one process by which the policies of a regime are 
spread – the convergence of secondary actors’ behaviours with the behaviour of 
the dominant actor (Johnston, 2008: 5; Raustiala, 1998: 24-25). The hegemon’s 
coercion and sanctions induce secondary actors to adopt its policies, which in turn 
reinforces its strength and influence. Ikenberry and Kupchan’s proposed theory of 
'socialization and hegemonic power' stems from neorealism and illustrates how 
this approach envisaged the diffusion of norms within a regime, although with the 
use of the term 'socialization' the authors reveal that they have been influenced to 
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a certain extent by the constructivist epistemology, as discussed further below 
(Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990). They argue that hegemonic powers influence 
other states to adopt the rules they have set for the international system partly 
through the manipulation of material incentives and partly through the 
manipulation of substantive beliefs of the elites in these states. The first 
mechanism appears to be a necessary condition for the second to be set into 
motion, and occurs when coercive methods are used to induce acquiescence. This 
is followed by the targeting of elites in order to obtain their approval for the 
norms and values in question. There are, then, two ways to look at this theoretical 
framework, which mirror each other: it is as much about the diffusion of norms 
(how the hegemonic power works to instil norms and values within secondary 
states) as it is about socialisation (how these secondary powers internalise the 
norms and values, where the internalisation is directed by a calculation of costs 
and benefits by the state elites). From this neorealist perspective, norm diffusion 
is no more than a process of the homogenisation of all states’ behaviour to reflect 
the dominant state’s behaviour (Johnston, 2008: 5). Having analysed how 
neorealist and neoliberal scholars developed theoretical models of regime 
compliance and regime effectiveness in their respective research tradition, the 
next sub-section introduces the constructivist approach on the same questions. 
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5.4.2 Constructivist perspectives on international cooperation, compliance 
and norm diffusion 
Constructivist scholars have attempted to fill the gaps that rational thinking leaves 
in the understanding of cooperation. They argue that the basic premise that states 
act as rational actors with identities, powers and interests prior to their presence in 
the international society is flawed. Hopf writes: 
“Meaningful behaviour or action is only possible with an intersubjective social context. 
Actors develop relations with, and understandings of, others through the media of norms 
and practices. In the absence of norms, the exercises of power, or actions, would be 
devoid of meaning. Constitutive norms define an identity by specifying the actions that 
will cause others to recognise that identity and respond appropriately.” (Hopf, 1998: 173) 
Constructivists also argue that rationalist thinking encourages a static approach to 
the study of International Relations, which is ill-equipped to account for learning 
processes and fails to understand how international social norms work 
(Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996: 206). This creates a situation where 
theory gradually disconnects from empirical observations. The hypothesis of 
constructivism is that states do not have a definite perception of themselves and of 
others, nor definite answers about what their goals are and how to achieve them. 
These conceptions are in constant formation and so they should be treated as 
variables, not as unchanging givens. Knowledge-based theories of regimes have 
enlarged the scope of variables: these do not exclude rationalist approaches 
entirely, but leave the door open to theoretical pluralism (Checkel, 1999: 39). 
Knowledge-based approaches make two general claims that cannot be made using 
a rationalist perspective. Firstly, they argue that each regime constitutes a 
'learning complex', within which states develop new understandings of their social 
and political environment over time. This affects decision making processes 
because policy makers can think of new strategies to achieve their goals, or 
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national interests can change. By doing so, they introduce an element of 
dynamism which is absent from rational choice analyses. Secondly, they argue 
that norms and rules have a power of their own over states, which adopt them as 
their own following a logic of appropriateness rather than a logic of 
consequentiality. Observing the rules gives legitimacy to states' actions and 
positively affects their reputation, offering a legitimacy that states seek 
(Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996: 205-217). 
With regards to the issue of compliance, constructivist scholars have brought into 
the study of International Relations a new path of analysis, which can be 
described as a compliance pull exercised by the rules of the regime. According to 
Hurd: 
“Compliance with a rule may be motivated by a belief in the normative legitimacy of the 
rule (or in the legitimacy of the body that generated the rule). Legitimacy contributes to 
compliance by providing an internal reason for an actor to follow a rule. When an actor 
believes a rule is legitimate, compliance is no longer motivated by the simple fear of 
retribution, or by a calculation of self-interest, but instead by an internal sense of moral 
obligation: control is legitimate to the extent that it is approved or regarded as ‘right’ 
(Hurd, 1999: 387).” 
Constructivists have therefore inverted rationalists’ assumptions by arguing that 
states have a “general propensity to comply”. The perspective they bring, which 
stresses the role of social structures, learning and socialisation, in fact 
complements the arguments developed by rationalists, which focus on material 
factors and instrumental motives (Checkel, 1999: 2). 
Socialization is one of the central concepts of constructivist research (Checkel, 
2001, Zürn and Checkel, 2005; Bearce and Bondanella, 2007; Johnston, 2008). It 
is a highly developed concept and has been applied to various fields of 
International Relations, in particular the study of European integration 
(Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2004; Zürn and Checkel, 2005; 
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Schimmefenning, 2011; Börzel and Risse, 2011). The concept has been defined 
by many and Johnston brings these definitions together: 
“Socialization is the generic term used to refer to the processes by which the 
newcomer—the infant, rookie, trainee for example—becomes incorporated into 
organised patterns of interaction” (Stryker and Statham 1985: 325). Berger and Luckman 
define the term as “the comprehensive and consistent induction of an individual into the 
objective world of a society or sector of it.” It gives people identities; they are “assigned 
a specific place in the world.” Socialization, then, involves internalization: “the 
immediate apprehension or interpretation of an event as expressing meaning, that is, as a 
manifestation of another’s subjective processes, which thereby becomes subjectively 
meaningful to myself.” And internalization means the development of shared 
identification such that people come to believe “[w]e not only live in the same world, we 
participate in each other’s being” (Berger and Luckman 1966: 129–30). Thus, 
socialization is aimed at creating membership in a society where the intersubjective 
understandings of the society become “objective facticities” that are taken for granted 
(Berger and Luckman 1966: 44)”. (Johnston, 2008: 21) 
For constructivists, international regimes are in themselves institutions of 
socialization: they create forums for processes of learning, persuasion, or social 
influence. These are dynamic processes, with decision-making viewed not as 
strategic but as deliberative (Checkel, 1999). Constructivists argue that 
‘collective’ understanding of the self and others can develop in a process of 
repeated cooperation. As Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger explain, states are 
socialised into patterns of cooperation: 
“Rule governed cooperation by egoistic actors within a state of nature can gradually lead 
those actors to change their beliefs about who they are. They get habitualized to 
cooperation and, as a result, develop more collective identities. The emergence of 
collective identities, in turn, strengthens the readiness of these actors to cooperate even if 
the dominant strategy of a self-interested actor would be to defect” (Hasenclever, Mayer 
and Rittberger, 1996: 215). 
Young identifies four non-mutually exclusive models of behavioural pathways 
indicative of regime effectiveness that adopt constructivist hypotheses (Young, 
1999: 23-28). The first is based on the legitimacy and authority of a regime's 
rules. It considers that this normative status triggers a behavioural response from 
states rather than calculations of anticipated benefits and costs. The second model 
argues that regimes “achieve their effects by initiating processes that give rise to 
individual and, especially, social learning” (Young, 1999: 26). The learning in 
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question here takes the form of new perspectives on the nature of the problem to 
solve, or new ideas to implement measures. This learning process can lead to the 
generation and sharing of relevant scientific information, for example, through 
'epistemic communities'. These are defined as “network(s) of professionals with 
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative 
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain” (Haas, 1992: 3). The 
causal impact of an epistemic community rests not only on its ability to create a 
dominant international framing of the problem, but also on its influence within the 
bureaucracies of the states involved (Blatter, 2009: 92). Scholars who argue that 
epistemic communities play an important role in the operation of international 
regimes do not consider states as rational actors, nor do they view them as unitary 
actors in the international community. On the contrary, they accept that the 
influence of actors of another nature (nongovernmental organizations; or 
scientific or business lobby groups, for example) must be taken into account. The 
third model argues that regimes help shape the identities of actors, which 
influence the way these actors behave in the roles assigned to them. This model 
inverts the utilitarian model through which actors are believed to have set 
interests determining their role by arguing that the emergence of new rules 
determines the role and interests of each, upon which they construct their identity. 
Finally, the fourth model argues that regimes affect behaviour by creating new 
constituencies and shifting the balance of power among factions and subgroups 
competing for influence within individual states. This model focuses on the 
internal dynamics of states, assuming that the creation of a highly visible regime 
can lead to the creation of powerful pressure groups among the community of 
government and non-government entities.  
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Young’s models of behavioural pathways go beyond the approach of the majority 
of constructivist research. Constructivists assume that norms and values are 
internalized (this is the core of the logic of appropriateness), such that pro-norm 
behaviour becomes so deeply internalized that it is viewed as automatic and taken 
for granted, but they tend to leave a number of questions unanswered regarding 
which norms are internalized by agents; and how and to what degree this occurs 
(Johnston, 2008: 15-16). The idea that socialization occurs within certain 
behavioural pathways acknowledges that the dynamics of socialization are not yet 
fully understood. In an attempt to fill this gap, Johnston proposes a matrix of 
'micro-processes of socialization', through which he studies how effectively 
socialization takes place; or how “social interaction can change actor preferences 
and interests in pro-social ways” and “lead to pro-normative behavior” (Johnston, 
2008: 20). His theoretical contribution also hinges around a perceived weakness 
in constructivist discourse. Constructivists, he argues, have taken for granted the 
fact that actors internalize norms and values without analysing how this process 
actually takes place, leading them to focus on the end result of value 
internalization (Johnston, 2008: 16-17). Moreover, he argues that it is because 
constructivists have neglected looking at how smaller groups and entities, 
sometimes individuals or single institutions, as valid units in the analysis of 
socialization, that they have been unable to explain adequately its mechanisms. In 
order to fill this gap, he identifies three mechanisms of pro-normative behaviour, 
or 'micro-processes': mimicking, social influence and persuasion, which he 
defines as follows: 
- mimicking explains pro-group behaviour as a function of borrowing the 
language, habits and ways of acting of others because it seems a safe 
option in a new environment. “Mimicking is a microprocess whereby a 
novice initially copies the behavioral norms of the group in order to 
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navigate through an uncertain environment.” I do X because everyone 
does X (Johnston, 2008: 23). 
- social influence explains pro-group behaviour as a function of an actor’s 
sensitivity to status markers given by a social group. I should do X 
because others believe that X is the appropriate thing to do and I will be 
rewarded socially for doing it. (…) 
 persuasion explains pro-group behaviour as an effect of the 
internationalization of new norms in an environment. I do X because it is 
good for me to do X” (Johnston, 2008: 23-26). 
Johnston’s conceptual framework does not contradict the constructivist argument 
on socialization. Rather, its purpose is to focus attention on a finer level of detail, 
and in doing so it addresses an often noted limitation of regime theory: that states 
are taken as unitary actors or units of analysis. While this logical at first sight, it is 
often misleading because it hides the fact that domestic and international 
decision-making processes interact through more than one channel. This issue 
was already at the centre of Putnam’s concept of the 'two-level game', which 
argues that international and domestic levels are 'entangled'. This states that in 
order to make sense of how decision makers act at the international level 
regarding an issue-area, it is necessary to understand the domestic level by 
focussing on, for example, the existence of pressure groups, their respective 
positions on this issue-area, and the political gains or losses that might incur for 
the decision-maker following an international agreement (Putnam, 1988).  
In another proposal to understand the dynamics of pro-group behaviour, Blatter 
proposes the concept of 'performance’ as a social behaviour, where actors seek 
attention and recognition on a much larger level than the issue area around which 
they set rules for cooperation. They then use the issue area to achieve 
international recognition (Blatter. 2009). In a manner similar to Johnston’s micro-
processes of socialization, Blatter defines performance as follows:  
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“The concept of “performance” (…) stresses the non-policy-specific motivations for 
policy-making. (…) A “performance” approach stresses the political imperative for 
gaining attention and recognition not only for policy issues, but also for political actors 
and political communities. The “performance” perspective points to the mutually 
constitutive processes of policy-making (issue-specific regulation) and polity-building 
(symbolic representation of a political community)” (Blatter, 2009: 102). 
By emphasizing the symbolic value of norms, Blatter follows key elements of the 
constructivist discourse, but he differs considerably on the issue of compliance to 
rules. According to his understanding, commitment to the rules should be seen as 
a side effect of political performance primarily motivated by a search for attention 
and recognition. Moreover, he does not distinguish himself completely from the 
standard rationalist discourse because the idea of a political imperative for 
attention introduces elements of strategic cost/benefit calculations alongside the 
symbolic aspects of performance. 
This sub-section has analysed the constructivist approach on regime effectiveness 
and compliance. It shows that constructivists develop their understanding on these 
questions as a response to perceived weaknesses of the rationalist approaches 
(presented in the previous sub-section). The next section details how all these 
approaches are used in the case-study in order to find the most satisfactory answer 
to the question of what processes have led Turkey’s transformative process. 
5.5 Using the theories to challenge dominant ideas about Turkeys drug 
enforcement 
Having explained the theoretical used in the empirical analysis and having 
highlighted its main concepts, it is now possible to propose how it can help 
identify what processes have driven Turkey’s transformation. In other words, it is 
now possible to analyse how and why Turkey’s drug control policy and practice 
changed radically over the course of two decades. Through Chapters Three and 
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Four, two main claims have emerged. The first is that the international drug 
control regime is best understood through a neorealist lens, which argues that the 
United States' interests are best served by the regime. The second claim is that the 
main policy tool used to control drugs – international police cooperation – has 
developed well beyond the realm of drug control. Specifically, it argues that 
international police cooperation has become an important area of policymaking 
within the European Union. These two ideas are important here because they can 
be easily assimilated to two frequent generalizations regarding drug control and 
Turkish policymaking. Firstly, that states have been coerced into pursuing 
American style drug prohibition; and secondly that Europeanization is the first 
(and best) explanatory framework for analysing changes in Turkish politics and 
policymaking (Alpan, 2011). 
In order to challenge these ideas, this thesis' empirical analysis draws on the 
theory explained above. The objective here is to establish firstly the extent to 
which these dominant ideas help understand the process studied and then to reveal 
the limits of their analytical powers by highlighting elements they leave 
unexplained. The variety of theoretical approaches within regime theory allows 
for such a dialogue. It is perhaps unconventional to seek to connect theory and 
empirical data in this manner – doing so does not seek to establish how one 
theoretical perspective fits the data available (or to demonstrate a lack of fit 
between the two), but rather explores “if the empirical material can encourage the 
challenging and rethinking of established theory”, and “challenge[s] the value of a 
theory as well as to explore its weaknesses and problems in relation to the 
phenomena it is supposed to explicate” (Alvesson and Karreman, 2011: 15). 
However, this thesis argues that this approach is the one that most effectively 
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mobilizes a complex and dense set of empirical material and therefore most aptly 
leads to answering the research main question of this thesis, which asks how and 
why Turkey’s drug law enforcement changed radically between the 1960s and 
today. The following paragraphs demonstrate how this question will be addressed 
by setting out the various hypotheses that can be generated using the theoretical 
tools of neorealist, neoliberal and constructivist approaches to international 
regime theory. 
5.5.1 Testing the Americanization hypothesis 
In the first empirical chapter (Chapter Six), the thesis focuses on neorealism, 
which is primarily interested in the role played by a hegemon in the diffusion and 
enforcement of international norms. Neorealists argue that for secondary states, 
compliance with international norms is a matter of survival because the hegemon 
coerces them into applying these norms. They therefore focus on the US position 
as the uncontested leader of the international drug regime. Thus, whilst not all 
states necessarily consider the threat of illicit drugs worthy of serious 
consideration, they may oblige with the regime nonetheless for fear of receiving a 
scolding from the United States either directly or through international forums. In 
this context, a demonstrable willingness to adhere to the international drug control 
regime may be explained as a diplomatic choice (Xenakis, 2006:  55). It would 
then follow that it is as a result of American influence that Turkey has adapted its 
drug control policies to conform with the international norms and rules. This 
hypothesis is scrutinized in the following chapter by constructing an analysis 
around the theoretical model offered by Ikenberry and Kupchan, which argues 
that hegemonic actors extend their power and control in international relations by 
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obtaining agreement from weaker states to bring their practices into line with the 
demands of the regime (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990). The theory of 
international norm diffusion they propose is that: 
“hegemon sponsored norms are spread from the hegemon to the international political 
arena and then filter down from state elites to their societies. The promotion and diffusion 
of the hegemon’s norms, through the manipulation of elite preferences in states within 
the hegemon’s sphere of influence, constitute a subtle but significant exertion of power 
by the hegemon.” (Xenakis, 2006: 57). 
Looking at the period from the late 1960s until the mid-1990s, the following 
chapter opens by discussing the extent to which it can be argued that the Turkey’s 
drug control policies and practices over that time bore the marks of American 
influence. As a second step, it will be shown that this theoretical model prioritizes 
a section of the empirical material available to be effective, but that this selection 
is arbitrary and fails to engage with many other aspects it cannot explain. This 
selection bias parallels the oft-cited weaknesses of neorealism: comprehending 
states as unitary actors and policy-making exclusively as a top-down process. The 
observed gap between Turkey’s strong stance on drug control in international 
forums and its lack of action against ongoing trafficking cannot be explained 
using this approach. 
In order to overcome the difficulty posed by this falsification of the original 
hypothesis of the American influence over Turkey’s drug control policymaking, 
the chapter takes the third step of examining the hypothesis that Turkish 
behaviour can be best described as 'mimicking' other states, in particular the 
United States, according to the micro-process of socialization, as described in the 
previous section. In this sense, Turkey’s pro-group behaviour is seen as a function 
of its desire to survive in the international drug control community, but lacks a 
“detailed ends-means calculation of the benefits of doing so” (Johnston, 2008: 
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23). This characterization of Turkey’s behaviour over the period under review as 
'mimicking' may be the best way to explain both the absence of response to 
threats and material inducements; and the lack of self-motivation to comply with 
the international drug control norms. 
5.5.2 Testing the Europeanization hypothesis 
Chapter Seven (the second empirical chapter) tests whether Turkey’s behavioural 
change on drug control matters has been part of its transformation to join the 
European Union. Here, the analysis focuses on the period between the mid-1990s 
and mid-2000s, during which time Turkey’s efforts to join the EU were most 
intensive. The claim here is that Turkey’s adherence to the international drug 
control regime and to other international police cooperation arrangements relating 
to organised crime was included in the accession negotiations because it is part of 
the EU acquis communautaire. Whilst the 'American influence' hypothesis tends 
to be the first that comes to mind in research concerning international drug 
control, 'Europeanization' theory is often the first theory of interest for scholars 
analysing transformations in Turkey (Alpan, 2001: 3). The analysis will be built 
around existing theoretical frameworks seeking to explain Europeanization in 
candidate states, which themselves draw from neorealist, neoliberal and 
constructivist perspectives. The first assumption is that the relationship between 
the EU and candidate states is characterized by a power asymmetry along 
neorealist terms, whereby the EU is the dominant actor, or 'normative hegemon' 
(Alpan, 2011; Haukkala, 2011; Diez, 2011). The second assumption adopts a 
neoliberal approach by looking at rational incentives of the parties. It argues that 
Turkey’s compliance to the international drug control norms is voluntary rather 
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than the result of hegemonic coercion, and is agreed upon following a 
consideration of the material interests and long-term gains to be made from 
complying. This corresponds to a situation where compliance with regime norms 
becomes an element in a calculation of costs and benefits. In this context, a 
demonstrable willingness to adhere to the norms of the international drug control 
regime may be explained by the existence of incentives, sanctions and 
conditionalities attached to the EU accession process. Finally there is also a 
significant trend of research taking a constructivist approach that identifies 
processes of 'social learning', or 'socialization' in Europeanization processes. The 
proposed models have much in common with Young’s models of 'regime 
effectiveness', mentioned above. They rely on the same claims: that the legitimacy 
and authoritativeness of the rules are sufficient to make states comply with them; 
that epistemic communities influence policymaking processes at domestic and 
international levels; that actors’ identities can be shaped by the norms at stake; 
and that new international rules can affect the behaviour of actors at domestic 
level in different ways and shift existing balances of power. Following the pattern 
in Chapter Six, attention is then given to elements that have been observed and 
which cannot be explained with satisfaction using Europeanization theoretical 
models. To overcome this falsification of the original hypothesis that 
Europeanization can explain Turkey's drug control policymaking, the chapter then 
examines the possibility that behaviour changes were driven by reputational 
concerns. If embracing international drug control policies and active involvement 
in fighting illicit drug trafficking created opportunities for Turkey to be rewarded 
socially by its peers, a micro-process of social influence would be at play. 
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5.5.3 Testing the persuasion and performance hypothesis 
In Chapter Eight (the third and final empirical chapter), the thesis seeks to explain 
Turkey’s strong attachment to the international drug control norms since 2005 
through the theoretical prism of 'socialization micro-processes'. The theoretical 
approach adopted here remains within the constructivist school of thought, with a 
narrow focus on socialization micro-processes. Having demonstrated in the two 
previous chapters that dominant theories about drug control and change in Turkey 
yield unsatisfactory results in the case under scrutiny, the micro-process analysis 
stands as a more effective explanatory tool. The chapter develops a two-fold 
analysis of Turkey’s policies and practices of drug control, arguing that they are 
characterized by demonstrations of persuasion of the validity of the international 
drug control norms and by a willingness to be recognised as a leader in matters of 
international security. To do so, the theoretical framework of persuasion as a 
micro-process of socialization is used to show that Turkey’s pro-group behaviour 
within the international drug regime is a result of having internalized the regime's 
norms and accepting them as being consistent with Turkey’s identity. However, 
Turkey’s strategy of offering capacity building on anti-drug trafficking for police 
forces of other countries is related to its desire for attention and recognition on a 
larger level than the issue of drug control.  
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the theoretical framework that will guide the analysis 
of the empirical evidence in the following three chapters. References to regime 
theory are not uncommon in the works of scholars interested in international drug 
control, yet with the exception of Bentham few spend much time analysing how 
regime theory can help explain how the regime works, or the behaviour of its 
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actors (Bentham, 1998; Bewley-Taylor, 1999; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006). 
This stands in stark contrast with other issue-areas, such environmental protection 
regimes, which have been the subject of extensive scrutiny for the purpose of 
generating theoretical models. This chapter also showed that regime theory, rather 
than proposing a single approach to explain how and why states adopt the same 
norms and cooperate on given issue areas, offers a variety of angles of analysis 
depending on the school of thought chosen: neorealism, neoliberalism or 
constructivism. Moreover, scholars studying states' behaviour have proposed a 
great variety of conceptual tools under different labels such as 'effectiveness', 
'compliance', 'norm diffusion' and 'socialization' while looking at similar 
processes, yet little attention is paid to the mechanisms and pathways that lead to 
compliance or socialization. 
Following a presentation of this extensive variety of approaches and models, the 
chapter outlined how these theoretical models are used in the empirical analysis, 
below. Rationalist approaches appear best suited to address the hypotheses of 
external influence on Turkey’s international policing, while constructivist 
approaches appear to more adequately address the hypothesis of a domestic-led 
and agent-based driver for change. Rationalist approaches also appear to be best 
suited for theories at the macro-level, while the various constructivist theoretical 
frameworks highlighted in this chapter allow for the study of change at the micro-
level. 
This chapter has outlined how combining research traditions and theoretical 
frameworks enables the organization of this thesis' case study into three steps: 
firstly probing the possibilities offered by a macro-level analysis, secondly 
ascertaining that the macro-level analysis is insufficient, and finally proposing a 
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micro-level analysis. The assumption that the United States dominates 
international drug control matters is articulated in the form of a hypothesis tested 
in Chapter Six, while the assumption that Turkey’s bid to join the EU is the driver 
of change in all Turkish policymaking is the hypothesis tested in Chapter Seven. 
Concluding the empirical analysis, Chapter Eight analyses socialization micro-
processes. The decision to focus on this approach has been made not only because 
it provides a useful explanation of the phenomena observed, but also because this 
line of enquiry is new and needs further exploration in order to fill a gap in the 
existing theory of socialization. 
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Chapter 6: The influence of the US on drug law enforcement in Turkey 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the first of three in which the empirical data collected for this 
study is examined and tested against the theoretical framework laid out in Chapter 
Five. Covering the period from the late 1960s to 1996, it seeks to explain 
Turkey’s behaviour on the issue of international drugs enforcement. It focuses on 
relations between Turkey and the United States on this issue and questions 
whether the power of the United States in determining Turkish action on drug 
trafficking has been as effective as is often assumed. The year 1996 is chosen as a 
cut-off date for this chapter for two reasons: firstly, it was when the MGK first 
named drug trafficking as a national security concern; and secondly, it was the 
year of the Susurluk car accident, which brought years of state collusion with 
organised crime under the spotlight. 
This period, which starts around the entering into force of the 1961 Single 
Convention, is characterised by significant Turkish involvement in the 
international rule-making processes of the international drug control regime. This 
involvement did not, however, translate to considerable action to apply these rules 
domestically. At the beginning of the period, Turkey appears to have bent under 
pressure from the United States to adhere to strict drug control rules. Yet it is 
apparent that throughout the 1980s, Turkey’s drug control system was ineffective 
and that there was little will within the state apparatus to strengthen it. During this 
period, the international drug regime and international policing also underwent 
significant changes, as was established earlier in Chapters Three and Four, with 
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scholars such as Andreas, Nadelmann and Bewley-Taylor arguing that drug 
control and policing 'Americanized'. This chapter will therefore attempt to 
determine if this label can be applied to the Turkish law enforcement 
(Nadelmann, 1993; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006; Bewley-Taylor, 1999, 2002 
and 2012). 
To test the hypothesis of the Americanization of Turkish law enforcement, the 
analysis is guided by a neorealist theoretical framework. This seems the most 
appropriate conceptualisation of the fact that contacts between law enforcement 
agencies rarely occur on a level playing field, so the capacity to influence and the 
capacity to be influenced is not evenly distributed between the parties, as has 
undoubtedly been the case between the DEA and the TNP (Goldsmith, Llorente 
and Rivas, 2010: 78). The analysis, however, finds that this neorealist theoretical 
framework is insufficient to account for the outcome, given that during the period 
under review drug trafficking continued to thrive in Turkey. The hypothesis of 
American influence, it is argued, can be replaced by a hypothesis of 'mimicking' 
American practices, which needs to be analysed at the micro-, agent-level, rather 
than at the macro-, state-to-state level. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first explores how Turkey interacted 
with other states throughout this period, with a significant emphasis on the United 
States. The second utilizes Ikenberry and Kupchan’s theory of socialization and 
hegemonic power to analyse the role of the United States in Turkey’s drug 
enforcement. The third highlights the weaknesses of this conceptual framework 
by identifying elements that cannot be explained by Ikenberry and Kupchan’s 
theory. The final section proposes to overcome these weaknesses by analysing 
these elements through the lens of socialization micro-processes. It demonstrates 
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that Turkey’s behaviour can convincingly be explained as an instance of 
mimicking other states, in particular the United States. 
6.2 Turkeys interaction with states and international treaties in respect of 
drug control 
6.2.1 Turkeys role in the work of the United Nations Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs  
This section begins with an analysis of Turkey’s participation in the work of the 
CND as this provides good indicator of Turkish interest in the issue of drug 
control. As was noted in Chapter Three, in 1971 the CND adopted the 
Psychotropic Convention, in 1972 it produced a Protocol amending the 1961 
Single Convention, and in 1988 it produced the Drug Trafficking Convention. 
Throughout this period, then, there were regular international discussions on the 
norms and rules to be adopted by the international drug regime. Analysing 
Turkey’s involvement in this rule- and policy-making process is the very first step 
to understand its positions on the matter.   
In a study of the UN drug control apparatus, Bruun et al. identified Turkey as one 
of the key actors of the international drug control regime – albeit one whose 
influence in that regime is below that of others of its standing (Bruun et al., 1973: 
130-31). This may be because Turkey was identified by the 1961 Single 
Convention as one of the producers of opium for the licit market. The exact 
reasons why Turkey did not have as much influence as would ordinarily be 
expected are impossible to ascertain precisely. It can be argued that Turkey 
attempted to stay abreast of new developments and to influence decisions that 
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could be detrimental to Turkey’s opium farmers (Robins, 2007), but did not make 
this a top priority at the UN because it had no inclination to fully apply 
international agreements.  
Bruun et al. focus largely on the size of delegations presented by each state and 
the number of years they have been key members of the evolving drug control 
regime. It is also useful to look at when Turkey intervened and the positions that 
it defended. For example, the official texts of the 1961 Single Convention and its 
1972 Protocol, as well as the text of the 1971 Psychotropic Convention, reveal 
that during the negotiation a Turkish ambassador to the CND was always among 
the Vice Presidents. This means that at each treaty negotiation the bureau of the 
commission charged with overseeing the conduct of the negotiation included a 
Turkish representative. Turkey is also known to have been active in getting the 
Commission to agree to discuss the 1971 Psychotropic Convention by introducing 
resolutions on this issue in the preceding sessions of the commission (Bruun et 
al., 1973). 
According to a former Turkish Ambassador, the state played an active role in the 
work of the CND because it was felt that being recognised as an active participant 
in international forums was important for its reputation (Interview with Sumru 
Noyan, Ankara, 2011). Moreover, it was felt that remaining silent on drugs would 
send a wrong message to other states. The former Ambassador added that even 
before Turkey established an effective control system for opium production, 
which happened after the opium ban was lifted and cultivation resumed, it wanted 
to be seen as being in the group of states standing up against drugs and thus be 
regarded as a 'good member' of the international community and in order to do so 
it was important to be against drugs (Ibid., see also interview with Suleyman 
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Demirel, Ankara, 2010). This point is noteworthy in itself, but also because it 
reflects changes from the pre-World War Two years of the international drug 
control regime, which the Ottoman and then Turkish authorities were opposed to, 
as noted in Chapter Two. 
6.2.2 The opium ban of 1972-1973 
Robins argues that Turkey only began to take seriously its obligations under the 
1961 Single Convention following the 'opium ban crisis' of the early 1970s 
(Robins, 2008). Chapter Two analysed how the ban was put in place in 1972 and 
lifted in 1974, but it is important to analyse here why it happened and the 
implications for Turkey in the international drug regime – in particular for its 
relationship with the United States, which pressured Turkey into adopting the ban.  
Despite Turkey’s active involvement in the work of the CND, it is widely 
recognised that by the late 1960s its control over the domestic opium cultivation 
was loose. Farmers were able to sell their produce directly to middlemen who 
channelled it to Marseille’s organised crime groups, often via Syria and Lebanon, 
for transformation and shipment – predominantly to the United States (Booth, 
1996; Gerber and Jensen, 2001; McCoy, 2003; Friesendorf, 2006). 
The ban on opium cultivation between June 1972 and September 1974 is 
commonly described in literature on the US ‘War on Drugs’ as a clear-cut 
example of the pressure placed by the United States on other states to combat 
drug trafficking through their territory (Booth, 1996:  247-249;  McCoy,  2003: 
464;  Friesendorf, 2006). The existing literature takes a critical approach to the 
US approach to the ban, largely because the Nixon administration is seen as 
having used the events for the sole purpose of domestic politicking (Bertram et 
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al., 1996: 105-109; Friesendorf, 2006; Evered, 2008). Bertram et al. contend that 
Nixon first identified crime as the main issue on his domestic political agenda and 
later singled out drugs as a major source of crime, and making drug control a 
central issue for his administration as a result (Bertram et al., 1996:105). 
Nadelmann and Woodiwiss argue that launching the War on Drugs was primarily 
a means for the Nixon administration to increase federal power over crime control 
(Nadelamnn, 1990; Woodiwiss, 2001). Woodiwiss writes:  
“Nixon narrowly won the election of November 1968 and needed to maintain his "law 
and order" constituency to win re-election in 1972. Headlines had to be made, results had 
to be achieved, otherwise the tough talk and promises to restore law and order might 
backfire. (...) Therefore the Nixonites decided to increase federal jurisdiction to an 
unprecedented level” (Woodiwiss, 2001: 266). 
Developing another aspect of the same events, Uslu insists on the role played by 
Congress in pressuring Turkey:  
“US Congressmen took the lead in calling for measures to force Turkey to abandon its 
opium cultivation. They argued: The United States had given considerable military and 
economic aid since the Second World War. The Turks owed the Americans a favour, 
therefore they should be willing to abandon the 5 million dollars a year they earned from 
legal opium production, which constituted less than one third of one percent of Turkey’s 
total foreign trade. In 1970 and 1971 Congressmen continuously threatened to terminate 
all aid to Turkey if it did not stop opium production. They argued that this threat would 
force Turkey to cooperate with the United States on the matter. Section 506 of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, passed by Congress, reads as follows: “The use of funds 
herein appropriated to assist any country shall be suspended by the President in whole or 
in part when the President determines that the government of such country has failed to 
take appropriate steps to prevent narcotic drugs…” It should be noted that congressmen 
were mainly trying to placate their home constituencies by indicating they were indeed 
doing something about the situation” (Uslu, 2003: 229-230) 
Friesendorf also explains the way in which the Nixon administration, knowing 
little about global drug production and transit routes, clung to a belief that most of 
the heroin consumed in the United States originated from the Mediterranean 
region (Friesendorf, 2006). As a result, Turkey was chosen as the “most logical 
target since pressure on the country promised the quick return that Nixon needed 
at home”, enabling him to assure the American electorate that progress was being 
made on the drug front. (Friesendorf, 2006: 61). Moreover, in inducing Turkey 
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into declaring a ban on opium cultivation following Iran's ban on opium 
cultivation in 1955 (McAllister, 200: 196), the United States threatened to 
withdraw humanitarian aid from as early as 1965 (Friesendorf, 2006: 45). 
The United States also advocated and helped finance crop substitution 
programmes. This was in line with a 1968 UN General Assembly resolution, 
which recommended that: 
“the Governments concerned develop plans to seek assistance from these agencies, from 
the United Nations Development Programme and from bilateral sources in their efforts 
to develop alternative economic programmes and activities, such as the substitution of 
crops, as one of the most constructive means of ending the illegal or uncontrolled 
cultivation of narcotic raw materials” (UNGA, 1968; emphasis added). 
Therefore, even if the American offensive on Turkish opium cultivation is likely 
to have largely served domestic interests for the Nixon administration, and most 
likely reflected a widely held belief among US policy-makers that eliminating 
supply would bring an end to drug use in American cities (Gerber and Jensen, 
2001; Friesendorf, 2006: 40), it could be justified using the norms of the 
international drug control regime at the time. Moreover, Turkey was party to the 
1961 Single Convention, so had to accept crop substitution as a viable solution to 
its problem. The ban on opium production was finally declared in June 1972 after 
the civilian government was toppled by the military in a coup in 1971, and the 
United States agreed to pay $35 million in compensation for farmers’ income 
loss. 
The literature on the manner in which Nixon and his administration launched the 
War on Drugs discusses the ban in Turkey as one of the events that set this ‘war’ 
in motion. For Bertram et al., the ban was just one element within a broader 
succession of events: 
“Operation Intercept was Nixon’s first attempt to strike at the source. The operation 
deployed two thousand agents on the Mexican border in September 1969 (…). Nixon 
 158 
 
then targeted Turkey, one of a number of countries that produced heroin for the US 
market. Turkey, however, was “the only country where we could expect dramatic results, 
and that was what the president wanted” explained a Nixon official – particularly after 
the 1972 elections. (…) The Turks complied – and Nixon declared success. (…) As 
Nixon’s War on Drugs campaign succeeded legislatively, anti-drug spending ballooned” 
(Bertram et al, 1996: 107). 
What is particularly interesting for the purpose of this study is that these events 
opened up a phase of close cooperation between the TNP and US law 
enforcement. Turkish officials and DEA representatives confirmed that it was 
around this period that a close relationship between American and Turkish law 
enforcement agencies began (interviews with Sadettin Tantan, Istanbul, 2011; 
Suleyman Demirel, Ankara, 2010; DEA officials, Ankara, 2011). It was in 1962 
that the Bureau of Narcotics – the predecessor of the Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) – established an office in Turkey, although at the time 
as it was under the US Department of the Treasury. The BNDD then became the 
DEA in 1973 and cooperation with Turkish law enforcement continued. A former 
police officer explained that he had been trained by the BNDD/DEA in 1971 or 
1972, and from there on went on to open the narcotics bureau of the TNP in 
Bursa, a city in Western Anatolia (Interview with Sadettin Tantan, Istanbul, 
2011). 
6.2.3 After the opium ban 
In the years between the opening of the US Bureau of Narcotics in Turkey in 
1962 and the appointment of the first police liaison officers from European 
countries in the 1990s, US law enforcement agencies enjoyed an unchallenged 
relationship with their Turkish counterparts. This fact should partly be seen in the 
context of the Cold War, during which Turkey was a close military ally of the 
United States. The DEA provided considerable support to the TNP in terms of 
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money, equipment and training up until the end of the 1990s (interview with 
DEA, Ankara, 2011; interview with Sadettin Tantan, Istanbul, 2011; interviews 
with senior police officers, Ankara, 2011, 2012). 
There are several signs of the strengthening cooperation between Turkey and the 
United States. By 1975, the DEA had four offices in Turkey: in Istanbul, Ankara, 
Izmir and Adana. In 1979, the two states signed a mutual legal assistance treaty 
and an extradition treaty, both of which entered into force in 1981. Turkey was 
not the only country where the DEA had such a strong presence, however: 
Nadelmann’s study of the DEA reveals that the 1970s were a period of great 
expansion worldwide, including in Western Europe (Nadelmann, 1993). What is 
important to note, though, is that the DEA were the only foreign law enforcement 
agency in Turkey at that time, and there was little close interaction between 
Turkish law enforcement and their European counterparts. It is reasonable to 
assume that European law enforcement agencies should have had a greater need 
for cooperation with Turkey on the drug front given that drugs transiting through 
Turkey were bound for European markets. Germany’s Federal Criminal Police, 
the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), for example, only appointed its first 
representative in 1986; the Netherlands and France sent theirs in 1992; while 
representatives of UK agencies also first arrived in the late 1980s (interviews with 
European liaison officers, Ankara, 2011). This coincided with Turkish and 
Kurdish organised groups becoming predominant in the trafficking of heroin into 
Europe (Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz, 2007).  
The major difference with the period before the opium ban is that by the 1980’s 
heroin was largely manufactured from Afghan-originated opium – which had 
become increasingly widely available – rather than from Turkish produced opium, 
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around which the controls were effective (Evered, 2008; Kamminga, 2006, this is 
further explained in Chapter Two above). Turkish and Kurdish organised groups 
established processing factories to transform the opium into heroin in Turkey, 
which was then smuggled through to Europe. As Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz 
explain, most often these organised criminal groups involved in drug trafficking 
were linked to the state apparatus; the police or government; or the PKK. They 
claim in their study of Turkish organised crime groups that:  
“there were underworld connections with both ultra-right wing and ultra-left wing 
politicians and with individual politicians and civil servants at the centre of power. 
Turkish drug trafficking turned out to be an integral part of the arms struggle between the 
Kurdish PKK movement and the Turkish government. … [The government] had become 
partially dependent on European drugs revenue.” (Bovenkerek and Yesilgoz, 2007: 14). 
The publicity surrounding the trafficking of Turkish opium during the 1960s gave 
the Turkish authorities a bad reputation, and this was aggravated even further 
during the 1970s and particularly in the 1980s (interviews with Sumru Noyan, 
Ankara, 2011; European liaison officers, Ankara, 2011). Robins’s assessment is a 
case in point: he writes that during these years, “Turkey came to resemble a 
'crime-challenged democracy', a category more familiar in Latin America” 
(Robins, 2002: 150). Among the police forces of other countries, in particular 
European countries, the opinion was that Turkish law enforcement forces were 
not to be trusted (interviews with European liaison officers, Ankara, 2011). 
Several liaison officers admitted that for a very long time, requests for 
information or cooperation coming from Turkish authorities were easily 
dismissed, and that even now it was still part of the role of the liaison officers to 
convince sceptical colleagues at home that it was safe to share information with 
and work with the TNP (Ibid.).  
 161 
 
The situation that evolved through the 1970s and 1980s included two paradoxes. 
Firstly, Turkish authorities seem to have consistently expressed agreement with 
and support for the prohibitionist approach of various drug treaties in international 
forums, and they ensured that Turkish opium did not leak into the illicit market. 
On the other hand they allowed, if not promoted, the emergence of organised 
groups involved in trafficking towards Europe. The Turkish intelligence MIT 
admitted in 1996 that: 
“A criminal organization has been set up within the police force in such a way as to give 
the impression that the people involved are combating the PKK and Dev-Sol [a violent 
leftist organization]. The group consists largely of former ülkücü and specialises in 
crimes such as intimidation, robbery, extortion, drug smuggling and homicide. (….) They 
give the impression of being active in combating terrorists but are, in reality, smuggling 
drugs to Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Hungary and Azerbaijan” (quoted in 
Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz, 2007: 176, brackets added). 
This means that Turkish authorities were ready to commit to the norms of the 
international drug regime, but did not transform their commitment into 
compliance. Secondly, the European countries that were most affected by the 
traffic going through Turkey were yet to establish a meaningful presence in 
Turkey. Meanwhile, the Americans cultivated a close relationship and kept a 
strong presence on the ground, despite the fact that by the 1980s they no longer 
saw the traffic ongoing in Turkey as a major threat to their national security. Uslu 
argues that even if the lifting of the ban caused some friction between Turkey and 
the United States, concerns that were expressed by US politicians more than by 
the administration itself – these issues were soon outweighed by the security 
concerns resulting from the crisis in Cyprus. The alliance between the two 
countries was foundational in the maintenance of security in the context of the 
Cold Ward confrontation between East and West. The US turned its attention to 
the Turkish plans to control smuggling and as early as 1974 it praised Turkey for 
adopting the poppy straw process (Uslu, 2003: 248-250, see also Chapter One). 
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These paradoxes lead to a complex picture. Beyond acknowledging that the 
involvement of the DEA in Turkey has been a long-standing one, the substantial 
impacts of this presence on Turkey’s approach to drug trafficking are not 
straightforward. Material incentives have been given by the United States to 
Turkey, but the actual impact of these incentives needs to be analysed. Chapter 
Four explained that authors like Nadelmann contend that US enforcement agents 
devoted a great deal of effort to persuading their foreign counterparts to develop 
their own drug enforcement capabilities and adopt American practices 
(Nadelmann, 1993: 247-249). US drug enforcement internationalized by 
providing models of ways to conduct criminal investigations and of laws to adopt 
in order to facilitate drug trafficking-related investigations. This assumption of 
law enforcement Americanization needs to be evaluated in the case of Turkey too. 
The next section will therefore test the hypothesis that Turkish law enforcement 
changed under US pressure. It does so by adopting a neorealist approach to 
international change, as this is the most suited to equate a process of international 
norm diffusion with a process of harmonization within secondary states to the 
model provided by the leading state. 
6.3 Explaining the US influence on Turkey through the lens of Ikenberry and 
Kupchan 
6.3.1 Ikenberry and Kupchans theory of socialization and hegemonic power  
International drug control is commonly designated as an aspect of international 
relations where the United States is unchallenged as the hegemonic power, and 
has shaped the international regime to its preferences by getting others to comply 
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with its preferred norms and values (Bewley-Taylor, 1999, 2012). According to 
Levine, “there is no doubt that governments throughout the world have accepted 
drug prohibition because of enormous pressure from the US government and 
some powerful allies” (Levine, 2003: 147). To make sense of this phenomenon, it 
is useful to employ the theoretical framework developed by Ikenberry and 
Kupchan in their 1990 article 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power'. They argue 
that hegemonic powers obtain compliance to the rules they have set for the 
international system only partly through the manipulation of material incentives, 
while the rest is obtained by the manipulation of substantive beliefs of the elites in 
the secondary states (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990). When the hegemonic power 
manipulates the preferences of the elites in order to secure their acceptance of the 
norm, mechanisms of 'strategic acceptance' and 'cognitive acceptance' come into 
play. The former, also known as acceptance, or 'acquiescence', occurs “when 
there are incentives to do so”, after which the latter occurs “where the state elite 
has to a certain degree internalise the norm” (Xenakis, 2004: 346). This is a 
rationalist, power-centred argument and the main assumption is that states are 
calculating actors that perform a cost/benefit analysis (Williams, 2010: 9). For 
Ikenberry and Kupchan, the first mechanism appears to be a necessary condition 
for the second mechanism to be set into motion. Coercive methods are used first 
to induce acquiescence and then the work of targeting elites to obtain their 
approval to the norms and values in question begins. 
There are two ways to look at this theoretical framework: either that it is as much 
about the diffusion of norms (how the hegemonic power works to instil norms and 
values within secondary states) as it is about socialisation; or that it focuses on 
how these secondary states internalise the norms and values. It should be noted 
 164 
 
that in this context, socialization should be understood from the neorealist 
perspective of the acceptance of rules and norms because of external constraints 
imposed by the hegemon, and not in a constructivist sense. There are effectively 
two different perspectives on the material or beliefs manipulation relevant here, as 
it can be analysed from the point of view of the hegemonic power or from the 
point of view of the secondary state. This leads to four separate elements that 
require analysis. Firstly, regarding material incentives, the existence of threats of 
sanctions or promises for reward needs to be assessed. Secondly, there needs to be 
an investigation into the reasons why the secondary power accepted rewards or 
bent under the threats of the hegemonic power. For instance, there could also have 
been other factors influencing decision-making. Thirdly, it is important to analyse 
the manipulation of beliefs in order to understand how the hegemonic power 
sought to reach the leaders of the secondary state. Fourthly, the elements 
indicating that these leaders have internalized the norms and values impressed on 
them by the hegemonic power need to be established.  
Several elements in the sequence of events in Turkey during the 1970s indicate 
that Ikenberry and Kupchan’s theoretical framework can explain how it 
internalised these norms. Firstly, the way in which the opium ban was obtained is 
extremely revealing. Friesendorf mentions, for example, that the US ambassador 
to Turkey investigated poppy cultivation in Turkey and recommended the ban 
rather than improving production controls (Friesendorf, 2006). This led to intense 
diplomatic pressure, marked by a combination of threats and rewards. Süleyman 
Demirel, who was Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic in 1969, explained that 
during an official visit to Washington to attend the funeral of former President 
Eisenhower he met with Nixon and his staff, who asked him to put this ban in 
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place (interview with Süleyman Demirel, Ankara, 2010). It appears that Nixon 
sought to add to regular diplomatic contacts between the two states by making 
this request personally, increasing pressure on the Turkish Prime Minister. The 
US also threatened to reduce humanitarian aid, though it finally agreed to pay 
compensation for farmers’ lost income. 
On the other hand, Turkish authorities were confronted with very strong negative 
opinion at home. The fact that there was a military coup in 1971 played a key role 
in the setting up the ban (interview with Suleyman Demirel, Ankara, 2010). The 
Turkish military depended greatly on US assistance, so it would have feared a 
backlash if requests were ignored. In the previous section it was noted that US 
Congress expected Turkish authorities to feel obligated to comply because Turkey 
was receiving high levels of military aid (Uslu, 2003: 229-230) Throughout the 
Cold War, the Turkish state sought acceptance as a European state, an approach 
that determined much of its foreign policy (see for example, Aydõn and Keyman, 
2004: 3-7; Buhari Gulmez, 2011). Turkey portrayed itself as the 'last guardian' of 
the West before the Communist bloc. Therefore, a long-term diplomatic conflict 
with the United States was unlikely to happen (Bozdaglioglu, 2007: 163). 
Whether the concurrence of timing between the pressures placed on Turkey by 
the United States for an opium ban and the military coup of 1971 is a coincidence 
or not is beyond the scope of this research. Nonetheless, this supports Ikenberry 
and Kupchan’s claim that, 
“the timing of socialization and the extent to which it occurs are highly dependent on the 
efforts of the hegemon to propagate its conception of international order and also on the 
susceptibility of secondary states to a restructuring and redefining of the terms of 
domestic political legitimacy” (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990: 313). 
This leads to a further observation, which is that what matters for a norm and 
value to become integrated into state behaviour is the socialization of the elites, 
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not of the masses. As mentioned above, in international drug forums 
representatives of the Turkish Foreign Ministry were concerned about Turkey’s 
reputation and wanted to show that the country was accepting international norms 
and values. This was at a time when Turkish elites emphasized the country’s 
European, Western identity and portrayed its Eastern civilisational heritage as 
'backward'. It was thus felt that adopting the rules favoured by the Western bloc 
would be a step further to demonstrate Turkey’s Western identity. 
Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter Two, the army has played a dominant role in 
Turkish politics since the 1960s, including staging military coups. It has 
positioned itself as the guardian of Turkey’s Western, secular, Kemalist values; 
and the defender of the Turkish state against threats as varied as communism and 
separatism. Until the end of the Cold War, the army dominated all aspects of 
Turkey’s foreign policy, but it was dependent on its close partnership with the 
United States to maintain its legitimacy to lead the country and its reputation as a 
trusted ally. Thus, the military bureaucracy and the state civilian elite were in a 
position to be highly receptive to the United States as the dominant state actor on 
drug control. This fits Ikenberry and Kupchan's proposition that the elites of 
secondary states are more receptive to the norms of the hegemon when there is 
domestic turmoil threatening their status, which means that they seek to reaffirm 
their legitimacy (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990: 292). Here, then, is an example of 
decision-makers placing the emphasis on Turkey’s Western identity by co-opting 
the norms preferred by the United States and Western countries, and suppressing 
domestic opposition that called on Turkey’s Ottoman heritage and beyond 
(Bozdaglio÷lu, 2001: 163). 
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 Following the opium ban, the DEA office in Turkey developed a privileged 
relationship with its Turkish counterpart, the TNP’s KOM department (Interviews 
with: Sadettin Tantan, Istanbul, 2011; senior police officers, Ankara, 2011 and 
2012). This was due to the longevity and the nature of their relationship, with two 
elements being of particular importance. Firstly, the DEA had been present and 
active in Turkey far longer than law enforcement agencies of any other country, 
and its financial support had been more consequential than that of any other 
country's. Secondly, the DEA had supported its Turkish counterparts during the 
1990s, when Europeans by and large lacked trust in and, as some admitted, were 
reluctant to work with the Turkish police. This created a gap which the DEA 
filled, and it was reflected in the methods adopted by the Turkish police around 
the year 2000, when a “culture of drug seizures” grew (interview with BKA and 
Italian liaison officer, Ankara, 2011). Additionally, it seems that police officers 
became increasingly interested in making large seizures, even if these occurred at 
the possible expense of making more significant arrests and bringing down entire 
trafficking networks. Most European liaison officers based in Turkey claim that 
achieving large seizures within Turkey and being able to claim a part of the 
success in its achievement is more important for the DEA than for European 
police forces. Indeed, the DEA needed to justify its presence and investment in 
Turkey each year because most of the drugs trafficked there were not meant for 
the American market, and seizures offered a straightforward indication to this 
end. On the other hand, for European agencies, seizing drugs in Turkey means 
stopping a drug consignment from reaching its destination, but does not 
necessarily have much impact on the network that organised it. Thus, it makes 
more sense to follow the drug consignment through controlled deliveries to its 
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destination so as to bring down all the network in all the countries involved 
(interviews with European, Iranian and Sudanese liaison officers, Ankara, 2011; 
senior police officers, Ankara, 2011 and 2012). Thus the 'culture of drug seizures' 
is seen as a mark of the American influence on the Turkish police.    
European liaison officers also claim that in the monthly meetings organised by 
KOM to discuss drug trafficking cases, the DEA representatives always sat to the 
right of KOM representative chairing the meeting, which reflected the influence 
of the DEA on KOM (interviews with: European liaison officers, Ankara, 2011; 
senior police officers, Ankara, 2011 and 2012). Liaison officers of European 
countries explained, either implicitly or explicitly, that  the DEA office sometimes 
acted as a broker between Turkey and other states when a case was developing 
and cooperation was necessary between them; and that there had been instances 
when the DEA was suspected of having prevented cooperation between Turkey 
and other states. 
Nadelmann argues that US law enforcement agencies developed a sense of pride 
in seeing foreign police adopt their measures and that they had started to perceive 
“a commonality of identity” (Nadelmann, 1993: 468). This pride was clearly 
expressed in discussions with DEA representatives. They explained that Turkey 
had always been a good partner, but insisted that at the turn of this century there 
had been a change of pace and attitudes. By then, Turkish law enforcement, in 
particular the TNP, had become an active, reliable and successful partner. The 
metaphor of parents allowing their offspring to acquire their independence was 
used, which reveals that – from the American side at least – there is an impression 
that the current shape of Turkish law enforcement results in part from the long-
term support of the DEA (Interviews with: DEA, Ankara, 2011; SOCA, Ankara, 
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2011). This suggests that the long term investment of the DEA in Turkish law 
enforcement has played a role in the adoption of anti-trafficking norms and 
values. It points to a process of socialization constituted of direct coercive 
measures, material inducement and normative persuasion – the three elements of 
Ikenberry and Kupchan’s framework.  
An issue Ikenberry and Kupchan do not discuss however, is whether the balance 
between the three elements has an impact on the way the secondary states are 
socialized: they only mention that normative persuasion alone is insufficient to 
drive socialization. While it was not possible to find detailed information about 
the level and exact nature of the support from the US authorities to Turkish law 
enforcement from the 1970s to the 1990s, it seems that the most important factor 
is that it continued over so many years. Some argue that the TNP today still defer 
to the DEA because they have been present for so long and, in particular, because 
they did not lessen their support during the 1990s when Turkish authorities were 
criticised internationally for their handling of the PKK (interviews with European 
liaison officers, Ankara, 2011). Thus, it seems that the theoretical framework 
proposed by Ikenberry and Kupchan can be useful, to some extent, in 
understanding how US-Turkey relations led to Turkey’s adoption of international 
drug control norms and values. There are, however, a number of issues that are 
left unexplained. 
6.3.2 Weaknesses of this theoretical approach 
Ikenberry and Kupchan’s theoretical framework helps to explain some elements 
that would make the DEA presence in Turkey the main factor in Turkey’s move 
from not involving itself in drug control to being a strong promoter. Yet it seems 
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to leave out a number of factors which, if explored in greater detail, may lead to 
another perspective on this issue. The relevance of their theoretical approach is 
weakened, firstly, if one asks who the term 'elite' – a concept that is central to 
their theory – can be applied to; and when one questions whether domestic factors 
might have played a part in the turn of events: a possibility Ikenberry and 
Kupchan do not consider. 
Ikenberry and Kupchan are interested in the socialization of elites, not of the 
masses: thus they state that it is when an elite community adopts an international 
norm, state behaviour is affected. The existence of such an elite in Turkey, which 
had the control of the state’s political and administrative structures from the 
creation of the Turkish Republic, is widely accepted. These elite, which carried 
the Kemalist project of the modernization of Turkey, is secular and Western-
oriented and has to a large extent rejected the Islamic components of the Turkish 
identity associated with the Ottoman empire (Bozdaglioglu, 2003: 5; Mehtap, 
2013). However, what Ikenberry and Kupchan seem to assume is that in any state 
the diffusion of norms occurs from the elites and follows a simple top-down path 
within a well-connected state administration. The political project of elites is 
therefore assumed to be implemented by the administrative structure and the 
possibility emergence of gaps between commitments and compliance; and 
between pledge and practice is not considered. This makes it difficult to 
understand why the initial commitments by Turkish authorities at the CND were 
only belatedly and partly implemented. Indeed, when Turkey decided to return to 
legal opium production, it established a strict control system that was successful 
in preventing leakage into the illicit market, but which still enabled opium 
originating in Afghanistan to pass through its territory. A potential explanation for 
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this is that the state simply lacked enough resources to allocate to law 
enforcement agencies for this matter. This straightforward claim fits with the 
DEA’s explanation of the opening of the BNDD bureau in 1962. It was with the 
DEA’s support that the TNP established its anti-trafficking division in 1969, and 
Turkish police officers received DEA training for many years (interview with 
Sadettin Tantan, Istanbul, 2011). 
A potentially superior explanation may be offered, however. This focuses on the 
fact that there was no real connection between the state representatives at 
international conferences and those in the law enforcement agencies. While the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to preserve the reputation of Turkey as a 
trustworthy partner on the international stage, the remainder of the state apparatus 
did not have the same level of international exposure and may not have attached 
the same level of importance to international agreements. In other words, while 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed Turkey’s commitment to fighting drug 
trafficking, the Ministry of Interior, and in particular the TNP, may not have made 
it a priority to investigate drug trafficking, especially at a time of collusion 
between the state and organised crime groups.  
Therefore, while Ikenberry and Kupchan conclude that “for norms to have a 
consequential effect on state behaviour, they must take root within elite 
community” (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990: 314), it seems that in this case the 
elite's agreement to abide by the norms were insufficient to elicit the necessary 
change in state behaviour – at least for many years. This suggests that top-down 
norm diffusion does not function as fluidly as Ikenberry and Kupchan suggest. 
Rather, there is a rigid division between the representatives of the state 
internationally and those who act domestically. A former Turkish ambassador 
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claimed that Turkey had always been a strong supporter of the international drug 
control norms, but that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs representatives had been 
trying to convince the Ministry of Interior to take international norms more 
seriously, implying that they were usually unsuccessful in doing so – something 
that would explain gaps in implementation (interview with Sumru Noyan, 
Ankara, 2011). Another element that reveals the gap between the two sides of the 
state is the fact that it was not until 1996 that the National Security Council 
recognised drug trafficking as a security problem for the state. This council, 
which determines the national security policy, has for decades been one of the 
most authoritative bodies of the Turkish Republic. The fact that it had not paid 
attention to drug trafficking would have had a direct influence on the level of 
priority security agencies gave to this matter. In other words, this institution is the 
best placed to initiate changes in state behaviour regarding security and law 
enforcement matters, and in the sense of Ikenberry and Kupchan, they represent a 
key group. Furthermore, the composition of the council, which consisted of a 
majority of military personnel, would fit in Ikenberry and Kupchan’s concept of 
elite. It was also noted in Chapter Two that a key piece of legislation on the 
prevention of money laundering which included elements on controlled deliveries 
and sharing of wire taping evidence was adopted in November 1996 and became 
effective with the publication of the regulation for its implementation in 1997 
(Law 4208, Regulation 23111). All of this suggests that it took over thirty years 
for US law enforcement agencies to successfully socialise their Turkish 
counterparts to the norms of international drug control, which is a very long 
period of time for such efforts to be considered successful. As a result, the 
prominence given to the socialization of elites in the diffusion of norms is 
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problematic in this case as it provides only one superficial narrative and overlooks 
details that can bring another explanation to account for the changes in practice. 
Similarly, Ikenberry and Kupchan do not consider the role that domestic factors 
can have in changes of state behaviour. They claim that the reason for the 
adoption of international norms and values is located in international relations. 
This overshadows the fact that leaders of states do not make decisions regarding 
international matters by considering only the international arena. It has already 
been noted above that Nixon’s declaration of the War on Drugs was partly 
explained by his domestic agenda. In Turkey, the sequence of events and 
decisions during the opium crisis also indicates that domestic factors played a 
crucial role. The civilian government was reluctant to enact a ban as this would 
prove highly unpopular with the Turkish population, especially as the poppy crop 
was cultivated for its seeds and oil and represented an important part of the rural 
economy at a time when vegetable oils were still uncommon. It was only after the 
military coup that the ban was put in place (interview with Süleyman Demirel, 
Ankara, 2010). The lifting of the ban also became a political campaign promise, 
which Bülent Ecevit executed once he became prime minister in 1974 – despite 
American opposition to this move (Uslu, 2003:248-250). 
Ikenberry and Kupchan’s theory also does not help to explain the attitude of 
Turkish institutions during the 1970s and 1980s, when Turkish organised crime 
groups flourished in Turkey and in Europe by trafficking heroin. These organised 
crime groups are now known to have had links to movements such as the ultra-
nationalist Grey Wolves, who played a key role in the 1980 military coup and 
enjoyed a significant level of state protection (Gunther, 2008: 126-127). Drug 
trafficking became tied into much broader political matters and served as a means 
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to raise funds for other criminal activities. The 1996 car accident in Susurluk and 
the subsequent investigation brought these connections between the state and the 
criminal world into the spotlight (see Chapter Two above). Analysts do not agree 
on the extent to which this accident brought immediate change in Turkey, and the 
parliamentary investigation is seen largely in a negative light, with politicians 
refusing to accept any responsibility and burying the issue. Nevertheless, the fact 
that it occurred only a few months after the National Security Council recognised 
drug trafficking as a security problem is important in itself. Indeed, within the 
police force, the Susurluk accident is accepted as a turning point. The public 
outcry it generated also triggered change within the law enforcement system – in 
particular within the TNP, which sought to eliminate corruption and complacency 
towards certain organised crime groups (interviews with senior police officers, 
Ankara, 2011, 2012). This means that these groups finally lost their freedom to 
engage in drug trafficking (and other crimes). Combined, these two factors meant 
that pursuing drug trafficking related crimes became an important matter because 
of domestic pressures. 
Relying on a theoretical framework that gives prominence to international 
relations at the expense of domestic aspects does not allow for any consideration 
of the above factors, and may even contradict them. Indeed, Ikenberry and 
Kupchan’s approach suggests a rather slow diffusion of international drug control 
norms into Turkish law enforcement, stemming from the United States by way of 
the DEA. Examining domestic factors, however, suggests that Turkish 
complacency towards drug trafficking was only part of a much broader problem 
of state corruption and a culture of involving organised crime groups in the 
political arena. It was the Susurluk scandal (followed by a series of other 
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corruption-related scandals, as explained in Chapter Two) that led to an end of 
this complacency and resulted in the combatting of drug trafficking being taken 
more seriously. In other words, Ikenberry and Kupchan’s approach tends to 
assume that once a norm is accepted it is also complied with, while this 
examination of domestic issues tends toward concluding that whilst the norms had 
been accepted, their implication was delayed as a result of domestic factors. 
6.4 Turkeys ambivalence towards drug trafficking: the micro-process of 
mimicking 
The analysis conducted above showed that the conditions identified by Ikenberry 
and Kupchan as leading to socialization by a secondary state to the norms of a 
hegemon seemed present in Turkey. But their theory also seems to neglect a series 
of elements that point to another explanation. They argue that material 
inducement is a pre-requisite for cognitive inducement, and this is supported by 
the fact that during the years in question the US government, through the DEA, 
provided substantial material support to the development of KOM, along with 
training and support for specific operations. They also posited that the elites of the 
secondary state ought to experience critical periods during which they need to 
reaffirm their legitimacy. This is supported by the fact that the civilian and 
military leaders and decision-makers during the second half of the twentieth 
century were concerned with re-affirming the Western identity of Turkey through 
their policy-making, especially in the area of security, while rejecting the 
Ottoman and Islamic heritage of the country in order to justify their position in 
power. Turkey’s belonging to the Western world was demonstrated by its 
becoming a party to international treaties, although observers such as Bilgin point 
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to the fact that participation in international affairs was maintained at a minimal 
level (Bilgin, 2005). From the late 1970s through to the early 1990s these same 
pro-Western elites also cultivated relations with gangs and organised crime 
groups that financed their activities through drug trafficking, because it was felt 
that fighting the PKK and leftist movements would not lead to any positive 
outcome if it had to be done within constitutional limits (Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz, 
2007: 179-180). This is a critical factor that finds no explanation in Ikenberry and 
Kupchan’s theoretical framework.  
The weakness of this approach is to be found in its reliance on the positive role of 
the elite community for the adoption of new norms. There were in fact deep 
divisions between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and law enforcement agencies, 
which prevented agreement to the rules of the international drug control regime 
from being translated into effective action. Johnston argues that the key weakness 
in Ikenberry and Kupchan’s theory is that it does not look closely enough at the 
process of norm diffusion.7 The analysis below uses Johnston’s theory of micro-
processes of international norm diffusion to help to fill this gap. As explained in 
Chapter Five, he identifies three main mechanisms: 'mimicking', 'social influence' 
and 'persuasion', with the former being most useful in this context. Mimicking 
refers to 
“copying pro-normative behaviour as satisfying means of adapting to an uncertain 
environment prior to any detailed ends-means calculation of the benefits of doing so. 
…[It] is a microprocess whereby a novice initially copies the behavioral norms of the 
group in order to navigate through an uncertain environment. It is an efficient means of 
adapting to uncertainty prior to any detailed ends-means calculation of the benefits of 
                                                 
7 He writes for example – and here the text in parenthesis matters most – that “Ikenberry and Kupchan list 
two routes of pro-norm behaviour that do not involve persuasion: exogenous shocks that lead to elite 
transformation in a state; and exogenous material inducements that lead, over time (and somewhat 
mysteriously) to the internalization of norms that were once adopted for instrumental reasons (1990:290-
292)”. (Johnston, 2001:495) 
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doing so. To be sure, this microprocess stretches the concept of socialization somewhat, 
since pro-group behavior is only indirectly an effect generated by the nature of the social 
environment” (Johntson, 2008: 20-23). 
A state mimicking the behaviour of a group is motivated by survival uncertainty: 
it does not know what benefits there will be from adopting group behaviour, but 
because it identifies with the group it is eager to be seen to behave in the same 
way as the group. The concept of mimicking, as developed by Johnston, can be 
extended further by looking not only at the behaviour of the state in question in its 
dealings with other states and international organizations, but also when it comes 
to the implementation of the norms and values agreed upon. 
It is argued here that the reason why Turkish authorities always proclaimed their 
acceptance of the strict anti-trafficking norm of the international drug control 
regime, when in fact they did little to prevent the activities of organised crime 
groups, is because Turkey sought to behave like other members of the group in 
this specific arena, without having reviewed the implications of upholding these 
specific norms. Consequently, older practices, in particular those relating to 
collusion and corruption, continued. That Turkey should have played an active 
role in the negotiations of the various drug treaties, or that it always claimed that 
it recognised trafficking as a danger, is understandable. It makes sense in a 
context where it was important to proclaim Turkey’s attachment to the norm 
because so doing signalled that it should be considered Western. In the 
international forums it was important to reiterate that Turkey was a supporter of 
the regime, largely for reputational concerns. The norm's integration was not 
complete, however, and this is evident in its lack of implementation. In this sense, 
mimicking is in fact a sign of incomplete socialization. Interestingly, however, 
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Johnston notes that mimicking can lead to an integration of the norm through 
repetition (Johnston, 2008:24). 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the United States has had a presence in Turkey 
for five decades; and that with the exception of a few years around the imposition 
of the opium cultivation ban, Turkey did not express opposition to the US' views 
on anti-trafficking. However, evaluating the actual influence exerted by the 
United States, through the DEA, on Turkish law enforcement authorities is less 
than straightforward. Throughout the period under review, the TNP was the 
recipient of high levels of technical support from the DEA, which contributed 
financially to the setting up narcotic teams in across Turkey and trained its 
personnel. As Goldsmith, Llorente and Rivas have already pointed out, however, 
the support of a foreign government can sometimes be “the price of acceptance” 
for domestic autonomy (Goldsmith, Llorente and Rivas, 2010: 78). Thus, it 
should not automatically be understood as a genuine indicator of 
internationalization through the influence of that state.    
Ikenberry and Kupchan outlined a theoretical model to identify the necessary 
conditions for international norms and values to be successfully transmitted by a 
hegemonic state to a secondary state. Even if these conditions were found in the 
case of US-Turkey relations, this theoretical framework fails to explain other 
elements, which suggest factors other than socialization by a hegemonic power. 
Whilst the hypothesis of American influence tends to be the first approach 
adopted by a researcher when studying the international drug control regime, this 
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chapter has shown that in the case of Turkish drug policy it is an insufficient 
explanation. 
The chapter has argued that, until the late 1990s, Turkish organised crime 
flourished through the trafficking of opiates towards Europe, and that whilst 
Turkish authorities claimed to support anti-trafficking norms, they did not 
implement them. The Susurluk accident and other corruption scandals then shook 
Turkish authorities into reconsidering, if not abandoning altogether, their reliance 
on the organised crime world. Robins argues that after the 1971-1972 opium 
crisis, Turkey’s adoption of a strict licensing system for its licit opium production 
encouraged it to pay much more attention to enforcing its drug control policy 
(Robins, 2009: 293). The analysis conducted in this chapter differs from Robins’ 
as it argues that in the immediate aftermath of the opium crisis and the lifting of 
the opium ban an influx of American assistance prompted changes at the TNP, 
but that efforts to ensure there was no further leakage of Turkish opium into illicit 
drug production did not increase the limited levels of concern regarding drug 
trafficking. While it does appear that “international cooperation on the subject 
came to be regarded as a core indicator of Turkey’s standing as a good 
international citizen” (Robins, 2008:  632), this concern did not translate to the 
law enforcement level. This disconnection between policy and practice is 
indicative of an incomplete socialization process.  
This chapter has contended that Turkey’s behaviour over the period studied can 
be best explained as a process of mimicking, which can lead to the internalisation 
of norms through repetition. US authorities insisted that Turkey should be active 
in their drug control efforts and by financially and technically supporting the TNP 
sought to ensure that they had the means to do so. Yet Turkish authorities might 
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have primarily have agreed not because drugs were a great concern to them, but 
rather because they were eager to find an area of cooperation with the United 
States irrespective of the subject matter. In reaching this conclusion, it has been 
demonstrated that non-material desires to conform offer a viable alternative 
explanation where the neorealist approach fails to convince. The next chapter, 
which focuses on the period between 1996 and 2005, will look at the European 
presence and influence in Turkey, and will demonstrate that a more extensive 
process of socialization seems to have been at play. 
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Chapter 7: The influence of the EU on drug law enforcement in Turkey 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the evolution of the relationship between Turkey, the EU, 
and EU member states. It will show that between 1996 and 2005, cooperation 
between the two sides underwent dramatic changes. It will explore whether the 
fact that Turkish anti-drug trafficking efforts increased at such a fast pace during 
this period of time can be explained by the Europeanization of Turkey’s policing, 
since this period coincides with the start of Turkey’s official EU accession 
process. In doing so, this chapter turns to the EU as the second possible source of 
external pressure on Turkey, having demonstrated in Chapter Six that viewing the 
United States as the main influence behind Turkey’s drug control efforts has only 
limited explanatory power. Its tests the explanatory power of this approach in a 
manner similar to that used in the previous chapter, exploring what it can explain 
before highlighting its weaknesses. As in Chapter Five, the hypothesis tested is 
one of externally-induced change, but unlike Chapter Six it does not rely solely 
on a neorealist approach, examining also neoliberal and constructivist arguments, 
which have all been utilized in Europeanization literature. 
Scholarly interest in the transformative power of the EU is considerable, 
particularly in the context of accessions, and there is a very large body of 
literature available proposing explanatory models of the ways in which the EU 
shapes, directs and sometimes determines changes in policy and practice in 
candidate states (Haughton, 2007 and 2011; Kirisci 2007). The main explanatory 
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models are assessed here, bringing to light the elements they help to understand, 
but also highlighting elements that they seem to overlook. 
This chapter is composed of four sections. The first examines the evolution of the 
relationship between Turkey, EU institutions and EU member states both before 
and after the recognition of Turkey’s candidate status in 1999. The second 
examines theoretical models of change through Europeanization and highlights 
how they apply to this case study. The third then identifies the limits of these 
theoretical frameworks in explaining the case study. The fourth and final section 
proposes an alternative approach to explain changes, based on Johnston’s theory 
of international norm diffusion micro-processes, and in particular the micro-
process of social influence. 
7.2 The evolution of relations between Turkey and EU and EU member 
states 
7.2.1 Relations before the start of the accession process  
The previous chapter demonstrated how the DEA implanted itself in Turkey as 
early as 1962 and has remained involved with Turkish law enforcement ever 
since, with the 'high point' of its involvement took place around the 1972 opium 
cultivation ban. The involvement of European states’ law enforcement agencies 
follows a very different pattern, despite the fact that European countries have 
always been the destination for the great majority of all the drugs trafficked out of 
Turkey. It was noted in Chapters Two and Six that during the late 1960s, the 
Turkish opium that found its way to the United States was largely purchased by 
Corsican and French organised crime groups and was transformed into heroin in 
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Marseille before transatlantic shipment – a process that came to be known as the 
'French Connection' (McCoy, 2003). Thus, this traffic also presented a problem 
for France and one could have expected the French authorities to be as least as 
interested in stopping the flow of Turkish opium as the Americans were. Several 
reasons can explain why the French and other European states did not respond as 
the Americans had, but two particularly powerful explanatory factors are that they 
had not developed institutions comparable to the DEA at national level; and that 
they accepted the rationales for regional and international cooperation on drug 
matters later than the United States. Indeed, it was explained in Chapter Four that 
the earliest attempts at European cooperation in combatting crime dates back only 
to the 1970s (Elvins, 2003; Occhipinti, 2003). The traditional law enforcement 
approach of stopping illegal trafficking at national borders, which was thought to 
be most effective, had not yet been challenged, even though the prevalence of 
drug use in Western countries was causing increased concern. The creation of the 
Pompidou Group in 1971 was the earliest attempt at drug control cooperation by 
European States, followed by the creation of the TREVI group in 1975, which 
marks the beginning of the progressive institutionalisation of mechanisms of 
international cooperation relating to law enforcement. Elvins explains:  
“Despite the emergence of new kinds of drugs and growing evidence of an evolving mass 
market in North America and Western Europe from the 1960s national governments 
clearly believed that domestic-level enforcement measures – focused on interdiction at 
national borders – were both sufficient and appropriate trafficking control mechanisms 
(with perhaps the occasional recourse to Interpol)” (Elvins, 2003: 71). 
Rees, meanwhile, argues that changes in the EU’s understanding of how to best 
preserve national security came about in the 1990s. He writes:  
“Through the course of the 1990s the EU has come to accept that national security 
challenges cannot be combated effectively by a policy designed to preserve a safe 
internal environment from a dangerous outside space. Instead threats need to be tackled 
and eradicated in those areas in which they originate if they are to avoid being imported 
into the Union. The process of organizational enlargement contributed to the realisation 
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that the EU would have to help shape its external neighbourhood, rather than withdraw 
behind the walls of a twenty-first century fortress. This thinking has been built into 
external relations by linking trade, cooperation, and Association Agreements to each third 
country's willingness to work with the EU on issues such as illegal immigration and 
transnational crime” (Rees, 2011: 395).  
In line with this, it appears that until the 1990s European states did not establish 
channels of communication and cooperation with Turkish law enforcement 
counterparts beyond the formal requests usually made through INTERPOL.  Four 
further interconnected observations can be made regarding this relationship. 
Firstly, interest in international cooperation on drug matters and law enforcement 
matters was growing, and the growth of the European institutional framework 
seems to have given greater legitimacy to international cooperation. UN treaties 
called for international cooperation and the Pompidou Group was the first 
institution to offer substantive regional cooperation in the area. Then, as the 
Single European Market was set up in 1985, the TREVI structure was 
complemented by a working group looking at “ways of improving cooperation 
against organised crime, principally drug trafficking.” (Elvins, 2003: 86) The 
Palma Document, a report to the European Council commissioned by the TREVI 
group in 1989, recommended a series of measures relating to law enforcement 
and the free movement of people in connection with drug trafficking, among other 
matters. Among these measures, the ratification of UN drug conventions was 
given priority, and the exchange of liaison police officers was also proposed. This 
concerned only those states party to the Single European Act, but meant that 
practical measures of cooperation were beginning (Elvins, 2003: 86-89). 
Secondly, in the 1980s and early 1990s European police agencies “discovered 
Turkish organised crime” (Bovenkerk and Yesilgöz, 1996: 145-172).  Bovenkerk 
and Yesilgöz describe how in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and the 
UK, police forces realized that Turkish organised crime groups had taken over (or 
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were in the process of taking over) the trafficking of heroin. In Italy and the 
Netherlands, Turkish criminals collaborated with existing organised crime groups; 
and in other countries the presence of immigrant communities contributed to their 
emergence. Therefore, greater attention was paid by these states on Turkish 
organised crime and drug trafficking in Turkey. 
Thirdly, these European states began to revise their national drug policies, which 
evolved from simple interdiction at the borders to more complex operations 
geared towards stopping trafficking as close as possible to the drugs' source. This 
was undoubtedly related to the progress made through the TREVI group, and 
more generally to institutional changes resulting from the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. 
Germany’s BKA adopted this new approach in the early 1980s and was the first 
state to appoint a liaison officer to Turkey in 1986: only their second foreign 
officer following the appointment of one to Bangkok in 1983. This appointment 
was decided upon following the adoption of a new drug strategy, which shifted 
away from a simple protection of the federal borders to interception in the source 
country and the neutralization of the organised crime groups. It is believed that at 
the time much of the heroin smuggled into Europe from Turkey arrived in, or 
passed through, Germany (Interview with the BKA liaison officer, Ankara, 2011). 
In the early 1990s, the UK, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands all followed 
Germany's lead and appointed liaison officers in Turkey. Likewise, these 
countries adopted new drug strategies, shifting attention from border protection 
towards source and trafficking countries – with Turkey among the countries to 
which liaison officers were sent (Interviews with liaison officers, Ankara, 2011). 
Fourthly, at the same time as these new institutional links were being created 
between Turkey and European states, the first European drug strategies were 
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formed: the European Council approved the first European Plan to Combat Drugs 
in December 1990 (Elvins, 2003: 94). This emerging framework to combat drugs 
at the level of European institutions comprised the measures that were already 
being experimented by some states, such as the posting of liaison officers in other 
European countries as well as outside the EU. It also encouraged other states to do 
likewise. 
These four elements explain why the number of police liaison officers from 
European countries in Turkey increased considerably during the 1990s, making 
exchanges easier and more frequent. But while there may have been a greater 
number of requests for exchange of information, it seems that communication 
remained very difficult for many years. Indeed, the level of trust between the 
parties seems to have remained very low for a long time, because each side had 
preconceived negative ideas about the other (interviews with European liaison 
officers and DEA officials, Ankara, 2011). Generally, Europeans felt that Turkish 
authorities were unprofessional, corrupt, disrespectful of human rights standards 
and, most of all, that they were only interested in investigating suspected 
members of the PKK based in European countries. For example, one liaison 
officer explained that there was a time when every information request from the 
Turkish authorities would be categorised as “yet again another request to arrest a 
guy who distributed PKK propaganda leaflets, even though it is not a crime here” 
(interview with European liaison officer, Ankara, 2011). Chapter Two explained 
that in the aftermath of the 1996 car accident in Susurluk, the public exposure of 
the links between the state security apparatus and the Turkish mafia reinforced the 
negative opinion of European police about their Turkish counterparts (interview 
with European liaison officers, Ankara, 2011).  Turkish authorities, meanwhile, 
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were reluctant to agree to requests to share information regarding suspected drug 
cases because of the frustration caused by the lack of attention given to suspected 
PKK members. Moreover, the complexities of the Turkish bureaucracy were such 
that requests were rarely answered promptly or in detail, which gave the 
impression that the matter was not deemed important in Ankara (interviews with 
liaison officers of France, Germany and Denmark, Ankara, 2011). 
By 1999, when Turkey’s candidature to the EU was officially accepted, 
Europeans, who had developed structures for international police cooperation and 
adopted EU-level multi-year drug strategies that called for cooperation with 
countries outside the Union, had become aware of the need for cooperation with 
Turkish authorities. In practice, cooperation was far from efficient – though in the 
proceeding years this changed drastically. 
7.2.2 Relations following Turkeys recognition as a candidate state to the EU 
On 4th December 1999 the European Council recognised Turkey as a candidate 
for EU membership. This set in motion a process (which will theoretically end 
with Turkey joining the EU) through which Turkey should progressively reform 
and upgrade its institutions and legislation in order to incorporate all of the EU 
acquis communautaire, the legal framework shared by all EU members. By this 
time, the Treaty of Amsterdam had entered into force in May 1999, with the 
Schengen Treaty incorporated in it; and during a special meeting at Tampere in 
October 1999, the European Council agreed the creation of an ‘Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice’ in the EU (see Chapter Four). The Tampere programme 
recognised that organising an internal security area meant developing the EU’s 
external action, in particular with candidate states (Trauner, 2011: 12).  Fighting 
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crime constituted a key objective of the AFSJ and measures to increase cross-
border police cooperation (such as the establishment of joint investigative teams) 
gained momentum. One of the arguments put forward for their creation was their 
usefulness in the investigation of illicit drug trafficking, which was to be the 
priority of the first cross border initiatives (Elvins, 2003: 141; Trauner, 2011).  
With the issue of internal security having gained such importance for the 
policymaking of EU states, candidate states are subject to a high number of 
demands in the area. The acquis communautaire relating to police cooperation 
and illicit drug trafficking (and the fight against organised crime more generally) 
is extensive – it obliges states to ratify international treaties; incorporate relevant 
framework decisions; sign and ratify cooperation agreements with EUROPOL 
and EMCDDA; and participate in the Schengen Information System. Thus, it is 
clear that from the moment Turkey was officially recognised as a candidate to the 
EU there would be substantive changes made at the levels of policy, legislation 
and operations. 
The terrorist attacks in the United States on 11th September 2001 added political 
momentum to the issues that the EU had grouped in the AFJS, and created 
additional pressure for greater decision-making powers, increased international 
cooperation and greater intelligence sharing regarding terrorist groups and their 
modes of financing their activities. The United States also placed pressure on the 
EU to establish greater cooperation between law enforcement agencies. 
According to Rees, the 9/11 bombings exposed the weaknesses of border and 
transport security, which falls within the jurisdiction of law enforcement agencies 
– in particular police forces (Rees, 2006: 80). Shortly after the attacks, the EU and 
the United States agreed to work together to target the sources of funding that 
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finance terrorist operations. The fact that the trafficking of Afghanistan-originated 
heroin through Turkey into Europe was highly likely to have helped finance the 
Al-Qaeda movement made the need for Europeans to establish effective 
cooperation with Turkish authorities even more pressing (Chouvy, 2004). A new 
series of measures to prevent terrorism and its funding sources including drug 
trafficking was thus adopted by the EU, and these encouraged European states to 
take a much stricter stance on PKK activities in their territories, as they had for 
several years showed reluctance to do so. Acting on a proposal of the French 
government, the EU placed the PKK on its list of terrorist groups in June 2002. 
These changes brought about a new environment in which the lack of trust that 
had previously prevailed in relations between Turkey and EU member states 
could be improved. A liaison officer explained that at this time, “Europeans took 
one step towards Turkey, and Turkey took two steps towards the Europeans” 
(Interview with European liaison officer, Ankara, 2011).  
At the operational level, this meant that European states took Turkish requests for 
cooperation and information about PKK suspects more seriously, while Turkey 
took greater care in responding to European requests relating to drug related 
cases, and in particular they agreed to investigate the PKK for its drug trafficking 
activities separately from its terrorist activities, which had previously been a 
source of contention. It seems that the EU's decision regarding the PKK was key 
in allowing trust to develop between and it is likely to have been related to the 
fact that fighting terrorism became a paramount priority for all the law 
enforcement agencies of Turkey and EU states at the operational level, as shown 
by the succession of bombings in Istanbul, Madrid and London in 2003, 2004 and 
2005, was key in allowing trust to grow between. This new common 
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understanding was already clearly expressed at political level in multilateral 
forums. 
A close examination of the official documents relating to Turkey’s accession is an 
effective way to extract clues about changes to Turkey’s approach to police 
cooperation and illicit drug trafficking as they show what the EU expected of 
Turkey. The Accession Partnership documents are the most general documents 
since they constitute the general framework agreement. The ‘National 
Programmes for the Adoption of the EU Acquis’ (NPAA) proscribed what legal 
and institutional changes were needed in various fields in order to fulfil various 
harmonisation demands in accordance with the EU acquis communautaire, and 
the yearly progress reports of the European Commission provide a succinct 
evaluation of what had been achieved, as well as detailing what further courses of 
action the EU recommended. The first Accession Partnership document and the 
first NPAA were adopted by the Turkish government in 2001, and both were 
replaced by newer versions in 2003. In 2006 a third national programme was 
adopted, and in 2008 both documents were updated once more. The European 
Commission’s progress reports have been published yearly since 1998. 
The national programmes are interesting because they reveal how far-reaching the 
requested changes were: new laws needed to be adopted and existing ones 
amended, with necessary regulations for the implementation of the laws adopted 
as a consequence. Existing government institutions were requested to change their 
organizational structure, create new divisions and often to train personnel in the 
areas introduced through harmonisation – such as, for example, with the training 
of Ministry of Interior personnel in EU law (NPAA, 2003: 685). The progress 
reports of the European Commission perhaps offer the best picture of what 
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changed from year to year as well as providing the best picture of how the view 
that the EU held of Turkish authorities changed. In the 1999 report, the European 
Commission makes a rather negative evaluation of the efforts and capacities of 
Turkey with regard to police cooperation and fighting illicit drugs, writing the 
following: 
“Turkey remains a major trafficking centre, particularly for drugs coming from 
Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia. It is also a centre for refining opium. The Turkish 
authorities need to devote attention to dismantling hidden laboratories and combating the 
chain of trafficking more effectively. Greater efficiency will require significant 
reinforcement of police cooperation with EU Member States, an area hitherto marked by 
insufficient exchanges of information. The Turkish authorities will have to acquire legal 
instruments which are compatible with international police cooperation practices, 
particularly in connection with ‘controlled delivery’” (European Commission, 1999: xx). 
The following year, the European Commission also found Turkey seriously 
lagging behind: 
“As regards police co-operation, the fight against fraud and corruption, the fight against 
drugs, customs co-operation and judicial co-operation in criminal and civil matters, 
serious efforts are required to comply with the acquis. This also implies the ratification of 
the respective international conventions by Turkey. Moreover, serious efforts are needed 
to increase the capacities to effectively implement and enforce legislation in these areas” 
(European Commission, 2000: xx). 
It is only from 2003 onwards that the reports mention that the Turkish authorities 
were active and carrying out operations against illicit drug trafficking:  
“As far as the fight trafficking in drugs is concerned, a number of successful operations 
were carried out by the law enforcement authorities, partly in international cooperation 
including some Member States of the EU” (European Commission, 2003: xx).  
In terms of the actions the EU expects Turkey to take for harmonisation, the 
reports mention some of those that appear to be the most important, and those that 
suffer from excessive delays. For example, between 2002 and 2007, it is 
recommended that Turkey should establish a Mini-Dublin Group,8 which would 
                                                 
8 The Dublin group is described as a “flexible, informal consultation and coordination mechanism 
for global, regional and country-specific problems of illicit drugs production, trafficking and 
demand.” Created in 1990 at the initiative of the US, it is composed of the 27 EU members, 
Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, the United States, the European Commission and the UNODC. 
The mini-Dublin groups are set up in countries where it is deemed that drug trafficking is of 
significant concern to the group members. They are set up to “monitor all aspects of the drug 
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be a meeting of the representatives of the Dublin Group present in Turkey 
focussing specifically on the Turkish drugs situation. After this date, the 
recommendation is not mentioned again – although nothing is said of the fact that 
the recommendation was never put into practice, nor is it mentioned that Turkey 
applied to be a full-fledged member of the Dublin Group (Interview with KOM 
official, March 2011). This is an indication of the fact that Europeans were 
unwilling to accept Turkey in the central Dublin Group and that they were hoping 
that by repeating their initial recommendation year after year that Turkish 
authorities would reconsider their position on the matter. 
What the reports reveal is that Turkey made several steps to adapt to the standards 
of the EU in terms of police cooperation, as well as the fight against illicit drug 
trafficking and organised crime in general. Turkey ratified international and 
regional conventions such as the 1961 Single Convention (as amended in 1972) in 
2001; the Palermo Convention against transnational organised crime and its 
protocols in 2003; and it signed the Council of Europe Agreement on illicit traffic 
by sea, and the Convention on laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the 
proceeds from crime and on the financing of terrorism. It also changed its penal 
and criminal codes accordingly. In 2004, it adopted an agreement with the EU on 
“precursors and chemical substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of 
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances”. It adopted a drug strategy and action 
plan in line with EU drug strategy in 2005. TUBIM acts as the EMCDDA's focal 
point in Turkey since a cooperation agreement between Turkey and the 
EMCDDA was signed in 2007 and became fully operational in July 2012 after it 
                                                                                                                                     
control situation in the host country, including the legal situation and the organization and 
facilities of the anti-drugs authorities, particularly in relation to national masterplans, where these 
are in place.” (General Secretariat, 2006).  
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was ratified by the Turkish National Grand Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet 
Meclisi, TBMM). Turkey also signed a cooperation agreement with EUROPOL, 
although it is not fully effective to this date because a new law on personal data 
protection that would allow full cooperation is yet to be adopted (European 
Commission, 2011). 
Since 1999, standards have thus become considerably closer, and this has made 
cooperation between European and Turkish law enforcement authorities easier. 
This is in line with the Joint Declaration on Drugs adopted in February 2002 by 
EU member states and candidate countries, including Turkey, in which the parties 
reaffirm their commitment to the “intensification of international cooperation with 
other countries and with international organizations”, and commit themselves to 
“enhance regional co-operation in supply reduction, notably by strengthening law 
enforcement co-operation including reinforcing activities against synthetic drugs, 
the diversion of chemical precursors and money laundering” (European Council, 
2002: 13-14). In this declaration, candidate countries also commit themselves to 
consolidate the process of institutional, regulatory and administrative 
reinforcement that will ensure that national drug strategies and coordination 
mechanisms are developed. 
At the same time, through the pre-accession instruments several initiatives have 
been set up to develop the administrative capacity of Turkish law enforcement. 
The national programmes for the adoption of the acquis communautaire call for 
training, exchange programmes and study visits – these are organised mainly for 
members of the Turkish police, Gendarmerie and the Customs Agency. For 
example, several twinning projects set up between Turkey and EU member states 
have been directed at all three agencies, in particular the TNP (Ministry for EU 
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Affairs, 2009). Two are of specific relevance: the first ran in 2006 and 2007 to 
support TUBIM. The second, which ran between 2009 and 2011, sought to 
strengthen the investigation capacity of the anti-smuggling and organised crime 
divisions of the Police and the Gendarmerie (Ibid.). 
7.2.3 The current situation between Turkey and the EU / EU member states 
The most recent evaluation of the European Commission on the state of Turkey’s 
harmonisation with the EU acquis communautaire recognises the changes that 
have taken place, but also highlights sticking points, such as the lack of progress 
on the adoption of a law on the protection of personal data, which impairs full 
cooperation with EUROPOL. The failure to ratify TUBIM's agreement with 
EMCDDA impaired the former's full participation in the agency, but this was 
remedied on 29 June 2012 when the necessary legislation was adopted (despite 
the issue having been on the agenda since 2009).9 There seems to have been no 
formal opposition to their adoption and law enforcement agencies had been 
expecting the changes to take effect, but because they were not a priority for the 
government they were not put forwards for discussion in the busy agenda of the 
legislative body (interview with the former Director of TUBIM, Ankara, 2011).  
                                                 
9  The 2012 TUBIM report mentions that “Following its signature between Turkey and the 
European Union on October 30, 2007 and its transfer to the TBMM by the Office of the Prime 
Ministry on March 9, 2009, the “Law Regarding The Suitability of the Approval of the Agreement 
Between the European Community and the Republic of Turkey concerning the Participation of the 
Republic of Turkey in the Studies of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction” was approved in the session of the TBMM held on June 29, 2012. The agreement 
came into effect following its publication in the Official Gazette on July 12, 2012. Turkey had 
been conducting its activities since 2007 as a candidate country in the EMCDDA, and with the 
signature of this agreement, Turkey achieved the status of a full member in this institution. As the 
National Focal Point of EMCDDA in Turkey, Turkish Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction (TUBøM) will continue to execute and increase its activities as a member of an EU 
institution. Thus, TUBøM has acquired the status of one of the first Turkish institutions to become 
a member of the European Union.” (TUBIM, 2012: 44). 
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At the operational level, all but one European liaison officer interviewed said 
cooperation with the TNP was excellent. They noted that their Turkish 
counterparts were highly qualified, dedicated and knowledgeable, in stark contrast 
with evaluations of the police a decade earlier. Some noted that relations with the 
Gendarmerie were considerably more difficult, and put it down to the fact that as 
a military body the Gendarmerie was not used to cooperating with civilian 
institutions. They also noted that cooperation between the TNP and the 
Gendarmerie seemed poor. More interestingly, they emphasized that informal, 
colleague-to-colleague relationships had emerged between them and their Turkish 
counterparts, and that these were essential for effective cooperation. A culture of 
cooperation and of reaching out had taken root in the TNP, particularly within 
KOM as contacts are more frequents with this department than with other 
departments of the TNP. There seems to be a desire to overcome difficulties that 
lengthy administrative procedures can generate, and officers tend to be proactive 
in seeking cooperation. The TNP has also been more proactive in reaching out to 
European countries in order to benefit from activities such as exchange visits and 
training courses, which can be organised within the pre-accession funds under the 
enhancement of administrative capacity (Interviews with liaison officers, Ankara, 
2011). 
It can be concluded, then, that in the area of combating drug trafficking, Turkey 
seems to have accomplished much of what was expected of it in order to advance 
the EU accession process. It adopted EU regulations and ratified international 
conventions, it adapted its administrative structure and enhanced the knowledge 
and capacity of its law enforcement personnel; and it is in the process of 
establishing strategic and operational links with EU agencies. At the operational 
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level, the TNP is significantly more trusted and respected than it had previously 
been and is praised for its professionalism. The opportunities created by twining 
projects, training courses and exchange visits – which enable Turkish authorities 
to meet their European counterparts – have acted as a catalyst for the development 
of professional networks, both formal and informal. The next section seeks to put 
all these elements into perspective in order to evaluate the extent to which the fact 
that Turkey is a candidate to the EU has been a key factor explaining the 
internationalization of Turkish policing. 
7.3 Explaining the EU's influence with theories of change through the 
accession process 
There is extensive research focussing on the impact of the EU on changes in 
prospective EU member states, with a number of elaborate theoretical frameworks 
proposing explanations of “when, why and how the EU shaped, directed and 
occasionally determined change” (Lavenex, 2004; Schimelfenning and 
Sedelmeier, 2004 and 2005; Grabbe, 2006; Haughton, 2007 and 2011). The 
accession of twelve central and eastern European countries (CEE) in two 'waves' 
in 2004 and 2007 allowed researchers working in the area to go beyond case 
studies to develop theories of Europeanization. Given the high number of 
comparisons possible, the validity of these theories could be more easily tested 
than if there were only a small number of cases to concentrate on. Moreover, with 
the current accession bids of Turkey and the Balkans states, there is still much 
work needed in order to update and refine what has already been proposed in this 
field. Research on the transformative power of the EU on Turkey is also vibrant, 
as Bolukbaúi et al. have demonstrated (Bolukbaúi et al.,  2010), to the point that 
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Europeanization is typically the first approach a researcher will use to analyse 
changes that have occurred within the Turkish state since 1998 (Alpan, 2001: 3). 
However, it is important to note that the most frequent area of study is politics 
and polity, rather than specific policies of the Turkish state (Aydõn and Keyman, 
2004; Bolukbaúi et al., 2010; Börzel and Soyaltõn, 2012). Furthermore, analysis 
usually revolves around the political criteria set by the EU at the Copenhagen 
summit – democratisation, human rights, the rights of minorities (Aydõn and 
Keyman, 2004; Muftuler Bac, 2005; Tocci, 2005) – rather than narrower policy 
areas like police cooperation and drug trafficking. 
In the case of the transformation of Turkish foreign policy, Kirisci found that “the 
EU’s ‘conditionality’ and the need to meet certain criteria for starting accession 
talks and then gaining membership has been an important driving force” (Kirisci, 
2009: 34). The aspect of conditionality that he considers is what 
Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier call 'the acquis conditionality', and is distinct 
from what they call 'democratic conditionality'. They argue that the acquis 
conditionality is effective (more so than the democratic conditionality) in the 
sense that the EU has enjoyed unprecedented influence on the restructuring of 
domestic institutions and public policy (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2004: 
661, 675-6). This kind of argument can be applied in the area of law enforcement 
and drug control policies. 
It was noted in the section above that Turkey has enacted many of the reforms 
requested by the EU in the areas of anti-drug trafficking and police cooperation. It 
has ratified international conventions, re-organised its administrative structures 
including the creation of new agencies like TUBIM, and enhanced the capacity of 
civil servants through means as varied as training courses, exchange study visits 
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and scholarships for higher education in European countries (NPAA: 2001 and 
2003). Using the financial assistance obtained from pre-accession reform 
instruments, the TNP has also acquired equipment that puts it on par with the 
most technologically advanced European police forces, with some claiming it is 
better equipped than most European police forces (interviews with European 
liaison officers, Ankara, 2011). 
The extent of change that has occurred in Turkish policing should not be 
underestimated, yet it is important not to assume that Turkey simply complied 
with EU demands without further analysis. Europeanization scholars have 
proposed several analytical tools to this end, and these utilize various approaches. 
Some adopt a realist approach, which sees the relationship between the EU and 
Turkey as asymmetrical; others utilize a neoliberal approach by focussing on the 
presence of rational incentives for relevant actors. There is also a significant trend 
of constructivist research, which seeks to identify processes of social learning and 
rule adoption within Europeanization. The main arguments are tested below 
against examples from the fields of police cooperation and anti-drug trafficking. 
The argument that is usually presented first to explain Turkey’s transformation, 
(and transformation in EU candidate states in general), presents the EU as the 
cause for domestic change as a result of a power asymmetry between the two 
parties. This is what Alpan describes as the 'Europe-as-hegemony' analysis, which 
typically consists of analysing changes in Turkey through the prisms of the EU’s 
pressure to adapt and the extensive list of conditions required by the EU for 
Turkey to become a fully-fledged member of the union (Alpan, 2010). Haukkala 
also contends that “the EU can be envisaged as a regional hegemon that is using 
its economic and normative clout to build a set of highly asymmetrical 
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relationships that help to facilitate an active transference of its norms and values 
(Haukkala, 2011: 46). 
In this sense, rules and norms are transferred from the EU to candidate states such 
as Turkey in a top-down manner. This approach is visible in Lavenex's analysis, 
which explains how rule transfer is part of the EU accession process where the 
EU, mainly through the European Commission, has developed a set of 
institutional practices in order gain acceptance of given rules from countries 
(Lavenex 2004). She contends that the acquis conditionality is a form of ‘external 
governance’: it is necessary from a functional point of view in order to increase 
the efficiency and problem-solving capacity of policies, but it is also necessary 
from a geostrategic point of view in order to ensure that states which are not yet 
members of the EU make political choices in line with the EU (Lavenex, 2004: 
681). Rees also argues that: 
“The EU has insisted that its own standards be followed by others, thereby exporting its 
model of internal security. (…) The main mechanism that the EU has been able the use to 
secure compliance from its neighbours has been the prospect of membership. The 
principle of conditionality has enabled the EU to impose its model of internal security 
upon countries seeking membership and subject them to regular monitoring” (Rees, 
2011: 395, 401). 
To apply this to the present case, it would be argued that the EU pushed Turkey to 
ratify international conventions relating to drugs (in addition to organised crime, 
terrorism and corruption); and demanded that it collaborate with EMCDDA, 
EUROPOL and the law enforcement agencies of EU member states. The 
objective here is not simply to ensure that the EU’s policies on controlling illicit 
drug trafficking are efficient, but also to ensure that Turkey strongly supports the 
spirit of European drug strategies and other over-arching policies, such as the 
Stockholm Programme or the European Pact to Combat International Drug 
Trafficking, which were both adopted in 2010 and represent the latest EU-wide 
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policy agreements in the area of internal security and drug trafficking 
respectively. 
The analysis of the annual evaluations and recommendations in the European 
Commission’s progress reports presented in the section above shows that what is 
expected from Turkish authorities can indeed be explained at a functional level, 
but also at a subtler level, which engages with the fact that Turkey is expected to 
act in the same way as other EU member states, even if it is not yet a member. For 
example, the EU requested Turkey align its national drug strategy paper with the 
European Drug Strategy Paper in each of its progress reports from 2003 to 2007 
(European Commission, 2003, 2004c, 2005, 2006 and 2007). Taking into account 
the fact that such strategy papers are of a declaratory nature and are not legally 
binding, insisting that a candidate state model its own strategy on that of the EU is 
a political rather than technical request to ensure that general policy frameworks 
are aligned. Furthermore EU policies on internal security matters including drug 
trafficking and organised crime are evolving: policies are re-evaluated every four 
years and priorities are redefined with each new policy that is agreed by the 
member states, thus implying that candidate states also adapt their priorities in 
parallel as the EU’s evolve. 
These expectations suggest a power asymmetry, placing the candidate state in an 
inferior position during the acquis process of integration (Schimmelfenning and 
Sedelmeier, 2004: 675). Regarding CEE states’ EU accession, Haughton argues 
that: 
“the EU seems extremely powerful.” […] Moreover, there was a clear power asymmetry 
during the process of accession, when the accession states of CEE were expected to 
transpose into domestic law the 80,000 pages of the acquis to a standard acceptable to the 
Commission and European Council (a condition which was not necessarily met by the 
existing member states). Indeed, the term ‘accession negotiations’ is in many respects a 
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misnomer, as there was very little left open to negotiation beyond the odd temporary 
transitional arrangement (derogation).” (Haughton, 2007:235) 
As a result of this asymmetry, scholars identify conditionality as possessing a 
transformative force, as it seems that what really matters is how quickly and 
accurately candidate states go through all the changes listed in their national 
accession partnership agreements. The extent of the expectations made by the EU 
regarding what Turkey should achieve in the fields of drug control and police 
cooperation should not be under-estimated. For example, the 2001 national 
partnership agreement stipulates the following: 
“-The capacity to fight against organised crime, the illicit use, production of and 
trafficking in drugs, fraud and corruption, money laundering and police and judicial 
cooperation will be enhanced. 
Work on the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant 
information on suspicious financial transactions will be accelerated.(…) 
For full membership in Europol, harmonisation with the relevant acquis will be achieved 
and preparations will be completed. (…) 
It is envisaged to benefit to the greatest extent possible from existing cooperation 
schemes within the framework of MEDA, and with the assistance of EU Member States, 
from specific programmes such as Falcone, Odysseus, Grotius, Daphne, Oisin and Stop, 
the Action Plan Against organised Crime, the Action Plan on the Fight Against Drugs, 
and the European Refugee Fund, in the field of justice and home affairs.” (NPPA, 2001: 
15)”  
The formulation of these objectives indicate that the EU assumes it has significant 
leverage over Turkey through the process of conditionality in the accession, as it 
is clear that in order to fulfil all of these objectives wide-ranging reforms in policy 
and practice are necessary. In this sense, the EU can be seen to have applied 
pressure on Turkey, with the result that Turkey has become increasingly involved 
in international police cooperation and the international fight against illicit drug as 
part of its Europeanization process. 
The second type of argument used to explain Turkey’s transformation adopts a 
neoliberal approach. It assumes that states are rational actors for which strategic 
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policymakers – those whose interests are at stake – make calculations of costs and 
benefits for each of the EU criteria for membership. EU conditionality is seen as a 
set of incentives and sanctions that trigger domestic change in the candidate state 
when the change is not costly for the strategic domestic player and when they 
provide additional resources for the strategic player to exploit the opportunities 
offered by the change (Börzel and Soyaltõn, 2012: 9). 
The main rational incentive for Turkey to go through this process is, obviously, to 
join the EU. Coupled with this are material incentives in the form of funding and 
training opportunities, which can be provided under instruments of pre-accession. 
The former Director of TUBIM provided an example of this as he explained why 
the TNP sought to create an agency dealing with national drug use , which 
became TUBIM, as there was none existing at the time in Turkey (interview with 
the former Director of TUBIM, Ankara, 2011). Indeed, since the 1996 National 
Security Council decision recognising drugs as a security matter, the Ministry of 
Family and Planning had been made responsible for drug use policies but in 
practice had done very little about it (see Robins, 2009). As a result, KOM was 
the only agency seeking to develop increased data and knowledge about drug use, 
drawing evidence from police cases. Around 1998-1999, KOM officers acting on 
their own initiative created questionnaires to give to people arrested for drug 
offences (interview with former KOM officer, March 2012). These provided what 
little knowledge was available about drug use, and there was considerable 
awareness that it was insufficient. In 2000, KOM proposed that a separate 
department be created, which would be the EMCDDA's focal point in Turkey. 
They put together applications for funding and training from the EU in order to 
set up this department (interview with the former Director of TUBIM, Ankara, 
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2011). According to TUBIM's former director, the reason for this was that they 
wanted to be ready for the moment when Turkey joined the EU and to benefit 
from the training that could be organised through pre-accession instruments. It 
was also good for Turkey, as there was a real need to develop policies to deal with 
addiction and drug use. In other words, it was a good opportunity for Turkey to 
strengthen its domestic policies on drug control. 
What this example reveals is that it was easy for Turkish authorities to overhaul 
their policies concerning drug use and addiction because it was a relatively vacant 
policy area at the time. A wealth of opportunities were created by the EU's 
stipulations that Turkey cooperate with the EMCDDA and “work jointly with EU 
Member States and organizations affiliated with the EU to increase the 
effectiveness of the protective and preventive measures”, as laid down in the 2001 
NPAA (2001: 443). Turkish authorities were presented with considerable 
incentives in an area where they acknowledged there was a lack of information 
and knowledge. Furthermore, the prospect of becoming part of the regional 
network as the EMCDDA focal point was viewed very positively by those in 
charge of this policy area. Therefore, the creation of TUBIM, which continues to 
exist within the organizational structure of the police, is significant because it can 
be seen to be a by-product of the accession process. This follows the analysis 
made by Grabbe: 
“Through the accession process the EU can directly affect policy, institutional 
development, and the capacity of the state. The EU’s influence is most readily 
identifiable where it advocates particular policy and institutional preferences. However it 
can stimulate far-reaching changes simply by moving an issue up the government’s 
decision-agenda, that is, by attracting more political attention to it” (Grabbe, 2006: 201). 
The third approach to explain the transfer of rules brought about by acquis 
communautaire moves away from the rationalist perspective and engages with 
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constructivist approaches. It considers acquis integration and the general process 
of Europeanization to be a process of social learning, or socialization – meaning 
that candidate states go ahead with the acquis integration because their state 
agents are socialized to new rules and norms during their interactions with 
external agents. Through this process they develop new understandings of their 
identities and interests, which requires the adoption of these new rules into their 
own system (Sedelmeier, 2011: 15; see also Checkel, 2001; Johnston, 2008: 15-
16;  Börzel and Soyadõn, 2012: 8). As Sedelmeier explains it: 
“As a result of such processes, elites in candidate countries become convinced that the 
EU’s rules are legitimate and have an intrinsic value. Governments thus adopt the EU’s 
rules regardless of the material incentives that the EU might offer for doing so” 
(Sedelmeier, 2011: 15).  
This theoretical approach is useful because it explains all the training 
opportunities and twinning projects organised under pre-accession instruments 
not as opportunities or rewards, as the rational choice approach does, but as 
'spaces' where socialization can occur. Arguably, this is one of the rationales for 
their use by the EU. As Tomalova and Tulmets point out: 
“Originally, Twinning was designed to facilitate learning about and socialisation into the 
transposition and implementation procedures as part of the accession process, focussing 
mainly on the acquis in Candidate Countries” (Tomalova and Tulmets, 2007: 382; see 
also European Commission, no date: 2). 
Furthermore, the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs has been the institution with 
which the highest number of twinning projects has been organised: between 2002 
and 2007, 25 out of 77 projects involved this ministry, a far greater than any other 
(Ministry for EU Affairs, 2008b). From 2002 to 2011, a total of 17 projects have 
involved the police or Gendarmerie, and some specifically related to the fight 
against drugs, such as the projects 'Strengthening the Turkish National 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction' (2002-2004) and 
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'Strengthening the Investigation Capacity of Turkish National Police and 
Gendarmerie Against Organised Crime' (2008-2010). 
Socialization scholars contend that through such opportunities, agents’ beliefs and 
their perception of their interests change because they learn new rules and norms; 
and because they develop professional networks with other agents who practice 
those rules (Haas, 1992; Meyer et al., 1997). These factors then convince them of 
the necessity of adopting these rules. Senior ranking police officers explained in 
their interviews that processes of this kind have occurred between them and 
European police forces, and that it influenced practices, if not policies. For 
example, one explained how KOM's yearly activity reports were influenced by 
European practices following the posting of liaison officers from various 
European police forces in Turkey. They requested statistics on arrests and 
seizures from the TNP. Initially, the TNP responded by providing raw statistics, 
until one officer proposed to make a report following the example of other 
European police agencies, in particular the Italian Guardia di Finanza. This report 
would not only be similar to those produced by European police forces to 
communicate their success and drug seizure rates, but it would also allow the 
Turkish police to analyse the raw data and share this analysis with counterparts, 
rather than leave it to others to make their own analysis (Interview with former 
KOM officer, 2012). This example shows that Turkish police officers adopted 
practices of their European counterparts. It suggests that there was a desire to be 
seen and understood by European police as a good police force, or at least one 
that works to the same standards. It also suggests how interacting with European 
police forces led the TNP to adopt some of their practices, and that the Turkish 
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police became conscious of the necessity to show to their counterparts that it was 
equally serious when in combating drug trafficking and organised crime. 
This leads to one of the main arguments of the proponents of Europeanization 
through socialization, which is that through interaction values and perceptions 
tend to converge, or at least that actors in candidate states align their 
understandings with their European counterparts by learning the practices of EU 
states. Some evidence of this process was noted by several European liaison 
officers in order to explain increasing determination by Turkish authorities to 
investigate drug trafficking after 2000. As mentioned earlier, in the aftermath of 
the 9/11 bombings the PKK was placed on the EU’s terrorist organizations list, 
and it seems that this decision triggered a positive response in the sense that 
Turkish authorities began to attach greater attention to cooperation requests from 
European countries on drug trafficking cases (Interviews with European liaison 
officers, Ankara, 2011). In a global context in which states turned much of their 
attention to the financing of terrorism, it seems that the drug trafficking activities 
of the PKK were singled out as a representing a significant threat, providing 
common ground around which Turkey and its European partners can converge. 
Simultaneously, Turkey agreed to increase cooperation regarding cross border 
investigations of drug trafficking. 
The legal and administrative reforms undertaken to integrate into the EU acquis 
communautaire seem to have been concomitant with the changes in values and 
perspectives, which would indicate that socialization has taken place. Indeed, 
several observers noted that between the years 2000 and 2005, middle-ranking 
and high-ranking police officers holding key positions in KOM were increasingly 
reaching out to international partners and worked actively to increase the outward 
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orientation of their organization. This is in line with the 2002 Joint Declaration on 
Drugs, which stipulates that candidate countries will enhance “regional co-
operation in supply reduction, notably by strengthening law enforcement co-
operation including reinforcing activities against synthetic drugs, the diversion of 
chemical precursors and money laundering” (European Council, 2002: 13-14). It 
also reveals that these officers, who occupied strategic positions at the time, were 
eager to prove Turkey’s credentials as a committed actor against drug trafficking. 
Several observers contended that their work has had a lasting effect on the extent 
to which Turkish authorities are attached to international cooperation in this field 
(interviews with European and DEA liaison officers, Ankara 2011; senior police 
officers, Ankara 2011 and 2012). 
To conclude this section, it can be argued that changes in and reforms to the 
Turkish state have been broad and far-reaching; and that the process of 
Europeanization can be observed even in areas as specific as anti-drug trafficking 
and international police cooperation. Europeanization scholars utilize several 
theoretical frameworks to explain how norms, values and rules have been 
transferred from the EU towards the candidate states, and these provide useful 
explanations for the changes that took place. The next section reviews the 
growing body of literature arguing that tracing all institutional change in 
candidate states back to the EU and Europeanization is too great a step as it leaves 
many factors unexplained. 
7.4 Weaknesses of Europeanization theories 
Alongside the large strand of academic research on Europeanization, a growing 
number of studies are critical of its claims. They question the almost automatic 
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assumption that the diffusion of European policies and institutions means that the 
process of Europeanization is the main catalyst for domestic change, in particular 
in EU candidate states (Börzel and Risse, 2012). Within this recent strand of study  
there is a growing body of work centring on Turkey’s accession to the EU (see for 
example Saatçioglu, 2010; Alpan, 2011; Buhari-Gülmez, 2011a and 2011b; 
Börzel and Soyaltõn, 2012; Noutcheva and Aydõn-Duzgit, 2012). The aspects of 
Turkey’s reforms most commonly studied are democratisation, human rights and 
the country's political structures, meaning that there is less interest in areas such 
as police cooperation and anti-drug trafficking – which relate more to 
administrative reforms and are only indirectly connected to political criteria. 
However, the approach these studies adopt to critique Europeanization literature 
is useful in this case too, as it helps make sense of some elements left unexplained 
or neglected.  
The first critique of note goes to the very core of the incentives model of 
Europeanization theory, critiquing: the top-down perspective it uses. This tends to 
assume a one-direction process in which the EU is allowed to impose its laws and 
institutions – an understanding that Buhari Gülmez critically labels a 'sender-
receiver' model (2011a). The claim here is that such an approach restricts 
understanding of more complicated processes. Specifically, it is argued that it 
obliges observers to conceive of the EU and Turkey as separate units that interact 
with each other in isolation of the rest of the international community, and that 
their relationships with other external actors have no impact on their interaction. 
This results in the exclusion of two important factors: firstly, criteria set by the 
EU are often defined in accordance with international standards, rather than 
European standards only, and secondly, current members of the EU should not 
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automatically be considered stronger or better performing states than candidate 
states. 
The first of these two elements points to the fact that the conditions of EU 
membership can hardly be considered as uniquely European. For example, the 
ratification of international and regional conventions and treaties is a major 
component of the EU acquis communautaire, yet this is only part of a global 
context: in relation to police cooperation and drug trafficking, the EU's first 
requirement is the ratification of UN and Council of Europe Conventions as these 
encompass global norms. Furthermore, Turkey has long attached a great deal of 
importance to participation in global organizations and claims to be highly 
committed to their norms and values. Therefore, when the EU requirements 
correspond to the norms and values of international regimes, the likelihood of 
Turkey complying with the EU requirements increases, as it already has a strong 
connection with the global institutions from which these norms and values 
originate (Buhari Gülmez, 2011: 16). Thus, the reason why changes in legislation 
or policy are made is related to global trends as much as it is the pressure to adapt 
to the EU. Thus, by taking this step Turkish authorities are committing the state to 
norms that go beyond the EU, and assuming that it is merely Europeanization is 
too limiting. 
The second element to consider is that the Europeanization approach assumes 
that, as a candidate state, Turkey is 'weak', or performs poorly in all aspects of 
governance, with existing EU states performing better. In the case of fighting 
illicit drug trafficking, however, such assumptions are debatable. Turkish 
authorities have for several years been keen to publicize the fact that rates of drug 
seizures have consistently been higher in Turkey than in all of the EU countries 
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combined,10 so a simple assumption that “Turkey needs to learn from EU” is 
wrong (Interviews with senior police officers, 2011, 2012). It is apparent that 
Turkish authorities have never placed themselves in the position of a ‘receiver’ or 
‘learner’ vis à vis the EU, so an alternative paradigm must be found to explain its 
harmonization with the EU's norms. To use the words of Börzel and Soyadõn, 
Turkey did not simply 'download' what it needed from the EU in order to 
strengthen its anti-drugs efforts simply because it had been imposed by the EU 
(Börzel and Soyadõn, 2012).  
The second criticism of Europeanization theory is that it automatically sets the 
prospect of EU accession as the main, if not sole, driver of domestic change, 
thereby ignoring domestic factors. Bolukbaúi et al. criticise Europeanization 
research on Turkey for its tendency to:  
“adopt a top-down research design approach, although they do not explicitly discuss this 
choice leaving the reader to infer such choice. […] The nature of this process leads to the 
expectation that any domestic change observed is attributable to the EU” (Bolukbaúi et 
al., 2010: 477). 
When the role and the weight of such domestic causes are not explored, reforms 
that had begun prior to the accession bid can be mistakenly attributed to 
Europeanization. Similarly, the possibility that some domestic actors favour, or 
are empowered by, Europeanization reforms and use them to their advantage 
against those who reject the reforms is downplayed. Alpan uses the term 'Europe-
as-Hegemony' to describe this situation, where the relationship between Europe 
and domestic politics is one in which “the former shapes and hegemonises 
                                                 
10  It is widely accepted that volumes of drug seizures are an inaccurate indicator of a state’s 
success in curbing illicit drug trafficking (higher seizures could be indicative of higher volumes of 
trafficking, and it is impossible to assess what proportion of the entire volume trafficked is caught 
at any point of time, just as it is impossible to know for certain how much drugs are trafficked). 
However, the fact that Turkey seizes a greater quantity of drugs than the 27 EU countries 
combined is a strong indication of its relative strength in this area, and is the statistic that Turkish 
authorities tend to rely on.  
 211 
 
politics”, with other processes sidelined in analyses of factors causing or 
influencing change (Alpan, 2011: 6). Thus, it is important to look closely at 
factors that may be overlooked as a result of the assumption that changes relating 
to drug policies and police cooperation simply result from Europeanization. 
Looking at reforms that had begun prior to the accession bid, it is important to 
take into account that even if December 1999 was a milestone due to the EU 
Council’s official acceptance of Turkey’s candidacy, the watershed moment in 
relation to police matters occurred a few years previously in the aftermath of the 
car accident at Susurluk in 1996. Once appointed Minister of Internal Affairs in 
April 1999, former police officer Sadettin Tantan proposed a new bill designed to 
combat organised crime and this was adopted by parliament later that year. At the 
same time, staffing of the TNP’s KOM was overhauled and new, high-calibre 
officers were employed who had no without links to the former minister Mehmet 
A÷ar and his followers in the police, given the revelations regarding his deep 
level of involvement in the Susurluk scandal (Interviews with: Sadettin Tantan, 
Istanbul, 2011; senior police officers, Ankara, 2011 and 2012). All of this 
happened in an effort to eradicate personnel and practices that were compromised 
from the connections between state and organised crime, but in particular it was 
the result of a desire to modernise the police. It should be noted, however, that 
these reforms occurred around the same time as the official acceptance of 
Turkey’s EU accession bid, making it difficult to clearly distinguish the 
importance of each potential factor, and their precise role. Furthermore, in Turkey 
the concepts of modernization and Europeanization have very often been 
conflated, as the Kemalist ideology has long been based on the premise that 
Turkey ought to look towards the West in order to modernise itself, and turn away 
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from its 'backwards' Islamist and Ottoman past (see for example Aydõn and 
Keyman, 2004; also Buhari Gülmez, 2011: 27). However, it can be stated that it 
seems that for many the urge to modernise was more pressing than the urge to 
‘Europeanize’, and that reforms which at first look as though they are part of the 
process of Europeanization were actually undertaken in order to modernise the 
Turkish state. Whilst these reforms fit the EU acquis harmonization process, this 
was not the primary objective of the domestic actors who pushed them forward. 
Rather, it is argued here that they were instrumentalised and that modernization of 
the state was the main objective.  
This instrumentalisation the EU demands, can be observed at two different levels. 
The first level offers a strong indication that it may be more relevant to look at 
changes using a bottom-up approach rather than Europeanization literature's top-
down approach, with a focus on changes which took place at the level of KOM. 
Certain key people who held key positions in this department at the turn of the 
millennium changed its way of working and created an environment that favoured 
outward-reaching behaviour, cultivating contacts with other police forces, and 
attending important international conferences such as the CND yearly sessions 
(interviews with: liaison officers, Ankara, 2011; senior police officers, Ankara, 
2011and 2012). It appears that because they put themselves in situations where 
they were able to promote Turkey’s efforts in fighting drug trafficking (and 
organised crime in general), their own initiative was viewed positively by the 
organization's hierarchy and so they continued this practice in order to benefit 
themselves and their colleagues within KOM. Progressively, a working culture 
developed where attending international events, for example training or 
conferences, or engaging in joint activities with international partners through, for 
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example information sharing or joint operations, was seen by many as an effective 
career advancement method. It seems that eventually, the possibility to propose 
twinning projects for capacity enhancement also became a way for staff to be seen 
as active and dedicated officers, and some projects grew out of individuals’ 
desires to take the opportunity given them by the availability of pre-accession 
funds (interviews with senior and middle rank KOM officials, Ankara, 2011). 
This suggests that what might have first appeared to be a genuine effort by the 
police as an institution to conform to European standards is in fact better 
described as instrumentalization by individual employees concerned with career 
progression; or as the result of rational choices at a personal rather than at 
institutional level. 
A second level of instrumentalization is also identifiable in the relations between 
the different institutions involved in fighting drug trafficking in Turkey. As 
explained in Chapter Two, the TNP is the primary agency in this field, but the 
Gendarmerie, Customs and the Coastguards are also active. At present, working 
relationships between the TNP and other agencies are inefficient, and remain a 
concern for the European Commission, who have noted it as 'problematic' in a 
number of reports (European Commission, 2002; 2005; 2006). The TNP seeks to 
promote itself as a 'leader' by adopting an openly pro-European attitude – in 
particular to distinguish itself from the Gendarmerie, which forms part of the 
army's structure. This explains why the Gendarmerie has exhibited a considerably 
lower level of openness to European police liaison officers (interviews with 
European liaison officers, Ankara, 2011). This also needs to be contextualised 
against the fact that the Turkish armed forces continue to play a significant role in 
Turkish politics and are thought to be hostile to reforms towards EU membership. 
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Thus, it can be argued that by adopting the opposite attitude, the TNP is placing 
itself in the political arena as an institution that can be relied on by the current 
government, which has been championing EU reform since its arrival in power. 
These examples suggest that even if institutions like the TNP have embraced the 
reforms they were asked to introduce in order to align themselves with EU 
requirements, the reasons behind such moves are not restricted to 
Europeanization. Theories on the Europeanization of candidate states suffer from 
multiple weaknesses because they leave out processes of change which, when 
analysed in depth, turn out to be difficult to separate from the supposed 
Europeanization process. Thus, the theoretical framework typically used to 
demonstrate the influence of the EU on changes in candidate countries – what is 
often termed the EU’s 'transformative power' – may not to be the most 
appropriate approach to the case studied here. 
 By combining these findings with those of Chapter Six, above, it can be stated 
that external factors are insufficient in explaining how Turkish policing has 
changed. In the following section, Johnston's concept of social influence is 
utilized to explain how Turkish policing has changed. While in Chapter Six it was 
demonstrated that the concept of 'mimicking' successfully explains much of 
Turkey’s behaviour during the 1970s and 1980s, it is proposed here that the 
micro-process of ‘social influence’ offers further understanding. 
7.5 Using 'social influence' to explain change 
Bolukbaúi et al. argued that in Europeanization research “top-down research 
design is still the dominant approach despite calls for a bottom-up research 
design, which reflects a preference for the search for ‘causes of effects’ 
 215 
 
(Bolukbaúi et al., 2010: 478). Based on the review of the weaknesses of the 
research designs analysed in the previous section, it is contended here that rather 
than looking for bottom-up research design it would be preferable to adopt an 
approach that focuses on the process of diffusion itself. In particular, it is argued 
here that what is missing in Europeanization research and its critiques is an 
explicit engagement with the underlying causal mechanisms: what Johnston terms 
the 'micro-processes of norm diffusion', which can help in clarifying norm 
transfer and norm convergence between the EU and candidate countries 
(Johnston, 2008). It is particularly useful in the case in question here contributing 
greatly to an understanding of how and why  Turkey changed its approach to the 
fight against drugs between 1996 and 2005, from one that saw it repeatedly 
criticised for a lack of engagement to one that saw it widely recognised as a 
strong player in this field. 
In Johnston’s words, social influence is: 
“[social influence] explains pro-group behaviour as a function of an actor’s sensitivity to 
status markers bestowed by a social group and requires some common understanding in 
the social value the group places on largely symbolic backpatting and opprobrium 
signals. I should do X because others believe that X is the appropriate thing to do and I 
will be rewarded socially for doing so” (Johnston, 2008: xxiv). 
The key feature of this type of behaviour is the existence of rewards and 
punishments, which he describes in this way: 
“Rewards might include psychological well-being, status, a sense of belonging, and a 
sense of well-being derived from conformity with role expectations, among others. 
Punishments might include shaming, shunning, exclusion and demeaning, and dissonance 
derived from actions inconsistent with role and identity. The effect of (successful) social 
influence is an actor’s conformity with the position advocated by a group as a result of 
“real or imagined pressure” (Nemeth, 1987: 237)” (Johnston, 2008: 79). 
 Applying this to the present case study, Turkey’s decision to become a highly 
cooperative state in drug enforcement matters can be seen as being motivated by a 
desire to “accumulate status markers” as a cooperative actor; seeking rewards and 
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avoiding the opprobrium that comes with failing to behave in this manner. 
Turkey's changing behaviour, however, did not require it to believe that this was 
the right way to behave, but rather that it would gain it a good reputation. As 
Johnston writes: 
“social influence rests on the influenced actor having some prior identification with a 
relevance group. Social influence involves connecting extant interests, attitudes and 
beliefs in one “attitude system” to those in some other attitude system, e.g.. attitudes 
towards cooperation get connected to seemingly separate attitudes toward social standing, 
status, and self-esteem in ways that had not previously occurred to the actor” (Johnston, 
2008: 80). 
In order to understand changes in Turkey’s approach to drug enforcement and 
police cooperation, it is important to analyse EU-Turkey relations outside of the 
accession process and in the context of the international drug control regime. It 
was noted in Chapter Six that throughout the 1970s and 1980s Turkey had tried to 
shake off a bad reputation as an untrustworthy state. When the EU officially 
recognized of Turkey as a candidate in 1999, the TNP had begun to reform and 
modernise in the wake of the Susurluk scandal, which had likely been a 
contributing factor to Turkey's poor reputation among foreign counterparts. In this 
context, it can be argued that the reforms undertaken were intended to show 
Turkey’s determination to fight illicit drug trafficking and organised crime; and to 
avoid shame and condemnation that would have resulted from failing to do so. By 
accepting the EU's acquis requirements, Turkey collected rewards on two levels: 
firstly as a state actively engaged in combatting international drug trafficking, and 
secondly as a state progressively integrating the EU acquis. The first is a marker 
of high status within the international community “as a co-operator or an active 
pro-social member of a group” (Johnston, 2003: 91); and the second is a social 
reward, as Turkey receives added recognition from the EU. At the level of the 
TNP, there was a strong desire to gain recognition from the effective institutions 
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of foreign counterparts. It is often stated, for example, that Turkey seizes more 
illicit drugs on a yearly basis than all of the EU states combined (interviews with 
middle ranking and senior police officers, Ankara, 2011, 2012). TNP officers also 
expressed some exasperation at the fact that Europeans tend not to see Turkey as 
a victim of illicit trafficking in the same way as EU countries. For example, 
EMCDDA and EUROPOL reports on drugs and crime tend to mention illicit 
drugs entering EU countries from Turkey, giving the impression that Turkey is 
the place of origin and not predominantly a transit country (interviews with a 
senior police officer, Ankara, 2011). The TNP are keen to highlight this 
distinction because not to make it tarnishes its reputation in their opinion. 
Meanwhile, European liaison officers recognise that the TNP has worked hard to 
clear its name and appear as a police force committed to fighting drug trafficking 
(interviews with European liaison officers, Ankara, 2011). 
Johnston argues that a social influence process is at work when the arguments 
given for adopting pro-group behaviour stress back-patting, image benefits and 
opprobrium costs (Johnston, 2003:95). Senior police officers explained that while 
there was no decision taken at political level to engage the TNP in cooperation 
with foreign counterparts, some key officers took that decision because they 
understood that it would improve the image of the TNP (interviews with senior 
police officers, Ankara, 2011, 2012). They also understood that such a move 
would also be beneficial for their careers, as they would be recognised among 
their peers as contributing to the good reputation of the institution (interviews 
with senior police officers, Ankara, 2011, 2012). 
It is therefore argued that Turkey's concerns about its image and reputation have 
played a major role in its approach to fighting illicit drug trafficking and 
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international police cooperation. This seems to have driven change as much as, or 
more, than any political decision. In particular, Turkey's behaviour in this area 
should not be construed as the result of a decision to harmonise laws and practices 
with the EU, but rather as a result of the fact that the EU requests provided 
opportunities not only for Turkey to improve its reputation as a state actively 
fighting drugs for the benefit of the international community, but also to gain 
rewards for actively pursuing the acquis harmonisation agenda. 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has showed that Turkey’s approach to drug enforcement and police 
cooperation changed dramatically from the end of the 1990s to 2005. The TNP – 
a police force once deeply involved in corruption, with links to organised crime 
groups, and that was mistrusted by its international counterparts transformed into 
an institution that these same international counterparts recognise as dedicated, 
efficient, professional, well trained and excellently equipped. This chapter 
showed that, although this transformation happened at the same time as Turkey 
entered the phase of pre-accession to the EU and thus engaged in a number of 
reforms to integrate the EU acquis communautaire, assuming that the 
transformation of Turkey’s law enforcement is a result of European influence or 
the of EU transformative power is misleading. While the two processes are not 
completely unrelated, presuming the existence of a simple cause-and-effect 
relation between the two is an ineffective way of explaining how and why Turkish 
policing transformed itself. 
Thus, while Europeanization literature's focus on how Turkey's progressive 
implementation of the EU acquis does offer some conceptual tools that are useful 
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to make sense of how changes took place, it fails to explain why changes 
happened. The use of these conceptual tools – which largely take for granted an 
asymmetrical power relation between the EU and Turkey – leads to scholars 
overlooking the fact that EU requirements in the area of drugs enforcement and 
international cooperation correspond to the norms and values of the international 
drug control regime. Modernisation is also easily equated with Europeanization 
because the two processes tend to take the same form but they do not always have 
the same causes or follow the same rationales. 
The concept of social influence, then, has proven to be a useful explanatory tool. 
It has revealed that a better understanding of the changes can be made by looking 
at Turkey’s behaviour within the community of actors of the international drug 
regime rather than within the confines of the Turkey-EU relationship. It has also 
shown that the most important motivation for change has been Turkey's concern 
that it be recognised as a high-status state in the issue of drugs enforcement. 
Additionally, these concerns were of particular concern for a number of 
employees of KOM, who acted as agents of change in order to advance their 
careers. 
In the next chapter, the analysis turns to the period between 2005 and 2012 and 
focuses on the role and motivation of these domestic actors of change. Having 
demonstrated in Chapter Six and in this chapter that Johnston’s theory of 
socialization micro-processes is effective in this case study, the chapter will apply 
these findings and test the extent to which they help elucidate the causal processes 
of this case study. 
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Chapter 8: Turkeys approach to international police cooperation 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses Turkey’s approach to international police cooperation from 
2005 until 2012, thereby completing the analysis begun in Chapter Six and Seven, 
which reviewed the 1960s to 1996 and 1996 to 2005 respectively. It argues that 
from 2005 onwards there is growing evidence that Turkish authorities have been 
seeking to capitalise on the good reputation they had gained with international 
partners by investing extensively in training of the police forces of states with less 
expertise and resources in drug and organised crime investigation. There seem to 
be two reasons for such investment. Firstly, the TNP has come to attach the 
utmost importance to the principle of fighting drugs and organised crime; and 
secondly, it sees sharing its expertise in this domain as an opportunity to increase 
its reputation internationally on security matters beyond drug enforcement. While 
Turkey’s intent to enforce the rules of the drug control regime appears genuine, 
doing so is also seen as a means to further international power and prestige; and to 
gain acceptance among the international community as a regional leader in law 
enforcement. This chapter explores in further detail the argument that emerged 
out of the previous two chapters, according to which reputational concerns are an 
essential explanatory element for the changes observed. Rather than pointing to a 
period of great change in Turkey’s approach to drug enforcement, the data seems 
to indicate a consolidation of the practice of and belief in the norms and values of 
the drug control regime. It is argued that in the period of time under review, there 
is evidence that the norms of the international drug regime have a strong hold 
among Turkish law enforcement authorities. 
 221 
 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first explores Turkey’s engagement 
internationally – both in diplomatic forums and at an operational level. It also 
explains the special role played by TADOC in Turkey’s international outreach. 
TADOC was created in 2000 as a five-year collaborative project between the 
TNP and the UNODC, with UN participation ending in 2005. Turkish authorities' 
control of the institution after that date represents a milestone, with the institution 
seen as a flagship of Turkey's international cooperation. This makes 2005 a 
suitable starting point for the analysis in this chapter. This should not, however, 
be understood as clear-cut moment at which Turkish authorities changed their 
behaviour from that observed and described in the previous chapter. 
The second section proposes an explanatory model of Turkey’s engagement along 
the two dimensions identified in the previous chapter: the internalization of the 
norms of the international drug control regime, and the desire for status 
maximization. This model is based on Johnston’s conceptualisation of 
socialization micro-processes and focuses on persuasion, following the focus on 
mimicking and social influence in Chapters Six and Seven respectively (Johntson, 
2008: 155-196). However, the model developed goes beyond Johnson's by 
introducing one further micro-process: performance. It is argued that as a result of 
its expertise in the field Turkey has become an influential power with Turkish 
decision makers using this power to gain international recognition for its work on 
global security. 
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8.2 The nature of Turkeys engagement in international drug control 
In order to understand the motivations behind Turkey’s drug enforcement it is 
useful to start by determining its main characteristics. In order to assess the 
consistency between what Turkish authorities claim to do and believe in; and 
actual practice, three aspects are examined separately: official discourse; the 
international activities and operations in which Turkey is engaged; and the 
development of the international training activities of the TNP. 
8.2.1 Turkeys participation in diplomatic forums 
Turkey’s official position on drugs is documented in the variety of public 
statements it has been making for international audiences. It can easily be seen in 
speeches at the CND, for example, and in the TNP's official reports. These public 
statements are structured around three arguments designed to prove Turkey’s 
attachment to the norms of the international drug regime. The first is that 
international cooperation is essential to any attempt to suppress illicit drug 
trafficking. For example, on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is 
stated that: 
“Turkey’s global strategy on the fight against illicit trafficking of drugs is based on the 
principle that the issue can only be addressed by extensive cooperation, exchange of 
information and expertise within the international community” (MFA, 2012).  
Meanwhile, KOM's 2010 annual report states that:  
“Today, distances between countries have largely disappeared (…) organised crime that 
earlier was perceived as a local problem has now acquired a character that goes far 
beyond the nation’s borders. When considered from this point of view, it is inevitable 
that police forces cooperate quickly, safely and effectively for the purpose of fighting 
crime organizations. An investigation initiated for crime organizations that are beyond 
borders should not be limited to the jurisdiction of that country; international police 
cooperation should be exploited actively for the purpose of exposing the crime 
organization with all its tentacles” (KOM, 2010). 
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Similarly, at the 52nd session of the CND in 2009, Turkey stated:  
“Turkey regards the Political Declaration as an expression of a universal commitment to 
create a more cooperative political climate in our battle with this global threat. On its 
part, Turkey will do its share on the international and domestic fronts, through bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation, to realize the balanced objectives set forth both in the 
Political Declaration and the Action Plan”  (Ertay, 2009). 
In TADOC's 2011 report, meanwhile, it is written that:  
“strong international cooperation is vital to achieve success in fight against organised 
crime. Having strong belief in international cooperation, Turkey has supported every 
initiative aimed at combating drug trafficking at the international level” (TADOC, 2011). 
These are just four examples of the public expression of Turkey’s determination 
to reach out to, and work with, other states’ law enforcement agencies. Similar 
assertions can be found in the many documents and statements published by 
Turkish authorities on this matter. The use of such language can also be 
interpreted as a way for Turkish authorities to signify that they wish their 
counterparts to be as willing to cooperate as they are. 
The second element of recurrent discourse is that the Turkish authorities – in 
particular the police – have achieved a very high level of expertise and success 
with their investigations of drug trafficking. The easiest way to advertise this 
success is by highlighting that drug seizures in Turkey are among the highest in 
the world on a yearly basis. The Turkish representative at t the CND in 2008 
stated that:  
“Turkey carried on her fight against illicit drug trafficking activities with an impetus and 
made record amount (more than 15 tons) of heroin seizures in 2008. In the World Drug 
Report 2008 of the UNODC it is stated that seizures in Turkey amounted to the 18% of 
the world’s whole heroin seizure in 2006” (Ertay, 2008, see also KOM, 2010: 5). 
As statistics of seizure rates are published in the UNODC’s annual report, 
comparisons with other countries are easy to make (see for example KOM, 2011: 
XVI). However, the value of using seizure rates as an indicator of actual success 
in curbing trafficking is debatable because of the illicit nature of drug trafficking. 
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Knowing how much has not been seized and thus what proportion of the entire 
trade the seizures actually represent is virtually impossible.  
More striking than the reference to seizure rates is the recurrence of the claim that 
Turkish police officers have very high levels of expertise and access to the most 
modern equipment. The reports of KOM emphasize the use of “modern 
investigative techniques”, and state that it has been professionalizing its work 
through “improved risk analysis, profiling methods and investments in modern 
policing techniques and methods” (KOM, 2006: foreword; 2007: 9). Reforms and 
modernization of the police force are also mentioned, as in the 2011 annual 
report: 
“having renewed and developed itself in all respects in recent years [the police] performs 
its tasks [with] exemplary dynamism and productivity in all aspects with its fully fledged 
manpower, fast adaptation of advanced technology into its daily routine and a 
professional concept of policing” (KOM, 2011: XIII). 
The third element of discourse, which follows from the first two, is that Turkey is 
in a favourable position to share its expertise by training other police forces. It 
positions such offers as a gesture towards enhancing global efforts against illicit 
drug trafficking: 
“Special importance is also given to training co-operation beside operational and strategic 
co-operation in fighting organised crime. The Turkish international Academy against 
Drugs and organised Crime, established in the year 2000, has filled in a big gap 
regionally and internationally on personnel training” (KOM, 2010: XI). 
The activities of TADOC (studied in greater detail later) are shown to indicate the 
strength and determination of Turkey not only in the fight against illicit drug 
trafficking, but also its willingness to do so in cooperation with other states. Thus, 
there seems to be a conscientious effort made by Turkey to publicize its own drug 
enforcement work as something beneficial not only for Turkey, but also for other 
states.  
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8.2.2 Turkeys international activity at the strategic and operational levels 
In line with its public position, Turkey is actively engaged in international 
cooperation at the strategy, policy and operational levels. It participates first and 
foremost in the CND: it has been a member of the 53-seat forum continuously 
from 1997 to 2009, and in 2011 it was elected once more for a four-year term.11 
Turkey’s participation in the work of the Commission evolved slightly in 2008 
when it agreed not to present a resolution calling for support for “traditional and 
established supplier countries”, as it had in previous years. Entitled “The need for 
a balance between demand for and supply of opiates used to meet medical and 
scientific needs”, this resolution had been co-sponsored by Turkey and India (the 
two traditional suppliers of opiates according to the 1961 Single Convention), 
which meant that Turkey had played a lead role in the negotiation and adoption of 
that resolution by the Commission every year. According to a Turkish delegate to 
the UNODC, the decision to no longer put forward this resolution was due in part 
to the efforts made by member states of the commission to streamline its 
workload, and it was felt that it may not be necessary to engage in negotiations 
over this issue every year as it was not highly controversial (Turkish delegate to 
the UNODC, telephone interview, 2012). Nevertheless, by agreeing to drop this 
resolution from the CND’s agenda, Turkey sent a signal that it does not wish to 
draw attention to its status as a traditional opiate supplier, and that in its dealing 
with the CND it prefers focusing on trafficking, the central theme of its 
declarations. 
                                                 
11 See http://www.the UNODC.org/the UNODC/en/commissions/CND/02-membership.html 
[Accessed 25 March 2013]. 
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Turkey is also striving to be amongst the countries that have most influence over 
international drug control. Following three years of negotiations (interview with 
Sumru Noyan, Ankara, 2011), Turkey became a member of the Major Donor 
Group of the UNODC in 2005. This is an informal group of the 21 largest donors 
of the UNODC, which monitors how the institution is run and has an unofficial 
say in its policy decisions. Membership of the Major Donor Group requires states 
to make a larger contribution to the organization’s general budget than to specific 
projects. In Turkey’s case, this latter part is focussed mainly on activities in 
Afghanistan, the Balkans, and more recently Africa (Turkish delegate to the 
UNODC, telephone interview, 2012). This newfound interest in Africa can be 
explained by the fact that during the last few years West Africa has emerged as a 
hub for cocaine trafficking from South America to Europe (Cornolli, 2011). One 
of the trafficking methods identified is the use of 'mules', or 'air couriers', who 
ingest the drugs and fly from West African cities to Istanbul, from where the 
drugs are redirected to Western European markets (interviews with KOM director 
and with Danish liaison officer, Ankara, 2011). This has also led to Istanbul being 
identified as an emerging hub for cocaine trafficking, and seizures have increased 
dramatically (KOM, 2011: 20). 
Turkey also participates in the work of a range of other institutions fighting 
against drugs (besides EMCDDA, as detailed in the previous chapter), including 
the Pompidou Group of the Council of Europe, the Paris Pact (which deals 
specifically with the traffic of Afghan originated opiates), the organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OCDE), the Southeast Europe Law Enforcement 
Centre (SELEC, known as the Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative until 
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October 2011), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization (BSEC), and 
the Drug Control Coordination Unit of the Economic Cooperation organization 
(ECO) (KOM, 2011). It is also an observer of the Central Asian Regional 
Information and Coordination Centre, which is a drug control cooperation project 
established by the UNODC in Central Asia. 
However, for the most part, law enforcement cooperation occurs at the level of 
police work itself, in the form of intelligence sharing for investigations led by 
another country. To facilitate such exchange of information, states tend to rely on 
bilateral security agreements and increasingly assign liaison officers to foreign 
countries. By 2000, Turkey had signed 54 bilateral agreements and assigned 6 
liaison officers abroad. By 2011 a total of 86 agreements were in place and the 
number of Turkish liaison officers assigned abroad had increased to 22 – although 
this increase only took place after 2005, as there were only 5 liaison officers on 
duty that year (KOM, 2000: 69; KOM, 2005: 115; KOM, 2011: 76). Since 2012, 
the Turkish government has been working on new legislation to create a legal 
framework for the appointment of liaison officers in 170 countries (almost every 
country in the world). Furthermore, since 1997 the Turkish legal system has 
allowed its police force to take part in controlled deliveries, which are inter-state 
operations through which consignments of illicit drug are followed throughout 
their journey in order for the police forces of the various countries involved to 
investigate and bring down entire trafficking networks. For each state taking part, 
this investigative technique must be clearly defined by law, as it obliges the police 
forces of countries through which consignments are ‘only’ transiting not to make 
arrests. This tactic is recommended in Article 11 of the 1988 UN Drug 
Trafficking Convention, the 2000 Convention on Transnational Organised Crime 
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and the 2003 Convention on Corruption, though not all states have adjusted their 
legal systems accordingly (EMCDDA, 2010). The TNP has led 96 international 
controlled delivery operations and 107 international investigations (KOM, 2011: 
21).  
Working with other police forces has thus become an accepted method of 
investigation for the TNP, and one that the government has been willing to 
facilitate by signing bilateral cooperation agreements. Whilst such agreements 
also provide for cooperation in areas unrelated to drugs or organised crime, in 
practice most of the requests concern drug trafficking and/or organised crime. 
This is why it can be argued that KOM acts as the international window of the 
TNP – a claim made by liaison officers posted in Turkey – while other 
departments of the police are far less prone to working with international 
counterparts (interviews with liaison officers of Denmark, Italy and the UK, 
Ankara, 2011). 
KOM, then, seems to stand out as an elite department within the TNP. Liaison 
officers noted that it is made up of officers selected for their professionalism and 
dedicationand uses the most modern equipment available to the TNP. Some 
European liaison officers also expressed a belief that KOM most probably worked 
with superior equipment to that available to most European police forces 
(Interview with liaison officers of Denmark, UK and Germany, Ankara: 2011). 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that efforts are being made to ensure 
that KOM has the means to work on an equal footing with international 
counterparts, and to ensure that it has sufficient resources to carry out its duties. 
Turkey’s commitment and its efforts are also recognised by its partners, who 
acknowledge its competence (Bozkurt, 2009). In 2011, for example, Nigel Kirby, 
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the Head of Drug Intelligence at UK’s Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) 
highlighted the role of Turkey’s law enforcement when he explained that the 
reason for a shortage of heroin in Britain was due to successful law enforcement, 
especially on the part of the TNP. The most significant reason for the shortage 
was identified as: 
“concerted and sustained law enforcement action. That's law enforcement action with 
partners overseas in Afghanistan, seizing the drugs and traffickers, that's law enforcement 
action in Turkey particularly, with our colleagues and liaison officers over there, at the 
border and in the UK. We've had concerted efforts against the traffickers, against the 
drugs, against their money and we believe that is one of the main reasons there is now a 
heroin shortage in the UK. [….] We've worked hard on identifying the major traffickers 
in Turkey for example, gave that to the Turkish National Police, they've been very 
professional about it and they've tackled the traffickers in their country, they've tackled 
the drugs, they've given us their intelligence and in turn we've looked at the organizations 
in the UK that have been operating with them and putting that back, that information, 
back up into Afghanistan when necessary. So that there has been a concerted effort of 
sharing intelligence, sharing information and working together to tackle the trade, not just 
one person, but the main people behind it, the source of the drugs and the routing, and of 
course the money behind it” (Kirby, 2011). 
Similarly, in 2011 the Home Affairs Committee of the British House of Commons 
reported positively on Turkey’s contributions to the fight drug trafficking and 
organised crime in Europe. It noted the high levels of appreciation the TNP had 
been receiving from both SOCA and EUROPOL: 
“There are three bodies responsible for policing in Turkey (…). Mr Coates [SOCA] had 
high praise for the Turkish National Police: They are efficient, professional and 
competent. They have high-end capabilities and technical capability. Mr Wainwright 
[Europol] was also complimentary: From my relatively narrow perspective of what I see 
of the Turkish authorities’ dealings with the European Union, including Europol, I am 
impressed by the commitment and energy” (House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee, 2011: 12). 
Ukrainian authorities have also given state medals to Turkish police officers for 
their involvement in heroin seizures on Ukrainian territory (Güneç, 2008). The 
apparent ease which Turkey is now cooperating with international partners and 
the praise it has gained from other states raises questions about whether this has 
resulted from changes to its methods of cooperating. This can be assessed at two 
levels: the legal framework and police practice. Legally speaking, several 
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legislative changes have been made in order to harmonize Turkey’s legal system 
with international practices, such as the aforementioned controlled deliveries. 
Other practices, such as the sale or purchase of illicit drugs by undercover 
officers, which are commonly carried out by DEA agents, is prohibited.  The 
current legal framework allows Turkey to work well with countries using a 
common law system (which is largely uncodifed legal procedure) while 
maintaining a civil law system (which is entirely codified), although these two 
systems vary greatly in the ways in which police can investigate crime and collect 
evidence. This has helped to maintain smooth working relationships with 
countries that use the former, such as the United States and the UK, as well as 
countries using the latter such as the Germany, France, Italy and most other 
European countries. (interviews with Italian, German, Danish, and UK liaison 
officers, Ankara, 2011).  
As Turkey has a common law system, police can only carry out investigations 
under the authority of a prosecutor and its independent powers are limited, 
whereas in civil law systems the police have more extensive independent powers 
to carry out investigations. The use of certain methods such as relying on 
informants or infiltrating organised crime groups is much more restricted in 
common law systems than in civil law systems (when it is not prohibited 
altogether), meaning that evidence produced through these methods is not always 
admissible in all judicial systems. To ensure the prosecution of crimes that 
involve more than one jurisdiction and different judicial systems, then, it is 
important that law enforcement agencies ensure the methods they use are 
acceptable to all. In terms of police practice, liaison officers interviewed agreed 
that their Turkish counterparts were more often than not willing to do their best to 
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share available intelligence and guarantee that joint operations could take place 
even when facing obstacles, such as guaranteeing that evidence can be accepted in 
the courts of different jurisdictions. The impression given was that Turkey had not 
modelled its drug enforcement on that of another state, but that it had adapted its 
legislation and practice in such a way that effective cooperation with all partners 
is possible (irrespective of those partner's legal systems). 
As noted in Chapter Seven, the EU’s decision to classify the PKK as a terrorist 
organization functioned as a catalyst for the intensification of cooperation 
between Turkish and European police forces on drug trafficking cases. This 
makes it possible to argue that the first and foremost motive of the Turkish state 
in tackling drug trafficking has been to suppress the PKK’s main source of 
income in order to bring the entire organization down. This assumption, however, 
does not seem to be supported by evidence. It is clear that Turkish authorities are 
keen to emphasize that the PKK is directly involved in drug trafficking, because 
PKK members have been arrested on drug trafficking charges, and because drugs 
have been seized in caches together with weapons and propaganda material (see 
KOM reports, in particular KOM, 2011: 21, 40). However, evidence has been 
found to determine that Turkey’s drug enforcement efforts are motivated solely or 
primarily by the state’s desire to dismantle the PKK. The Director of TADOC 
argued that Turkey’s drug enforcement policy was a by-product of the state’s 
fight against organised crime, which was stepped up following the Susurluk 
scandal, and is not directly related to the fight against terrorism, which has been 
in place for many years: 
“I think that Turkey’s drug policy has developed as by-product of combating organised 
crime and mafia. I believe that neither the Turkish government not the TNP had a counter 
drug policy until recently. However, Turkey has always had an anti-terror policy since 
1990s. (…) After the Susurluk scandal and 1999 there was a strong policy to dismantle 
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the mafia groups. I think that was the main drive for the development of KOM 
department. To be able to stop the mafia, KOM was strengthened and once they were 
finished with the mafia problems they also focused on drugs, and on financial crimes and 
cybercrimes. From my point of view especially for the last 5 - 6 years, after 2005, Turkey 
became very successful on drugs and it is because KOM department waged a successful 
fight against the mafia and won it then it focused on drugs”  (Director of TADOC, 
Ankara, 2011). 
Likewise, although for many years European police forces usually had the 
impression that requests for cooperation emanating from Turkish authorities were 
made in connection to the PKK (interviews with French and Danish liaison 
officers, Ankara, 2011), this trend has disappeared after 2000. The representative 
of SOCA (UK) noted that he rarely worked on the same cases as the British 
liaison officer for terrorism based in Ankara (interview with SOCA liaison 
officer, Ankara, 2011). 
To conclude this section, it appears that the concerns Turkey has raised in 
international forums regarding drugs and its commitment to curb trafficking has 
been matched by the resources it allocates to the issue. Its status as a major donor 
to the UNODC is symbolic of this, and the fact that KOM has gained high levels 
respect among its counterparts shows it is seen as a trusted partner. The next 
section examines Turkey’s involvement in international capacity building on anti-
drug trafficking and organised crime. 
8.2.3 TADOC 
Formed in 2000 through collaboration with the UNODC, the Turkish 
International Academy against Drugs and Organised Crime (TADOC) is a 
training centre falling under the auspices of the Turkish police. Its 2011 Activities 
Report states that the centre has trained over 4,000 law enforcement personnel 
from 84 countries and almost 20,000 Turkish police officers in matters relating to 
drug enforcement and investigating organised crime. 
 233 
 
TADOC is now seen as the flagship of the TNP’s international outreach, thus it is 
useful to review the history of its creation and how it functions. In the late 1990s, 
the UNDCP12 initiated discussions for the establishment of a regional training 
academy for drugs and crime in one of the countries on the trafficking routes from 
Central Asia to Europe. This academy was to function in a manner similar to the 
DEA’s international academies, and provide drug enforcement training for law 
enforcement officers in the surrounding countries in the hope that it would help 
curb trafficking on these routes. It was initially proposed to open the institution in 
a Balkan or Eastern Europe country, but in 1999 the Turkish capital city Ankara 
was chosen. There seem to be several factors explaining this choice. Firstly, at the 
time Turkey was trying to change the nature of its collaboration with the 
UNODC: until then it had generally been thought of as a country in need of 
assistance from the organization, but for some time it had been felt that the 
assistance received was inadequate (interview with Sumru Noyan, Ankara, 2011). 
For example, there were years when border control equipment was donated but 
was left unused because it was not needed by the Turkish authorities, who already 
had similar equipment (Ibid.). When the UNODC proposed the establishment of 
the training academy in Turkey, the Minister of Interior Sadettin Tantan allocated 
a building in Ankara, the refurbishment of which was entirely paid for by the 
“Foundation to Strengthen the Turkish Police” – a not-for-profit organization 
linked to the police. This move, coupled with the support of the United States and 
the lobbying of Sumru Noyan, a former Turkish Ambassador who at the time was 
working as the Deputy Director of the UNODC, convinced the UNODC to choose 
Turkey as the host for the academy (interviews with: Sumru Noyan, first Director 
                                                 
12  The UNDCP became the UNODC in 2002. See chapter 2, footnote 1.  
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of TADOC and Sadettin Tantan, Ankara and Istanbul, 2011 and 2012). 
Furthermore, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported the establishment 
of this training academy: 
“They thought that strategically the creation of TADOC in Turkey would help to increase 
the visibility of Turkey in the international arena, that it would increase Turkey’s 
influence in the region and globally, and that it would increase Turkey’s capacity to take 
initiatives in the international arena in the future” (First Director of TADOC, 2012). 
TADOC functioned as a joint project of the UNODC and the TNP between its 
opening in 2000 and 2005, but the financial support by the UNODC was 
gradually phased out. The academy has been funded entirely by the Turkish 
government since 2005. Initially, it was strongly supported by the DEA as well as 
the law enforcement forces of several European states. Through the UNODC, the 
DEA covered the costs of running the academy during its first two years, and the 
UK's SCIS (formerly SOCA) covered the expenses for the following two years 
(Ibid.). Course curricula were designed in collaboration with American, British, 
French and German experts. In the centre's early years, trainers from several 
European countries and the DEA were regularly invited: this practice continues 
today, but is much more infrequent (interviews with liaison officers, Ankara, 
2011). 
TADOC hosts four research centres on drugs and organised crime, but is first and 
foremost a training centre. Under the bilateral security agreements Turkey has 
signed with other countries, it delivers training to police forces of countries in the 
Middle East, Central Asia, Asia and Africa. In 2011 alone, participants from 30 
countries received such training (KOM, 2011: 61). In addition to its activities in 
Ankara, it has created mobile training teams and has concluded agreements with 
several organizations for the training of police forces outside Turkey. For 
example, under the umbrella of the NATO-Russia Council, TADOC is charged 
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with the anti-drug training of Afghan and Pakistani police, as well as those in 
some Central Asian States (usually in the countries concerned or in Russia). 
TADOC also has a team in Afghanistan, providing training for the Afghan police 
under an agreement with the UK's SOCA and a team training Central Asian 
police in Kazakhstan under an agreement with the DEA. Along with the OSCE, 
TADOC has also developed training modules for Kosovan police and delivered 
training for Balkans states (OSCE, 2012). 
Extending its reach away further than Turkey and the trafficking routes of Afghan 
originated opium, TADOC has also made an agreement with the 'Colombo Plan' – 
an organization of sixteen East and South East Asian countries (KOM, 2011). 
TADOC is involved in their latest project: a NATO and Japanese International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) led initiative to training Afghan police cadets at a 
vocational police school in Sivas. Five hundred cadets graduated in June 2011 and 
more were trained in 2012 (Sivas Police School, 2012). TADOC has therefore 
successfully established itself at international level and is capable of reaching 
audiences beyond Turkey’s immediate neighbours. 
The success of TADOC is highly regarded both in and beyond Turkey; and its 
diplomatic value is widely acknowledged. As its first Director noted: 
“TADOC is an important institution for Turkey to develop Turkey’s influence in the 
region. I know from my own experience that TADOC and its efforts were highly 
appreciated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They think that it increases Turkey’s 
influence in the region and in the world in the area of law enforcement. They are proud of 
TADOC and they praise it” (interview with the First Director of TADOC, 2012). 
The use of TADOC’s services is advantageous for the DEA and SOCA 
particularly because Turkey has cultural and linguistic connections with the 
countries of Central Asia, which is thought to help establish trust and 
understanding during the delivery of training. The SOCA representative in 
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Ankara admitted that they had an agreement with TADOC for the training of 
Afghan intelligence officers. He stated that “not only is the training good but also 
SOCA understands that the Turks have privileged cultural connections we do not 
have to influence others” (interview with SOCA liaison officer, Ankara, 2011). 
Turkish police training is therefore becoming increasingly widespread in Central 
Asia, and most of all in Afghanistan. A DEA official remarked that “Turkey now 
has the best trainers in Afghanistan” (interview with DEA officials, Ankara, 
2011). Interestingly, while the representatives of the DEA, SOCA and other 
foreign police forces seem to see the cultural connection as a strategic asset 
helping to ensure that the 'foreign intervention' of international training is well 
received, it seems that within Turkey this task was conceived of more as a 
responsibility. Some of the officials interviewed spoke of a regional and historical 
responsibility, connecting this to the Ottoman Empire; others spoke of an 
international humanitarian responsibility attached to Turkey’s role as a 
honourable member of the international community (interviews with senior 
Turkish police officers). 
The TNP's latest project is the development of a new International Police Training 
Centre forecasted to accommodate 3,000 students. This seems to epitomise 
Turkey’s strategic desire to become a world leader in law enforcement. The new 
centre is planned to be completed in 2014 at an estimated cost of 200 million 
Turkish Lira (approximately USD 110 million). The Turkish state has invested 
heavily because it foresees positive outcomes at more than one level: its own 
police and foreign police forces will be better trained, and Turkey’s status as a 
strong actor on security issues will be reinforced. The project’s description states 
in unequivocal terms that: 
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“The target is that Turkey will become a leader in the area of security first in its region 
and in the world and Ankara will be a national and international capital of security. The 
creation of the International Police Training Centre will enable Turkey to share the 
extensive knowledge and experience that it has had for long time with law enforcement 
agencies of other states and Turkey will have an important role in determining the 
international security policies. (…) The vision of international trainings of the TNP will 
be redefined. Thus, in compliance with Turkey’s foreign policy, the TNP will rise to 
leading position in the area of security training in its region and in the world. The 
International Police Training Centre will constitute an international platform where 
foreign police officers who are experts in their field will deliver trainings and share their 
knowledge therefore Turkey will play an important and active role in the creation of an 
international concept of police work”. (Turkish National Police, 2011). 
It is therefore clear that this project brings Turkey’s willingness to engage in 
international police cooperation to the fore. It also suggests that it has gained 
significant confidence in the excellent capacity of its law enforcement force, to 
the point of considering it as one of the elements defining its identity within the 
international community. 
Since 2005, Turkey has demonstrated that it has matched its official policy with 
practical steps to combat drug trafficking. KOM has been equipped with human 
and technical resources at a high level and its success is widely acknowledged in 
Turkey and beyond. Moreover, by financing the UNODC’s activities, attracting 
police trainees from a great variety of countries to TADOC and investing in the 
International Police Training Centre, Turkey is actively engaging in international 
capacity building. This is in stark contrast with how it behaved prior to 2005 and 
in particular prior to the Susurluk scandal in 1996. The following section proposes 
an explanation of this change of behaviour. 
8.3 Explaining Turkeys attitude with a socialization micro-process analysis 
This section consists of an analysis of Turkey’s drug enforcement approach using 
Johnston’s theory of micro-processes of socialization. Whereas in Chapters Six 
and Seven it was proposed to combine the analysis of external influences of the 
United States and the EU from rationalist perspectives, in this chapter the focus is 
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on the domestic, sub-level state only. It is argued that socialization micro-
processes can offer a sufficient explanation of Turkey’s behaviour.  
8.3.1 Evidence of a micro-process of persuasion  
A critical examination of the facts presented in the previous section indicates that 
since 2005 Turkish authorities appear to have become convinced that the norms 
of the international drug regime not only benefit Turkey but are consistent with 
the country's identity (Johnston, 2008: 22). This seems to resonate with Johnston's 
concept of 'persuasion', which he defines as having:  
“to do with cognition and the active assessment of the content of a particular message. As 
a microprocess of socialization, it involves changing minds, opinions, and attitudes about 
causality and affect (identity) in the absence of overtly material or mental coercion” 
(Johnston, 2008: 155). 
There are an abundance of studies referring to persuasion processes but, as 
Johnston and Checkel note, these are less clear on how persuasion occurs 
(Checkel, 2005: 7). Johnston suggests three channels through which an actor can 
be persuaded. Firstly:  
“s/he engages in a high-intensity process of cognition, reflection and argument” about the 
content of the information at stake. Secondly […] when the actor has a relationship to the 
persuadee, s/he looks for clues about the nature of this relationship to judge the 
legitimacy of the arguments presented, so that information from a persuadee that is 
“liked” is more convincing than that from one that is disliked. Thirdly, […] the 
persuasiveness of a message may be a function of characteristics of the persuadee 
himself” (Johnston, 2008: 156-157).  
These three channels of persuasion seem to have been at play in Turkey. While it 
is virtually impossible to precisely weigh their respective importance, it is argued 
here that the first channel – which Johnston calls the 'central route' – may have 
carried the least weight of the three. 
The first channel of persuasion, which utilizes cognition, reflection and argument 
is visible in Turkey’s official discourse on illicit drugs and trafficking because it 
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is highly consistent with the normative arguments of the international drug 
regime. In fact, the official position of Turkey on illicit drugs has been in line 
with the norms of the regime from the moment it joined the International Opium 
Convention in 1933 (Robins, 2008: 632; interview with Sumru Noyan, Ankara, 
2011). In practice, however, Turkey’s behaviour did not converge with this 
official position until the end of the 1990s (see Chapter Seven, above).  
What appears to have developed in recent years is a process of reflection, leading 
to a state where the general norms of the drug regime – such as the fact that illicit 
drugs in themselves are a threat to human, national and international security; and 
that they can only be curtailed through international cooperation, have become 
engrained. Several liaison officers in Ankara argued that Turkey has strong views 
regarding the harm caused by drugs and this was confirmed by interviews with 
Turkish officials. Comparing drug trafficking to crimes against humanity is 
common, for example. Such strong opinions indicate that a deep-rooted belief in 
the harmfulness of drugs for individuals supersedes concerns about the risks for 
states caused by organised criminal groups that are involved in trafficking. 
Furthermore, as the Director of TADOC notes, Turkey’s national drug policy is a 
by-product of its organised crime policy, and it seems that it only in recent years 
have illicit drugs been seen as a problem distinct from organised crime (interview 
with the Director of TADOC, Ankara, 2011). This is becoming a more pressing 
concern, with the fear that Turkey may become a country with high drug 
consumption levels increasing. To counter this fear, strong supply reduction 
methods are preferred, building on a belief that the prohibitionist approach's 
success in keeping the domestic consumption market small means it should be 
continued.  
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Thus, even if Turkey is currently strengthening the prevention and treatment 
aspect of its policies, demand reduction responses remain limited. Until the 
creation of TUBIM in 2002, there was little in the way of expertise on this issue 
(interview with the former Director of TUBIM, Ankara, 2011). In 2007, a 
National Strategy for Organised Crime was adopted separately from the national 
drug strategy, which has been developed according to the EU drug strategy. This 
reveals that there is an acceptance of two distinct problems: drugs are not simply 
a trade of organised crime. It also reveals a strong belief that continuing to fight 
trafficking will prevent Turkey's domestic drug market from growing. Therefore, 
perceptions about the harmfulness of drugs and the righteousness of limiting their 
availability are consistent with the central prohibitive norm of the global drug 
control system. 
The second channel of persuasion focuses on the relationship between an actor 
and a persuadee. It can be argued the fact that Turkey has been reinforcing its 
presence in international institutions (notably the UN) means that it has not been 
able to stray from the norms of the drug regime that the UN promotes. Turkey has 
been a member of the group of major donors to the UNODC since 2004, and was 
elected as a member of the Security Council for the years 2009 and 2010.13 In this 
context, it would be extremely difficult for Turkish representatives not to endorse 
the position of the international drug regime, which is supported by the UN. As a 
member of the major donor group, Turkey has undertaken the responsibility to 
uphold the norms and values of the regime, and these norms and values have 
gradually become taken for granted. Moreover, it is worth noting that, in recent 
                                                 
13  The UN Security Council is composed of five permanent members and ten non-
permanent members, which are elected for two years. See for further details: 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/.  
 241 
 
years, Turkish authorities have largely been represented by KOM staff at 
international drug and crime forums rather than diplomats. Arguably, the 
reasoning for this is that police officers are best placed to discuss matters of law 
enforcement, but it also means that police officers are put in direct contact with 
the institutions of the international regime rather than through the filter of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a result, they internalized the norms, values, rules 
and working methods of the regime. 
The third channel, whereby persuasion is a function of the characteristics of the 
persuadee themselves, also appears to have played an instrumental role in this 
case, with KOM most frequently embodying the role of persuadee. In Chapter 
Seven, it was noted that from 2000 onwards a renewal of management and 
personnel in KOM was decisive in the adoption of a new working culture, 
characterised by a greater willingness to reach out to international partners and a 
greater ease in working in this manner. This was viewed positively by senior 
management and so officers pursued it because it would be advantageous for their 
own careers. Drug control is also incentivised by a system of bonuses paid to 
officers involved in drug seizures, contributing to the commitment of officers to 
that task (interviews with senior police officers, Ankara, 2011, 2012). In 2004, 
these bonuses were doubled and seizures of synthetic drugs also qualified for 
bonus payments, which had initially been restricted to heroin seizures (Güneç, 
2003). Once again, it is highly likely that this incentive generated a virtuous cycle 
whereby the apparent effectiveness in the policy of increasing drug seizures 
reinforced the beliefs in its effectiveness. Thus, it seems that a process of self-
persuasion and self-interest was set in motion. As a result of apparent success in 
practice (in the form of high seizure rates and in the form of recognition by 
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international partners), the process of self-persuasion turned into what Johnston 
calls a “most durable and self-reinforcing pro-social behavior” (Johnston, 2008: 
26). 
A combination of these three micro-processes of socialization appears, then, to 
have contributed to the internalization of the international drug regime's norms 
and values. These are now considered “normal, given, and normatively correct” 
(Johnston, 2008: xxv), and there is a sense that upholding them is an important 
responsibility. 
8.3.2 The re-definition of Turkeys role in the drug regime  
Turkey has traditionally been perceived as a country of transit for drugs. Its 
geographical location accounts for the persistence of that notion, yet the country’s 
licit poppy production and its domestic drug use are mentioned far less frequently. 
A major aim of Turkish authorities for the past decade or so has been to modify 
Turkey’s reputation from being seen as a country with porous borders where drug 
trafficking was widespread, easy and uncontrollable – to a country that has had 
success in disrupting this traffic, such that traffickers have been forced to divert to 
other routes. This reputation seems to be the key to understanding why Turkey 
appears increasingly committed to the norms of the international drug regime.  
Joshi’s analysis of honour in international relations is useful to understand how 
such reputational concerns can matter greatly (Joshi, 2008). Honour, he explains, 
is composed of both negative and positive elements. The negative aspect is more 
easily identifiable, and can be defined as an aversion to humiliation, or being 
regarded as unreliable and inconsistent. Positive honour, however, is pursued in 
three ways: the maintenance of a stable image; the pursuance of eminence and 
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prestige; and the pursuance of a “specialized and recognised role” (Joshi, 2008: 
10). Chapter Seven has already shown that the Turkish authorities worked hard to 
shake off Turkey’s poor reputation as a country with porous borders and 
untrustworthy law enforcement; whilst it was noted earlier in this chapter that this 
initial bad reputation has been overcome and that foreign law enforcement forces 
have radically changed their view about the integrity of the TNP. Nevertheless, by 
investing so heavily in developing training for foreign police forces, Turkey also 
shifts towards the pursuit of a “specialized and recognised role”. More 
importantly, it does so by capitalising on its newly acquired good reputation; and 
its success in disrupting drug trafficking and seizing drugs. This suggests that 
there is a discourse developing, according to which Turkey deserves to be 
accepted as the provider of international law enforcement training because it is 
successful on the home front.  
When presented with the opportunity to host the UN-sponsored international 
academy (which ultimately became TADOC) and to be a provider of international 
police training, Turkey keenly accepted the offer because the decision-makers 
quickly understood that it would reinforce the police’s and the country’s 
credibility (interview with: Director of TADOC, Ankara, 2011; First Director of 
TADOC, 2012). Thus, the fact that this training centre has been success plays a 
key role in the way in which Turkish authorities have constructed the country’s 
role and responsibility internationally. The idea that Turkey is a country 
committed to drug trafficking is integral to the image it wants to promote. Thus, 
whilst it may suffer from an illicit trade because of its location between producing 
and consumption countries, it is keen to highlight that it has the capacity to 
disrupt illicit drug trafficking and that it takes this responsibility seriously. 
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It could be argued that by presenting itself as tough on drug trafficking, Turkey is 
merely following the rules of the international drug regime. Was this the case, 
Turkey’s behaviour would simply be the result of a thorough internalization of the 
regime's norms. However, this seems to be too simple an explanation of the 
position Turkish authorities are establishing for themselves within the 
international drug regime. Indeed, the basis for international cooperation in the 
fight drug trafficking is the principle of collective responsibility: one that is held 
in common and shared between states. This appeared in 1984, in the UN 
Declaration on the Control of Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse, and again in the 
1998 Political Declaration adopted at the UN General Assembly special session 
(UNODC, 2007: 206). It refers to the “moral obligation that countries with high 
levels of drug consumption (consumer countries) should assist countries with high 
levels of drug production (the traditional supplier or producer countries)” 
(Kamminga, 2011). Strictly speaking, this principle means that states have a 
responsibility to combat illicit drugs either as consumer country or as producer 
country – but although it is routinely mentioned in international agreements and 
declarations since its emergence thirty years ago, exactly what it entails remains 
unclear. At the 2012 session of the CND, it was mentioned that: 
“an operational definition of the principle of common and shared responsibility was 
lacking, as was a definition of the extent of each country’s responsibilities and 
commitments in the fight against illicit drugs, and more work was needed in order to 
clarify the concept of common and shared responsibility” (Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs, 2012: 38).  
As Turkish authorities tend to frame Turkey’s dealing with drugs around 
trafficking and fail to mention the ongoing licit poppy production or domestic 
drug use, they are effectively interpreting the principle in a particular manner in 
order to establish their responsibility as a transit country. This has implications, 
because there is room for interpretation regarding what the moral obligations and 
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responsibilities of drug transit countries are. Even more importantly, it reveals 
how Turkish authorities are not just emphasising Turkey’s compliance with the 
prescriptions of the regime, but the distinct (and possibly unique) manner in 
which compliance is achieved. In this sense, they have cast themselves in a 
special role within the international drug regime: a state that is successful in 
disrupting drug trafficking so that it has a responsibility to help others in this task. 
8.3.3 Explaining Turkeys behaviour through a logic of gaining attention and 
recognition 
Johnston's concept of persuasion and the fact that Turkey has internalised the 
norms and values of the international drug regime seem insufficient to explain 
why Turkey has invested so much in international law enforcement training. 
Blatter's theory of performance as a causal mechanism of social interaction is 
useful here, and seems to provide a more complete understanding of Turkey’s 
behaviour as it is articulated around the idea of actors as 'role-makers' rather than 
'role-takers' (Blatter, 2009), which corresponds better to the process described 
above. Blatter’s theory of performance, which he sees as an alternative to 
mainstream regime theory, is conceptualised as follows: 
“Social actors are seen not so much as norm conforming role-takers whose social 
orientation depends on the internalization of established community values. Instead, they 
are conceptualized as creative role-makers, who strive for an attractive image connecting 
her/him to current cultural and communicative trends in the social environment. Since 
meanings and identities are not stable structures (but instead have to be permanently 
reproduced and re-presented), rituals, symbolic actions and projects, staging, branding 
and other theatrical performances are increasingly important to make meanings and 
identities visible. A performance is an “event,” an activity through which presence is 
created. Social interaction as performance does not follow the logic of appropriateness, 
but the logic of gaining attention” (Blatter, 2009: 101). 
What this theoretical framework helps to explain is the importance of the 
symbolic motivations behind policy decisions. Thus, Turkey's recent turn towards 
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leadership in international law enforcement training can be seen to be motivated 
by symbolic concerns as much as by a desire to maintain the good reputation it 
has established. With TADOC taking charge of training an increasing number of 
foreign law enforcement organizations, and with the planned development of an 
International Police Training Centre in Ankara, Turkey positions itself as a 
country with valuable expertise and experience to share. Through this, it seeks to 
influence 'beneficiary' countries. Thus, Turkey's real motivation is not to increase 
the efficiency of the international drug control regime, but is to gain influence on 
security matters.  
Turkey, then, is seeking to gain recognition internationally as a state with 
significant political power. The aim is to establish a long term relationship with, 
and credibility within, other states – and whilst this begins in the field of law 
enforcement, Turkey has aspirations to extend this influence to other areas. For 
example, Minister of Interior Güler has argued that the work of Turkish police 
liaison officers abroad grew into an “efficient instrument of Turkish foreign 
policy” (Turkish National Police, 2013).  
To conclude this section, it appears that for the period under review, utilizing the 
concept of micro-processes of socialization can provide an adequate analysis of 
Turkey's increasing role in the international drug control regime. Moving away 
from the rationalist tradition of enquiry has highlighted that Turkey’s behaviour is 
driven to a great extent by reputational concerns. Thus, the reasons for Turkey’s 
push to become a leading country in training and learning on policing and security 
are likely to extend well beyond this specific issue-area, as Bozkurt argues:  
“the Turkish army and police presence in other countries as part of multilateral or 
bilateral commitments (…) helps shore up Turkish diplomatic clout in a number of 
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regions, setting the stage for a windfall profit in terms of political capital that later may 
be cashed in for economic benefits” (Bozkurt, 2012). 
8.4 ConclusionBy focusing on the post-2005 period, this Chapter has explained 
how and why Turkey has become a strong supporter of the international drug 
regime. It suggests that Turkey has carved a role for itself within that regime and 
intends to nurture and develop this role. It is also argued that the motivations 
behind this move have been a concern for its reputation and – in recent years –  a 
belief that it can capitalise on its acquired good reputation in this issue-area to 
influence other states on a broader spectrum of security matters. In other words, 
Turkey has found self-interested reasons to support this regime. To some extent, 
the analysis made in this chapter resonates with theories developed by Deflem 
and Walker (discussed in Chapter Four), in which it is argued that law 
enforcement agencies are more likely to cooperate internationally when they have 
access to adequate, modern police technologies; and when they had developed a 
vested interest in expanding and consolidating their own structure (Deflem, 
2002a, 2002b and 2010; Walker, 2000 and 2008). These two elements can be 
observed in the Turkish case.   
The findings in this chapter are likely to be relevant beyond this case study in the 
context of the study of international regimes in general. Indeed, the scenario 
uncovered corresponds to one that Young and Levy envisaged as one of the 
behavioural pathways indicative of regime effectiveness (Young, 1999: 1-32), – 
as analysed in Chapter Five. In their study of environmental regimes, they posited 
that regimes could “operate at the constitutive level, shaping identities (and 
therefore the interests) of actors and, in the process influencing the way actors 
behave as occupants of the roles to which they are assigned” (Young, 1999: 25). 
Undoubtedly, the international drug regime seems to be one in which states are 
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almost automatically allocated a role: each country is designated as a place of 
production, transit or consumption – despite the fact that no country falls neatly 
into just one category. To a considerable degree, these three roles condition the 
behaviour that is expected of each state in its approach to the drug problem.  
This chapter has also demonstrated that Turkey has been able to re-define its 
position and role within the regime, since it seems to have largely overcome being 
defined by its traditional role as a supplier of licit opiates. Thus, the model 
proposed by Young and Levy seems validated in this case in the sense that the 
international drug regime has been effective: it has influenced the behaviour of 
Turkey by providing it with a space in which it has established a special role 
within the international community.   
This chapter completed the case study analysis of this thesis. Whilst Chapters Six 
and Seven were aimed primarily at dispelling notions that modelling change in 
Turkey as a response to Americanization or Europeanization is sufficient, this 
chapter sought to present an alternative model focusing on domestic drivers for 
change. In doing so, it left rationalism aside and assumed a constructivist 
approach, combining the socialization micro-processes models of Johnston, Joshi 
and Blatter to build a valid explanation for this case study. 
The general conclusion to the thesis that follows offers some final thoughts on the 
outcomes of this case and the way in which it fits within the literature on the 
internationalization of policing; IR scholarship regarding international norms 
diffusion; and the value of regime theory and the possibilities it offers to combine 
several research paradigms simultaneously. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
This thesis makes three main contributions to knowledge. Firstly, it tells the story 
of how Turkey’s law enforcement internationalized as a result of a change of 
approach to drug control in the years from its ratification of the UN Single 
Convention in the late 1960s to 2012. Secondly, it draws on this analysis to reflect 
on the mechanisms of international norm diffusion. In so doing it questions IR 
scholarship that has – at times – become overly reliant on research designs 
assessing the influence of the United States and the EU on phenomena and 
processes of interest beyond these territories. Thirdly, it explores the richness of 
regime theory in order to analyse states’ behavioural changes in given issue-areas. 
This conclusion brings together the various elements highlighted for each of these 
three levels. 
9.1 Main contributions to knowledge 
This thesis is first and foremost aimed at explaining the internationalization of 
Turkish law enforcement. It identified international drug control as a key case 
study, as this has served as the catalyst for the process of law enforcement 
internationalization. Chapter Three demonstrated that law enforcement has 
become the cornerstone of the international drug control regime. State parties to 
the three UN drug conventions have committed themselves to working together in 
order to suppress the trafficking of illicit drugs, and their law enforcement 
agencies have the responsibility to operationalize these commitments. In other 
words, states, as members of the international drug control regime, are required to 
engage their law enforcement agencies in international cooperation in order to 
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fulfil their obligations under the UN drug conventions. Chapter Four explained 
how international cooperation has gradually become integral to global policing. It 
noted that as the Cold War ended, and as technological advances made 
communication easier, states re-evaluated their security priorities. They found that 
organised crime groups and drug traffickers, whose activities disregarded national 
borders, represented threats to national security. To counter these borderless 
threats, law enforcement agencies found ways to overcome the limitations of their 
jurisdictional confines by integrating international cooperation into their working 
methods. DEA agents operating outside the United States were once the 
exception, but the presence of police liaison officers abroad and investigations 
involving law enforcement agencies from more than one country have now 
become the norm. 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight documented how Turkey progressed through these 
changes. Chapter Six showed that Turkish authorities put an end to the leakage of 
opium grown in the country into the illicit drug market. Two factors were 
highlighted as indicative of Turkey's desire to remain a privileged and trusted ally 
of the United States: its receptivity to the opium ban, and, once the ban was lifted, 
the emergence of a close working relationship between the DEA and the TNP. But 
as opium from Afghanistan began to flow across its borders towards European 
markets, and as Turkish and Kurdish organised crime groups emerged in Turkey 
and Western Europe, Turkish authorities did not make it their priority to fight 
against the ongoing traffic. In international diplomatic forums Turkey pledged 
that it was committed to drug control, but in practice collusion between its 
security agencies and Turkish organised crime group undermined these claims. 
From 1984 onwards, Turkey engaged in a military struggle against the PKK, and 
 251 
 
terrorism trumped drug trafficking in the accusations brought against the 
organization. Turkey’s behaviour reveals a wide gap between its policy and its 
practice on drug control: despite wanting to appear committed to fighting 
trafficking, its drugs enforcement efforts were ineffective, to the point that the 
TNP’s relationships with its European counterparts were plagued by its poor 
reputation and a lack of trust. Chapter Seven showed that changes came about 
after 1996. This year was a watershed because the Turkish state re-evaluated both 
policy and practice on the issue of drugs. The National Security Council listed 
drug trafficking as a threat to national security, thereby joining the global trend in 
that direction (as identified in Chapter Three). At the practical level, the 1996 
Susurluk scandal and the subsequent revelations of state collusion with organised 
crime rocked the Turkish political class the public opinion. It was the first in a 
series of major scandals that precipitated reforms, in particular within the TNP. 
This coincided with the beginning of reforms initiated in preparation for EU 
membership, which provided a number of opportunities for Turkish law 
enforcement authorities to work closely with European police agencies, in 
particular on matters related to drug trafficking. The TNP, and in particular KOM 
officers, started to use the issue of drugs to initiate collaborative activities, for 
example through twinning projects and working visits. They did so in order to 
acquire new skills and expertise as much as to restore the reputation of their 
organization with their counterparts. They also did so to raise their personal 
profiles within the police, hoping that acting as the initiators of successful 
international activities would facilitate career advancement. Progressively, their 
growing successes helped establish a new working culture within KOM, one of 
 252 
 
reaching out to foreign counterparts and initiating further cooperation whenever 
possible. 
Finally Chapter Eight argued that since 2005 the TNP has sought to capitalise on 
its newly-acquired good reputation in order to promote itself as a transmitter of 
expertise in the fight drug trafficking and organised crime. TADOC has developed 
into a successful international training centre, whilst the recent project to build an 
international police academy reveals Turkey’s ambition to be recognised as a state 
where law enforcement is of the highest international standards. A steady stream 
of training requests from countries in Central Asia, South East Asia and Africa 
guarantees that Turkish expertise will continue to spread for some time. Turkey 
seems not only to have embraced the norms and values of the international drug 
control regime by making the fight trafficking a law enforcement priority for 
itself, but also to have elevated its international capacity-building efforts on the 
issue to one of its defining features. This is aimed at further elevating its prestige 
in the hope that it will spill-over to other security issues. 
At the second level, this analysis contributes to debates about methods of enquiry 
in IR scholarship. Establishing how change occurred over a period of 40 years has 
helped to make sense of Turkish law enforcement's embrace of international 
cooperation step by step. In order to piece together the multitude of elements that 
constitute the final puzzle (Alvesson and Karreman, 2011), it has proved 
necessary to challenge traditional explanatory frameworks whereby behavioural 
changes in states other than the United States or the EU are explained by 
elaborating on the relationship between that state and the United States or the EU. 
At this stage it should be noted that the necessity of undertaking this exercise 
revealed itself as a consequence of the interviews undertaken for this thesis, as 
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their preliminary findings did not match the researcher’s pre-understanding and 
expectations. Testing the level of influence by the United States and the EU on 
Turkey’s drug control policy is in line with mainstream international norm 
diffusion scholarship. According to Heilmann and Schulte-Kulkman, “domestic 
policy decisions are systematically examined for their links with prior policy 
choices made in other countries, international organizations, or multilateral 
agreements” (Heilmann and Schulte-Kulkman, 2011: 639). Indeed, the analysis in 
Chapter Six showed that military cooperation between the United States and 
Turkey during the Cold War played a crucial role in the way events unfolded both 
during and after the opium crisis when Turkey resumed poppy production. US 
financial and technical assistance since the 1970s has undoubtedly contributed to 
the development of the TNP. Similarly, Chapter Seven showed that EU pre-
accession partnership funds have been used to finance twinning projects and joint 
activities between the Turkish authorities and their counterparts in the EU. 
Nevertheless, this thesis has argued that the injection of funds and the 
introduction of policies from abroad are not sufficient to make a valid statement 
on causal mechanisms and outcomes (Heilmann and Schultke-Kolkman, 2011: 
635-636, Johnston, 2008). Moreover, it argues that limiting the possibilities of 
causal mechanisms of change to US or EU influence on Turkey’s drug control 
policies are inadequate explanations that reflect “social pressures and convention-
guided constraints” within IR scholarship. Alvesson and Karreman argue that: 
“A researcher’s work can often be seen as an effect of the various social forces at play 
and the pressure to show coherent and convincing results. A persuasive study mobilizes 
and prioritizes empirical material that clearly supports one case”  (Alvesson and 
Karreman, 2011: 10).  
Western-centric and Eurocentric biases in IR research have been highlighted by 
many (Bilgin, 2011: 403). This thesis has attempted to deconstruct these biases 
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and present an alternative explanatory framework. Thus, it is hoped that this thesis 
will critically inform debates about the transformative impact of the EU on 
Turkey, which has become a well-established area of research since the 1999 
decision to accept Turkey as an EU candidate (Bolukbaúi et al.., 2010). While 
some have begun to question the analytical limits of Europeanization as a 
conceptual and analytical tool, this thesis develops this line of thought to question 
whether research into Turkey’s Europeanization might have developed because of 
academic fashion rather than evidence (Blavoukos and Oikonomou, 2012). 
Finally, the third aspect to this thesis is theoretical. While this case study alone 
cannot attempt to lead to theory generation (indeed, this was not the intention of 
this project), it can contribute to debates about the mechanisms of regime 
effectiveness. Theory-oriented process tracing as a method of enquiry was used in 
this thesis in order to highlight what can be best explained by the different 
theoretical frameworks available within regime theory, and to propose alternative 
explanatory models to overcome weaknesses when they were brought to light. 
This thesis does not deploy the rivalry between theoretical frameworks in order to 
test which is the most robust. However, some conclusions can be drawn about the 
advantages presented by the socialization micro-process approach. It is argued 
that throughout the period analysed, Turkey’s behaviour on drug control has been 
characterized by micro-processes of mimicking, social influence, persuasion, and 
performance. Coming to this conclusion was made possible not by looking at 
Turkey as a unified actor, but by refining the analysis to the level of individuals 
who occupied positions that enabled them to make key decisions affecting policy 
and practice. As it has been necessary to bring the analysis to such a fine level of 
detail, it becomes clear that a rationalist perspective, which takes the state as unit 
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of analysis in international relations, could not have provided a satisfactory 
explanation for Turkey’s behaviour change. In this sense, it would seem this 
thesis' analysis has revealed weaknesses in neorealist and neoliberal theoretical 
frameworks, and that in general the analysis of regime effectiveness is one that 
needs to be conducted from a constructivist perspective if one hopes to yield a 
convincing theoretical explanation.  
It should be noted, however, that conducting such fine analyses is not always 
possible. To be able to analyse the roles played by individuals in policymaking it 
is important to bear in mind personal tactical adaptations made with career 
progression in mind, including the ways that individuals seek to raise the 
international prestige of their institutions in order to benefit their careers. This is 
only possible when a researcher can conduct a large enough number of interviews 
with interviewees of different backgrounds and who have knowledge about the 
same events or sequence of events. This in turn reveals that the choice of 
theoretical framework can also depend on the method of enquiry and the 
availability of data. While there is a general trend towards increasing transparency 
in government policymaking processes, meaning data is increasingly made 
available, different issues and areas will be subject to varying levels of openness 
and accessibility, which may limit the comparability of results. This is also why 
this thesis mainly seeks to explain one specific process and recognizes the limits 
of its contribution to theory generation. 
 
9.2 Areas for further study 
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This thesis has touched on some issues that fall beyond the scope of this research 
but would deserve further study. Firstly, because the object of study was the 
internationalization of Turkish law enforcement, this thesis focused on the law 
enforcement aspect of drug policy. Though the issue of drug use is evoked in 
Chapter Two and Chapter Seven, it is not analysed in detail. With the notable 
exception of Robins, there is a dearth of political science research into Turkey’s 
policies on drug demand and drug users. For him: 
“Turkey has been more effective at using the drugs issue to create ties with international 
organizations, raising significant funds from a plethora of foreign agencies, and 
generating prestige abroad. It has been less successful in developing sound and effective 
systems against different aspects of illegal drugs at home. Whether greater success in this 
latter challenge is to be achieved will very much depend on the future administrative 
record of the responsible specialist agencies (Robins, 2009: 302). 
On 11 July 2012, the Turkish Grand National Assembly ratified the cooperation 
agreement between Turkey and the EMCDDA, which had been pending for 
several years. It remains to be seen whether this ratification, which will allow 
Turkey to be fully integrated in the activities of EMCDDA will contribute to 
strengthening Turkey’s emerging drug demand policies. TUBIM’s 2012 report to 
EMCDDA includes a discussion on the future of Turkey’s policies: 
“it is possible to say that a transition from a prohibitive regime to a medical intervention 
regime is currently [taking] place in Turkey. The judiciary system’s decisions that have 
paved the way for probation and treatment for addicts, in other words (…) that addicts 
should be in treatment centers and not in prisons, as well as the recognition of addiction 
as a disease and an important public health issue in the National Drug Strategy Document 
(2006-2012), are among the indications of this transition. Naturally, this transition 
process engenders the necessity to immediately reinforce Turkey’s existing treatment and 
rehabilitation capacity” (TUBIM, 2012: 30). 
The process of change in Turkey’s drug demand policies is thus an area that could 
be studied further.  
The second area that would be well served by further study is the claim made in 
Chapter Eight that Turkey is trying to become a regional, if not international, 
leader on law enforcement matters. Three aspects of this new development will 
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deserve particular attention. The first pertains to Turkey’s commitments with the 
Afghan National Police, in conjunction with Turkey’s role in the NATO presence 
in Afghanistan. While it seems that Turkey has been praised by other NATO 
partners, and in particular the United States, for its engagement in Afghanistan, 
the conditions of, and reasons for, Turkey’s willingness to be part of Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction are not well understood. Goldsmith and Sheptycki suggest that 
states which engage in training other police forces across regions are driven by “a 
choice between or combination of missionary idealism, humanitarian assistance 
and national self-interest” (Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2007: 10). Thus, further 
study of Turkey’s involvement in Afghanistan is needed in order to verify the 
extent to which this statement applies. The second aspect pertains to Turkey’s 
increasing interest in Africa. Aynte gives the following explanation regarding 
Turkey’s growing interest in Somalia: 
“Moral authority that defines Ankara’s Islamic values; business opportunity that makes 
Turkey a raising global economic competitor and geo-strategic vision that is part of 
Ankara’s global roundabout ambition – a roundabout of different ideas, cultural, 
business, people and innovation” (Aynte, 2012, italics in the original text).  
Whether Aynte’s assessment is valid in general for Turkey’s growing interest in 
Africa remains to be evaluated. 
Thirdly, the fact that Turkey seems to be trying to raise its international profile by 
investing in policing should be reflected with reference to the fluctuation of 
understandings of 'national security' and 'international security'. In Turkey, the 
concept of 'national security' is undergoing redefinition (Bilgin and Cizre, 2011). 
This has largely been studied, however, with regard to the declining power the 
army holds over civilian institutions, with policing largely ignored. Yet it remains 
unclear whether military matters will retain priority over law enforcement matters 
in states’ definitions of national and international security. Goldsmith and 
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Sheptycki argue that after the Cold War, Western states have come to understand 
the police character of new national security threats (Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 
2007: 10), but the extent to which policing is increasingly linked to international 
security is unclear. It remains to be seen whether having effective police forces in 
places that often never had them will become a more important aspect of 
international security. 
Finally, this study into the internationalization of Turkish policing has 
demonstrated that it is underpinned by a number of coincidental and sequential 
factors that do not lend themselves to a single theoretical explanation. The 
hypothesis of the Americanization of Turkey’s law enforcement helps to 
understand the period from the opium ban until the mid-1990s, whilst the 
hypothesis of its Europeanization helps to explain the period since, but the limits 
of their explanatory powers are easily observable. This internationalization 
process cannot be fully understood unless account is taken of domestic, sub-state 
issues, including the changing nature of organised crime and collusion with state 
institutions in Turkey, the behaviour of individuals within the TNP, and the 
discourse surrounding the shaping of Turkey’s reputation and its international 
identity. 
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